# Emerging Tech Innovation Negative

## Notes

### Explanation

#### This is a case negative against the Emerging Tech Innovation aff. It includes four new counterplan options and case answers. Notes about the affirmative are included at the top of the aff file.

### User’s Guide

#### The negative has the following off-case options against the Emerging Tech Innovation case:

#### NATO Cohesion DA

#### DOD AM&E Tradeoff DA

#### AI Bad DA (from the AI case negative)

#### Bilateral CP

#### State Department CP

#### Germany and Italy CP (with internal net-benefit)

#### Quad CP (with internal net-benefit)

#### Trilateral Israel-India-U.S. CP (with internal net-benefit)

#### Unilateral/Domestic CP

#### Security K

#### Be careful when designing case frontlines. If you are reading one or more of the DAs, you should not read impact defense that would take out your DA impact(s). To prevent mistakes, the case frontlines in this file have intentionally omitted typical impact defense cards. During the season, the negative should attempt to construct negative strategies with more “external” impacts so they can fully challenge the 1AC’s impacts. For now, that wasn’t realistic.

## Germany and Italy CP

### 1NC — Germany and Italy CP

#### Next off is the Germany and Italy Counterplan.

#### The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Italy should substantially increase their defense spending and joint defense investment, including investment in defense innovation hubs and research and development in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and cybersecurity, and should invite the French Republic to join these initiatives.

#### The counterplan solves emerging tech innovation and European strategic autonomy.

Antinozzi and Varvelli 22 — Isabella Antinozzi, Research Associate at the European Council on Foreign Relations, holds an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King's College London (UK), and Arturo Varvelli, Senior Policy Fellow and Head of the Rome Office at the European Council on Foreign Relations, former Co-Head of the MENA Center and Head of the Terrorism Programme at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (Italy), former Lecturer in History and Institutions of the Middle East at IULM University (Italy), holds a Ph.D. in International History from the University of Milan (Italy), 2022 (“Armed for innovation: How to drive German-Italian defence industrial cooperation,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 4th, Available Online at https://ecfr.eu/article/armed-for-innovation-how-to-drive-german-italian-defence-industrial-cooperation/, Accessed 07-13-2022)

European defence is a team game. Following Germany’s decision on 27 February to massively increase its military budget in response to Russia’s all-out war on Ukraine, other European countries need to catch up – by adapting their own defence planning and spending accordingly. Italy was one of several EU member states that, soon after Berlin announced this huge shift in policy, called for a hike in defence spending to 2 per cent of GDP in line with its commitments as a NATO member. Yet, despite the initial fanfare over the move, the Italian government is now vacillating. The leader of the Five Star Movement, Giuseppe Conte, recently expressed reservations about the increase in military spending, explaining that “the priority must be to protect families and businesses from the crisis”.

Conte’s statement is questionable not only because he participated in NATO summits at which Italy committed to more military spending but also because it suggests that increases in the defence budget and support for people’s livelihoods are mutually exclusive. As research by the RAND Corporation shows, the defence industry has a value that goes beyond the protection of a country and its population from adversaries – it also creates economic opportunities. Therefore, Italy should follow in Germany’s footsteps by increasing defence spending and developing a closer alliance with Berlin on military matters. Indeed, joint defence investment could substantially contribute to industrial development and integration in Europe.

Defence industrial cooperation between Italy and Germany has two promising fronts, both of them in the air domain. The first is fighter jets. During his dramatic announcement of Germany’s new strategy, Chancellor Olaf Scholz indicated that his government would likely acquire the F-35 Lightning II instead of the F/A-18 Super Hornet as previously planned. From an Italian perspective, this is good news for two reasons. Firstly, it means more work for the FACO industrial plant in Cameri, where Lockheed Martin assembles F-35s. Secondly, and most importantly for Italy, Germany now seems more open to procuring the designated successor to the F-35, the Tempest. British firm BAE Systems and Italian company Leonardo lead the Tempest project, while France, Germany, and Spain are cooperating on the comparable Future Combat Air System programme. Germany’s new approach could encourage Paris to support a merger between the two initiatives – a move that Italy and Germany have long advocated.

Political support for defence industrial cooperation

European defence companies are already exploring potential opportunities for such cooperation. In a recent interview with Italian newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger indicated his firm’s willingness to expand its industrial networks in Italy by increasing investments and strengthening cooperation with Oto Melara, a subsidiary of Leonardo. Papperger explained that, “to underline the long-term nature of our commitment, we are also prepared to make a financial commitment by acquiring shares in Oto Melara.” In this way, the firm could become a springboard for a new role for the German defence industry in Italy.

Rheinmetall wants to be involved in the modernisation of the Italian Army, including through the supply of new armoured fighting vehicles such as its Lynx models. The company would like to be the medium through which Italy participates in the Main Ground Combat System programme – which is designed to develop a European-made, next-generation heavy tank. Accordingly, there is considerable potential for Germany and Italy to begin a new era of defence industry collaboration – one characterised by what Italian ambassador to Berlin Armando Varricchio calls a “much more integrated dimension”.

However, such a defence marriage can only take place with the blessing of the government in Rome. The government controls both Leonardo and Fincantieri. And it will have a say in the planned sale of Oto Melara and Wass, another Leonardo subsidiary. German defence companies are keenly aware of the need for Rome’s backing. “I am open to creating a partnership in Italy”, Papperger remarked in the interview with Il Sole 24 Ore, “but, of course, we need the agreement of the government, to which we have explained our position”.

Italian leaders should recognise the political benefits of closer security and defence cooperation with Germany. In recent years, Italy and Germany have been at odds in areas ranging from migration to structural economic reform. Although Mario Draghi’s election as Italian prime minister has eased the tension between the sides, he and Scholz disagree on key policy issues such as the reform of EU debt rules. Determined to overcome these differences, Italy and Germany have pledged to sign an action plan for cooperation by mid-2022. By including defence industrial cooperation in this pact, they could match France’s leadership in the area and sustainably promote European strategic autonomy – an issue that is important to policymakers in Rome and Berlin.

A bilateral foundation for pan-European cooperation

German-Italian cooperation of this kind will need to be outward-looking if it is to avoid being perceived as a threat to other European defence industries, particularly that of France. Historically sceptical of German rearmament, France could regard such cooperation as a challenge to its leadership of EU defence policy. Germany and Italy should be open to expanding their joint defence industrial projects to include France. To this end, their efforts in the area should aim to promote complementarity between European defence industries, value chains, and technologies.

As such, initially bilateral cooperation could drive broader European security and defence integration. Indeed, any ambitious defence initiative within the European Union will require the support of multiple member states. Undertakings such as the European Intervention Initiative and Permanent Structured Cooperation are valuable formats in which Italy and Germany can engage with other European countries on operational and industrial issues. As part of the effort, they should try to spur the development of European defence consortia – which would create a promising avenue through which to strengthen European strategic autonomy. While much technological innovation has traditionally started in the military realm before entering the civilian sector, it is now increasingly common for such innovation to begin with private and non-state actors before reaching the military domain. This trend calls for closer, more sustained cooperation between the civilian and military sectors across Europe, covering both government-owned and private companies. This is one of the key ways in which European governments can address the challenges of decreased state control of emerging technologies.

By backing pan-European defence industrial cooperation, the EU can boost both economic innovation and its credibility as a geopolitical actor. There is no strategic autonomy without a strong defence industry. And cooperation between Italy and Germany can breathe new life into long-running attempts to integrate European defence industries. Italian leaders are right to consider how defence spending affects society as a whole, but they should not forget its benefits beyond the security realm. They have much to gain from becoming credible leaders in this increasingly important policy area.

#### European strategic autonomy is crucial to de-escalate African and Middle East wars.

Borrell 20 — Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Government of Spain, former President of the European Parliament, holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the Complutense University of Madrid (Spain), 2020 (“Why European strategic autonomy matters,” European External Action Service—the diplomatic service and combined foreign and defence ministry of the European Union, December 3rd, Available Online at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters\_en, Accessed 07-13-2022)

Why is strategic autonomy salient more than ever?

Because the world has changed. It is difficult to claim to be a “political union” able to act as a “global player” and as a “geopolitical Commission” without being “autonomous”. What are then the factors that make this concept more relevant than ever?

The first is that the weight of Europe in the world is shrinking. Thirty years ago, we represented a quarter of the world's wealth. It is foreseen that in 20 years, we will not represent more than 11% of world GNP, far behind China, which will represent double it, below 14% for the United States and at par with India.

The next two decades are going to be crucial because China will use them to become the first global power, before becoming itself confronted with new demographic constraints, which will slow its rise. The relay could then probably be taken over by India.

The conclusion is straightforward. If we do not act together now, we will become irrelevant as many have argued cogently. Strategic autonomy is, in this perspective, a process of political survival. In such a context, our traditional alliances remain essential. However, they will not be enough. Since power gaps are shrinking, the world will become more transactional and all powers, including Europe, will tend to be more transactional too. This is an unescapable truth.

The second factor has to do with the transformation of economic interdependence in which we, as Europeans, have invested a great deal, particularly through the defence of multilateralism. Today we are in a situation where economic interdependence is becoming politically very conflictual. And what was traditionally called soft power is becoming an instrument of hard power.

The Covid-19 crisis has revealed the fundamentally asymmetrical nature of interdependence, and the vulnerability of Europe. Science, technology, trade, data, investments are becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics.

This is a very important change, which should lead us to strengthen all the instruments beyond security and defence, in particular those competences and instruments of the Commission that we have at our disposal, to defend our interests.

Another important reason is the shift in the world's focus towards Asia, particularly in US policy. This trend did not start with the Trump administration. The Obama administration initially decided to withdraw the last US tank in 2013. However, following the crisis in Ukraine it decided to bring back, on a rotational basis, an armoured brigade. Still, the wider point stands, as also the German defence minister said recently: “Only if we take our own security seriously, will America do the same.” I cannot agree more.

Additionally, Europe is today confronted on its periphery with a certain number of conflicts or tensions in the Sahel, in Libya and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In these three cases Europe must act even more, and alone, because these problems do not primarily concern the United States.

As one Polish scholar wrote, “the US will no longer be engaged in large-scale military operations in Africa and the Middle East and will leave to Europe crises and conflict resolution in the European neighbourhood”.

Therefore, we need to close many capability gaps and loopholes and to be present and active in areas where our interests are at stake. In conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya as well as Syria, we are witnessing a form of “Astanisation” of regional conflicts (in reference to the Astana format on Syria) which leads to the exclusion of Europe from the settlement of regional conflicts in favour of Russia and Turkey.

Why is this? How can this be remedied? Should it be accommodated? These real questions must be asked within the framework of strategic autonomy. On these issues, the exclusive reference to NATO is no longer enough.

#### Escalation causes global wars — they’re highly likely without active conflict management.

Hiltermann 22 — Joost Hiltermann, Program Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the International Crisis Group, Research Affiliate at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Consultant to the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq, former Adjunct Professor in the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, former Executive Director of the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California-Santa Cruz, 2022 (“Managing Crises, the Least-Bad Option,” *The Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, Number 44, Winter, Available Online at https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/managing-crises-the-least-bad-option/, Accessed 07-13-2022)

The year 2011 was a watershed in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as the popular uprisings that cascaded through the region precipitated the collapse of several regimes at astonishing speed. These developments in turn triggered civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen that converged in dangerous ways, raising the potential for a wider conflict between regional actors, directly or through proxies, including potent armed groups supported by powers external to the region.

Over ten years later, Yemen is going from bad to worse, but the big war in Syria is for now frozen. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a shadow of its former self, and the Libyan civil war isn’t raging on as it used to. Some of the intersecting disputes have calmed down—at least for the moment—as states in the region direct greater energies toward diplomacy.

Yet, the situation remains fragile and could turn at the merest incident. This could be a rocket fired by Houthi rebels in Yemen landing in Abu Dhabi or Riyadh; a Hezbollah rocket striking a school in Israel; an Israeli raid on Iranian assets in Syria to which Iran retaliates by attacking the U.S. military base at Al-Tanf with drones; an accidental confrontation between the Iranian and U.S. navies in Persian Gulf waters; or any event of similar impact, including what may follow a possible Donald Trump return to the White House in 2025.

The complexity of the region’s conflicts has created unprecedented challenges for conflict management and resolution. This is because wars may have more than one fundamental driver. Addressing one may aggravate another. Take Libya, for example: a deal to end the conflict by forming a unity government will likely come at the expense of improving governance and accountability, thus potentially giving rise to new popular protests. Or Iraq: when the United States and the Kurds fought ISIS together, Iraqi Kurdish leaders felt empowered to try for independence in 2017. But their bid escalated an old conflict over secession with the central government in Baghdad and neighboring countries, triggering a fight in disputed territories.

External intervention also tends to exacerbate conflicts more often than help resolve them. Such meddling draws in competing forces, directly or by proxy— for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen, or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey in Libya. Another challenge is that armed non-state actors, presenting themselves as state-like entities but without the true trappings of states, are less accountable. Meanwhile, the region’s states themselves often start to crumble through their partial loss of territorial control, sovereignty, and authority. An additional complicating factor is that the “international community” as a whole is going through a period of severe turbulence, in which multilateral institutions are increasingly driven by internal zero-sum competition and are losing legitimacy and influence.

The continuation of conflicts in the MENA region without the prospect of a durable resolution—even if they are temporarily stalled—raises two critical dangers. One is that any conflict can metastasize at any point, covering even larger territories and involving a greater number of actors. The second is that external power interventions in places such as Syria where their interests collide can generate hair-trigger situations that could spiral rapidly out of control, possibly with global consequences. That is in addition to the constant presence of regional conflict drivers such as the struggle between Iran and the Gulf monarchies or the continued Israeli military occupation of Palestinian territories, which prevent conflicts from coming to a negotiated conclusion.

Under these circumstances, there is no direct or optimal approach to tackling the region’s conflicts. What we are left with is trying to find ways to manage and contain conflicts before they intensify. This will require diplomatic efforts and tactical deals, as well as the creation of channels of communication and dialogue between adversaries that can help prevent unintended and uncontrollable escalations.

### Top-Level + Net-Benefit Explanation/Extension

#### Instead of increasing U.S. security cooperation with NATO, the counterplan increases German and Italian defense cooperation. This solves the case by boosting European defense investment in emerging tech. German and Italian joint investment will jumpstart European defense industry integration, cementing interoperability and convincing other European countries to follow-on. This also strengthens Europe’s strategic autonomy, but only if Germany and Italy take the lead and establish credible defense leadership — that’s Antinozzi and Varvelli.

#### Strategic autonomy is vital to de-escalate conflicts in Africa and the Greater Middle East. The U.S. has ceded these regions to Europe, but its lack of credible military power and an independent foreign policy prevents effective conflict resolution. That causes hotspots like the Sahel, Libya, Syria, and the Nagorno-Karabakh to escalate — that’s Borrell.

#### African and Mid-East conflicts are fragile and on the brink of sudden escalation. This will spark larger regional wars that draw in external powers. Only sustained conflict resolution can prevent these inevitable conflicts from escalating globally — that’s Hiltermann.

#### This turns the case — it decimates NATO security and helps Russia and China win the global strategic competition.

Morcos and Simón 22 — Pierre Morcos, Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division at the French Foreign Service, holds an M.P.A. from Sciences Po (France), and Luis Simón, Argyros Family Foundation Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director of the Brussels Office of the Elcano Royal Institute (Spain), Research Professor in International Security and Director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance (Belgium), holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of London (UK), 2022 (“NATO and the South after Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9th, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-south-after-ukraine, Accessed 07-14-2022)

“We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have met today to address Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades.” In this solemn statement released after an extraordinary summit in Brussels on March 24, 2022, NATO leaders sent a clear signal: Russia poses an unprecedented threat that the alliance needs to address as a matter of priority. Beyond its decisions to assist Ukraine and reassure frontline allies, NATO is also preparing for the long-term implications of the return of war to the European continent. Incidentally, this reorientation coincides with the preparation of a new strategic concept that will be adopted in Madrid.

The strategic concept is arguably NATO’s most important political document as it scans the international security context, identifies the main threats and challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, and outlines an approach to addressing such challenges. The previous strategic concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, signaled a meaningful rebalancing among NATO’s so-called core tasks, namely collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. Inter-state competition took a back seat because the alliance still hoped it could strike a cooperative relationship with Russia despite the invasion of Georgia in 2008. The return of great-power competition in Europe—arguably best illustrated by Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014—forced allies to put collective defense once again at the center of NATO strategy. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is further compounding this shift. A renewed commitment to territorial defense will undoubtedly be at the forefront of the Madrid strategic concept.

However, this should not lead NATO to neglect other priorities, including stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with many challenges—and is not impervious to the larger competition with Russia and China. The stability of the South remains critical for Euro-Atlantic security. Yet the war in Ukraine and prioritization of deterrence should also incentivize NATO to reimagine how it engages with the South. Instead of relying on large-scale military interventions as it did in Afghanistan, the alliance should invest in strengthening its partners’ resilience so they can better resist both pressures from competitors and transnational challenges. Promoting “forward resilience” will require NATO to be innovative and to deepen its cooperation with other organizations, starting with the European Union.

The End of an Era

In many ways, the 2010 Lisbon strategic concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallization of NATO’s experience in the post–Cold War era, a unique period characterized by Western unipolarity and military-technological supremacy, as well as the seeming absence of peer competitors. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies enjoyed a rather favorable position in the pivotal regions of Europe and East Asia. There was still a widely-held belief that former adversaries such as Russia—and even emerging great powers such as China—could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order. This belief underpinned much of the thinking that shaped the Washington and Lisbon concepts.

The power surplus the United States and its allies enjoyed gave the West a freer hand—both politically and militarily—to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavors and leverage crisis-management operations and collective-security initiatives to help stabilize the broader Euro-Atlantic neighborhood and beyond. NATO’s operation in Afghanistan illustrates this paradigm, as well as its limitations. During this long post–Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though such goals remained the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of the West’s military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day, as illustrated by allies’ military engagement (whether under the NATO umbrella or in ad-hoc coalitions) in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, the Sahel, and Syria.

But this world is gone. Great-power competition (also dubbed “strategic competition”) is back—as illustrated by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its increasingly revisionist and aggressive behavior since, as well as by China’s strategic rise and assertiveness, including in the Euro-Atlantic area. Peer competitors are once again challenging the security, geopolitical architecture, and U.S.-led alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the so-called rules-based or liberal international order.

Adapting the alliance to this competitive era will arguably be the main purpose of the new strategic concept, especially in light of Moscow’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. This will not only require revamping NATO’s deterrence and collective-defense pillars, but also ramping up allied efforts in technological innovation and strengthening the resilience of NATO countries against hybrid interference in the form of, for example, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

In parallel, the United States and its European allies have experienced a mounting “intervention fatigue,” as illustrated by the abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan. In Iraq and the Sahel, allies are also reducing their military footprint and privileging a more tailored approach to the fight against terrorism. “Over-the-horizon” operations based on air strikes and special-forces raids seem to be the preferred modus operandi after years of large-scale and intensive interventions.

The Risks of Neglecting the South

A de facto prioritization of collective defense over crisis management and collective security is probably unavoidable—but it is not without risks. Notably, NATO’s southern neighborhood remains structurally vulnerable. Transnational challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation of small weapons, and irregular migration will arguably remain core drivers of instability and insecurity across the South. Despite years of international diplomatic, development, and security engagement, the Sahel continues to face mounting extremist violence, internal displacement, and food insecurity. In Libya, the political process to solve a years-long civil war is still very fragile, while Tunisia has recently experienced worrisome political turmoil. Although the Islamic State has lost its territorial stronghold in Syria and Iraq, it remains active and resilient. Even the seeming stability of the Western Balkans is misleading, as illustrated by deep, longstanding political tensions between Serbia and Kosovo and within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Instability across NATO’s South is likely to be further compounded by the war in Ukraine. In the Western Balkans, the conflict has heightened fears that Russia’s actions may embolden nationalists, potentially leading to violence. Countries in Africa and the Middle East are already facing spillover effects ranging from higher energy prices to food insecurity. These countries are particularly vulnerable to the sharp decrease in Russian and Ukrainian wheat exports, raising concerns that diminishing grain supply could fuel ongoing crises in Syria or Ethiopia and aggravate instability in Egypt and Lebanon. As UN secretary general António Guterres underlined, Russia’s aggression of Ukraine is “planting the seeds for political instability and unrest around the globe.”

NATO’s southern neighborhood is also an increasingly relevant theater in the West’s strategic competition with Moscow and Beijing. The expansion of Russia’s diplomatic and military presence in the South, whether directly (as in Syria) or indirectly via proxies and private military companies (as in Libya and Mali), is an issue of growing concern. This increasing military footprint is already affecting allied counterterrorism efforts, as recently witnessed in the Sahel. Taking advantage of Mali’s political instability, Russia’s Wagner Group has managed to entrench itself in the country, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of French and European troops in February 2022. Far from contributing to the stability of Mali, Russian mercenaries have already participated in mass killings there, as witnessed in the town of Moura at the end of March.

Russia’s increasing military presence—and the proliferation of Russian weapon systems—may also fuel arms races in the South and endanger NATO’s security in more traditional ways. For instance, Russian capabilities deployed in Syria have created interdiction bubbles, or anti-access/area denial zones, limiting NATO’s freedom of action in the Eastern Mediterranean. The French navy has observed a significant increase in the Russian navy’s activity in the Mediterranean since the beginning of the invasion, forcing a French carrier-strike group deployed in the area to adapt its posture to avoid any misunderstandings. More broadly, Russian arms sales and the proliferation of precision-guided munitions and missiles may also fuel arms races in places such as North Africa, thus incentivizing the alliance to look at the South through a deterrence lens as well.

China’s growing political and economic influence is also affecting NATO’s interests. China’s acquisition of digital infrastructure across the South—and its de facto monopoly on the development of fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks in Africa—represents a long-term political and military challenge to NATO and could complicate the alliance’s ability to work with its partners. Similarly, China’s massive investments in transport and energy infrastructure in southern Europe could potentially complicate NATO’s military mobility and readiness during a crisis. Beijing is also progressively expanding its military presence along NATO’s southern flank, as demonstrated by Chinese-Russian naval drills in the Mediterranean.

### They Say: “CP Doesn’t Solve Strategic Autonomy”

#### Coordinated defense investments by Germany and Italy do strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy — their geographies and economies are key. Even if the aff’s defense is broadly true, the counterplan is sufficient to solve conflict resolution in NATO’s South — that’s our impact.

Marras 21 — Stefano Marras, Analyst on European Security and Foreign Policy at *The Defence Horizon Journal*, Policy Analyst at the Atlas Institute for International Affairs, holds an M.A. in International Relations and Affairs from Utrecht University (Netherlands) and an M.A. in History from the University of Bologna (Italy), 2021 (“Germany and Italy Should Be Strong Security Actors: European Security Demands It,” *The Geopolitics*, July 24th, Available Online at https://thegeopolitics.com/germany-and-italy-should-be-strong-military-powers-european-security-demands-it/, Accessed 07-13-2022)

As the world enters into a new period of instability and great power competition, European security cannot be given for granted anymore. The times when the US was fully committed to European defense and the continent lacked any meaningful peer competitor, besides transnational threats such as piracy and terrorism, are over. In particular, the return of Russia, Turkey and China as great powers pose significant security implications for Europe. This is especially true in light of the recent United States’ strategic tilt to the Indo-Pacific and on the containment of China, which implies a diminished availability of resources and a minor willingness to engage in military operations for the defense of Europe. As a result, Europeans are being forced to spend more in their armed forces and think more strategically to defend their national security, without having to rely too much on Washington. France and the United Kingdom, the two countries with the most powerful militaries in Europe, do not seem capable and willing of covering the whole spectrum of threats. Thus, the rest of European countries should do more and increase their share of responsibility for European defense. While many improvements have been reached in the last five years, such as higher defense spending and the launching of PESCO and the European Defense Fund to increase interoperability among the armed forces of the continent and the development of military technology, these efforts are not enough to guarantee an acceptable level of European security if two key countries, Italy and especially Germany, do not fully commit their military and political institutions to this cause. Because of their geographical position and economic resources, these two nations are essential to tackle the present and future challenges to European security and prosperity.

Due to its central location at the heart of Europe and as the biggest economy of the continent, Germany in particular, has always been the cornerstone of European stability and defense. For centuries and for better or worse, Germany’s weakness or strength have decided the fate of the continent. Nowadays, Berlin plays chiefly an economic role of semi-hegemony with a high degree of political influence. However, unless Germany also become a military power commensurate to its economic and technological resources, and it assumes more security responsibility, it cannot be regarded as a fully-rounded geopolitical power. And this is a problem for European security, for a weak Germany also means a vulnerable Europe. As the former foreign minister of Poland Radoslaw Sikorski said in 2011 during the Euro financial crisis, “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity. You have become Europe’s indispensable nation.” This condition is primarily due to its recent history in Second World War, after which German leaders have developed a pacifist, economy-oriented and non-strategic attitude to questions related to foreign policy and military affairs. This can be clearly observed in the reluctance in engaging in military missions abroad and in the precarious state of its armed forces.

Germany, in fact, spends only 1.4 % of its GDP in military, compared to the NATO benchmark of 2 %, not to speak of other countries such as the United States and Russia which spend more than 3 %. This lack of funding and focus on armed forces is also reflected on the level of readiness of the Bundeswehr and on the number of troops and weapons available. They are simply not enough in face of the security challenges the country is called to face. Germany is also reluctant to lead Europe geopolitically as this evokes its dark history, and thus preferring to let the French and the Americans take the lead in matters of foreign policy and defense. Once a technologically powerhouse with arguably the best engineers and scientists in the world, Germany is also lagging behind the United States and other countries when it comes to the development of new technologies and the digitalization of its society. This relative absence of innovative spirit is partly related to Germany’s lack of great-power ambition and a reluctance to invest significantly in high-risk military projects capable of overcoming the so-called “the valley of death” and bring about new technologies.

Although Germany has only recently started to address these issues by adopting a more assertive foreign policy, allocating more resources to the military budget and developing future technologies, these changes do not seem to be enough. Berlin is set to reach the 2% NATO military expenditure only by the early 2030s and some parties even question this goal; for several reasons, it is unlikely to catch up technologically with the US and China with regard to new disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum technologies; and most importantly there are not many signs suggesting an attitude change toward the use of the armed forces for geopolitical goals. While this role of Germany as a “tamed power” allows its European neighbors to sleep well at night, eventually it makes Europe weaker, more dependent on other countries and more exposed to external interference and security challenges. Conversely, a stronger Germany would reinforce the Western deterrence against Russia and it would discourage Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy. Moreover, as Europe’s economic powerhouse but with a latent technological potential unexpressed, Berlin could and should play a fundamental role in the development of Europe’s strategic autonomy and sovereignty in order to be more competitive with the economic and technological superpowers of the US and China. Thus, considering the American pivot to Asia and the difficulties for the rest of European countries to provide for their own security, Germany’s leading economic role and security guarantees are needed more than ever.

Italy too, has an important geopolitical role to play even though this is not properly recognized most of the times. A quick look at the geopolitics of Italy, its resources and the security challenges toward Europe, one immediately understands the strategic importance of the country. Given the fact that it is the third largest economy in the EU, ranking second in its manufacturing output in Europe after Germany and it is situated in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea with deep diplomatic, historical and cultural links to North Africa and the Middle-East, Italy is an essential factor in the stabilization and resolution of Europe’s security problems in its southern flank. Libya and the management of migration flow are certainly the most important areas where Italy plays a fundamental role. Libya is becoming a contested area among great powers, fostering further destabilization and driving large number of migrants to Italian shores and successively to the rest of Europe. This causes the rise of extremist political forces, as well as creating negative collateral effects for European cohesion and stability. Hence, Rome should adopt a more assertive foreign policy in Libya, including the use of military forces, so as to stabilize the country and help its recovery.

In addition, with the rise of Turkey, despite being in an economic crisis currently, as an aggressive and revisionist regional power that is willing to use military power for geopolitical goals and to expand its sphere of influence in North Africa (e.g. Libya) and south-east Europe, Italy could also play an important role in the balance of power against Turkey and other antagonistic powers in the Mediterranean. Rome has a bigger GDP than Turkey, a similar population and a relatively strong navy that could operate as a powerful deterrence against Ankara. However, similarly to Germany, Italy is hesitant to develop an assertive foreign policy and to deploy military resources for geopolitical goals. Its defence expenditure is only 1.6 % of the GDP. This weakens the southern front of Europe and leaves it open to external incursions and the rise of other powers, such as Turkey. Different from Germany though, in the last three decades Italy has been ravaged by a dysfunctional political and economic system that is gradually eroding the country’s geopolitical power. Unless Rome fixes its structural problems, it will be difficult for the country to regain international credibility and play a meaningful role in European affairs and in the security of the continent.

Therefore, I argue that a more active and assertive foreign policy by Germany and Italy in their respective areas is warranted to strengthen European security and power. The unwillingness of these two countries and the Italian incapacity to do so affect the whole continent. Rome and Berlin should learn again how to think strategically and how to use military power to reach political ends and defend their national interests, in the same way as other great powers do. They should also embrace a more innovative and risk-taking spirit, a characteristic of big powers, which allows constant innovation and growth of the economy to happen. To do so, structural changes are needed in both cases, especially for Italy. However, such a prospect is unlikely to materialize in the short-medium term as strategic cultures and political institutions persist through generations and they usually change only after dramatic and historical events like a war, or with a shift in the dominant narrative, which could slowly lead to a different zeitgeist.

### They Say: “NATO Deficit/NATO Good”

#### Counterplan Solves Faster — it gets immediate results.

Nemeth 22 — Bence Nemeth, Lecturer in Defence Studies Education at King's College London (UK) where he primarily teaches British and international military officers at the UK Defence Academy and European military staff colleges including the Baltic Defence College, the Czech University of Defence, the Irish Command and Staff School and the Netherlands Defence Academy, former Defense Official at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, holds a Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King's College London (UK) and an MBA in Defense Systems Management from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2022 (“Bilateralism and Minilateralism Are Europe’s Secret Strengths,” *War on the Rocks*, June 3rd, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/bilateralism-and-minilateralism-are-europes-secret-strengths/, Accessed 07-13-2022)

Strengthening the Network

Improving NATO and E.U. defense cooperation requires looking under the hood to appreciate the role of these efforts. Scholars have already pointed out that Europeans must recognize the minilateral foundations of Europe’s security architecture. This corresponds with my experience as a former defense official. European ministries of defense do not always think in terms of institutions like the European Union and NATO. They have their own considerations, and they are using the framework that fits their goals the best, which can be NATO, the European Union, or smaller formats. Starting an initiative at this level is often more effective and can provide results more quickly.

As I argue in my newly published book, while these forms of cooperation are not new, their recent proliferation is unprecedented in Europe’s history. Furthermore, they provide the substance of practical military cooperation in Europe, which NATO and the European Union can build on. Thus, comprehending the dynamics behind them is crucial to foster effective defense cooperation moving forward. The research in my book indicates that when European nations start new defense collaborations, five structural and situational factors are important to achieve success.

#### Counterplan Causes NATO Follow-On — empirically proven.

Nemeth 22 — Bence Nemeth, Lecturer in Defence Studies Education at King's College London (UK) where he primarily teaches British and international military officers at the UK Defence Academy and European military staff colleges including the Baltic Defence College, the Czech University of Defence, the Irish Command and Staff School and the Netherlands Defence Academy, former Defense Official at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, holds a Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King's College London (UK) and an MBA in Defense Systems Management from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2022 (“Bilateralism and Minilateralism Are Europe’s Secret Strengths,” *War on the Rocks*, June 3rd, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/bilateralism-and-minilateralism-are-europes-secret-strengths/, Accessed 07-13-2022)

A History of Bilateralism and Minilateralism

In a few months, NATO countries have deployed thousands of troops and significant capabilities to enhance the defense of members on its eastern flank. In a stunning transition, two traditionally militarily non-aligned E.U. states, Sweden and Finland, re-evaluated their geostrategic position and submitted applications to join NATO. The debate about boosting the European Union’s “strategic autonomy” has become even more intense, and once again, member states are discussing coordinating their defense spending via joint procurements.

These vital initiatives could not work without existing, critical lower-level collaborations. For example, Russian military actions over the last several years in Ukraine prompted NATO’s eastern-flank allies to work swiftly together with their bi- and minilateral partners. The United Kingdom took on a leading role in Estonia, building on the close relations the two countries developed carrying out dangerous operations over a decade in Afghanistan’s Helmand province. Lithuania is a relevant defense market for Germany, and not surprisingly, the Bundeswehr leads NATO efforts there. Thanks to cultural similarity and extensive previous military cooperation, the Czech Republic has sent the most troops to Slovakia and oversees the international forces located there. For similar reasons, France deployed 500 troops to Romania. Such comparatively low-key actions were crucial in developing the necessary bottom-up relations, norms, and experiences upon which more recent grandiose announcements build.

Although Finland and Sweden intend to join NATO, they also found it essential to sign bilateral mutual security deals with the United Kingdom. This could happen quickly, mainly because Helsinki and Stockholm have built trust with London working together in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force. The dynamics in the European Union are the same as in NATO. For example, in 2017, the European Union established the Permanent Structured Cooperation to strengthen defense cooperation among its member states after the Russian occupation in Crimea. However, most of its projects were based on existing bi- and minilateral defense initiatives, and the participating states often just rebranded them according to the new E.U. vocabulary.

The fact that existing bi- and minilateral relationships are the foundation of defense cooperation in Europe is not a new phenomenon. A survey of 70 examples of European defense collaboration highlighted that most have five or fewer participating states, and many are purely bilateral. These collaborations range from creating multinational units to cooperating on armaments, training, logistics, surveillance, operations, and/or command and control. More often than not, these collaborations are not part of NATO or the European Union, but they can be rebranded as E.U. and NATO projects quickly if it is necessary.

States can also use these collaborations to shape NATO and E.U. policies. For instance, the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 was basically an Anglo-French war, as France and Britain pushed for the intervention and took the brunt of the fight. They used NATO’s command structure to coordinate their war effort and the limited military support they gained from some NATO members helped fill their capability gaps. The background of this was a historical and overarching British-French bilateral defense agreement, the Lancaster House Treaties, which the leaders of the two European military powers signed a year earlier. The launch of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 also stemmed from a British-French bilateral agreement in St. Malo in 1998 as well.

#### Counterplan Strengthens NATO — but *starting* with bilateral or minilateral defense coop is key.

Nemeth 22 — Bence Nemeth, Lecturer in Defence Studies Education at King's College London (UK) where he primarily teaches British and international military officers at the UK Defence Academy and European military staff colleges including the Baltic Defence College, the Czech University of Defence, the Irish Command and Staff School and the Netherlands Defence Academy, former Defense Official at the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, holds a Ph.D. in Defence Studies from King's College London (UK) and an MBA in Defense Systems Management from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2022 (“Bilateralism and Minilateralism Are Europe’s Secret Strengths,” *War on the Rocks*, June 3rd, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/bilateralism-and-minilateralism-are-europes-secret-strengths/, Accessed 07-13-2022)

As a result of the war in Ukraine, policymakers in Europe and North America have scrambled to strengthen defense cooperation in Europe. The headlines inevitably focus on NATO and the European Union. Yet this ignores the reality of how European defense cooperation is actually established, fostered, and solidified. Indeed, the essence of defense cooperation in Europe is a web of hundreds of bilateral and minilateral collaborations. Often, NATO and the European Union work merely as a framework into which European countries upload their existing bi- and minilateral efforts.

To better enhance European defense, policymakers should appreciate the dynamics of these many collaborations. Taking advantage of the current circumstances to build more mini and bilateral ties, particularly where leadership and financial circumstances are most conducive, will strengthen Europe and make its multilateral institutions that much more formidable.

### They Say: “NATO Solves Africa/Mid-East War”

#### Strategic autonomy is key *in Africa and the Greater Middle East* — NATO has too many other priorities.

Morcos and Simón 22 — Pierre Morcos, Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division at the French Foreign Service, holds an M.P.A. from Sciences Po (France), and Luis Simón, Argyros Family Foundation Visiting Fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Director of the Brussels Office of the Elcano Royal Institute (Spain), Research Professor in International Security and Director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Brussels School of Governance (Belgium), holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of London (UK), 2022 (“NATO and the South after Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9th, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-and-south-after-ukraine, Accessed 07-14-2022)

A Transatlantic Division of Labor in Crisis Management

Finally, allies should strengthen their ability to act rapidly in the event of a crisis in the southern neighborhood. In this regard, allies should reckon with the reality that, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China remains Washington’s “most consequential strategic competitor” and a “pacing challenge” that will inevitably require a recalibration of the U.S. presence in Europe and its vicinity in the medium term. This will compel European allies to take up greater responsibilities in security and defense.

As Europeans step up their defense spending and efforts, NATO will arguably remain their main referent when it comes to deterrence and collective defense. However, when it comes to crisis management in the South, Europeans may prefer to act in smaller coalitions or through the European Union. The adoption of an EU Strategic Compass does indeed signal a specific interest in crisis management, notably through the development of a “rapid deployment capacity,” which would allow the European Union to send up to 5,000 troops in scenarios ranging from evacuation missions to stabilization operations. Such initiatives are beneficial for NATO as a whole, especially if complemented by a strengthening of the EU-NATO relationship.

### They Say: “Permute: Do Both”

#### Links To DOD Tradeoff DA — only the counterplan alone avoids overstretching the Pentagon and unraveling its AM&E process.

#### Links To NATO Cohesion DA — the counterplan alone doesn’t bring a controversial new proposal to NATO. But, German and Italian action sets the foundation for future NATO adoption. Winning “follow-on” doesn’t take out the DA link because it’s an issue of policy sequencing — bilateral and minilateral policies must be adopted first before being scaled up to the multilateral level.

#### Doesn’t Solve European Strategic Autonomy — Germany and Italy have to be the first mover in order to demonstrate independence from U.S.-led NATO initiatives. Perm reinforces Europe’s reliance on the U.S. — it’s an issue of sequencing.

### They Say: “Multi-Actor International Fiat Bad”

#### Multi-actor international fiat in this context is good:

#### 1. Topic Education — the question of who should act is central in debates about NATO and transatlantic relations. Considering the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and its allies is crucial to in-depth policy analysis. This outweighs minor fairness concerns because they’re only a means to the end of encouraging deeper topic knowledge and policy comparison skills.

#### 2. Neg Ground — core generic arguments about European strategic autonomy and institutional alternatives to NATO aren’t strategically viable without international fiat. Excluding them hurts fairness by artificially shielding the aff from important literature-based disagreements.

#### 3. International Perspective-Taking — international fiat forces students to understand and empathize with foreign perspectives. Their interp enforces a dangerous American exceptionalism that limits our policy imaginations and implicitly indoctrinates us with an ethnocentric worldview. International fiat allows students to study Europe as an actor, not just as an object that the U.S. acts upon.

Bel 19 — Olivier-Rémy Bel, Visiting Fellow at The Atlantic Council, former Advisor for Europe, Africa, and Arms Export Control and Head of the EU Desk at the French Ministry of Defense, holds an M.A. in Public Affairs from Sciences Po (France), 2019 (“‘Brain-dead’ or not ‘brain-dead’? That is not the question.,” The Atlantic Council, November 12th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/brain-dead-or-not-brain-dead-that-is-not-the-question/, Accessed 07-14-2022)

If anything, French President Emmanuel Macron has managed to stir up quite a debate. Macron’s assertion in an interview with The Economist that NATO is experiencing “brain death” quickly spurred responses from other transatlantic leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she doesn’t “think that such sweeping judgments are necessary, even if we have problems and need to pull together.” Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have now jumped into the fray to argue about the strength of the Alliance or the wisdom of such public pronouncements by one of NATO’s most important leaders.

Let’s get hasty readings out of the way. Macron does not want NATO to be “brain-dead.” By replying “I don’t know” to a question about whether NATO’s Article Five mutual defense clause was effective, he is not signaling French reluctance to come to the aid of NATO allies. He is rather taking stock of the current travails of the Alliance, of the lack of coordination regarding Syria, and of the doubts cast by what he calls the “guarantor of last resort”: the United States.

Some commentators have seen the interview as a vindication of their critiques of US policy towards NATO, and more broadly towards alliances, under US President Donald J. Trump. Others have rushed to contradict Macron’s assessment, highlighting official statements, Congressional action, and public opinion that demonstrate full support for NATO, as well as pointing out the continued US presence in Europe (such as the European Deterrence Initiative and the large scale exercise Defender 2020).

But that is missing the point. This interview is not about NATO. It is not even really about the United States. It is about Europe. About deep worries that it is gradually being on the menu of global power politics and about the means to ensure that it is at the table instead.

What Macron sees is a world that is increasingly dangerous for Europeans. A world in which authoritarian regimes are on the rise, instability and terrorism persists in the vicinity of Europe, and history returns in the form of great power competition. A world in which, regardless of who sits in the White House, the United States’ focus is moving away from Europe. To face that world, he fears Europe is still a house divided, has partly forgotten it is a political project and not a market, and, most of all, shies away from asserting its very real power on the world stage.

This should not come as a surprise. This has been his constant worry, from his 2017 Sorbonne speech to his August 2018 proposals about deepening the EU’s solidarity clause, to his calls for a European Army—a call to be understood as powerful image, not read literally of course—to his address this summer at the annual ambassadors meeting, where he laid out his Russia policy.

And he offers some solutions. The first is strengthening European military capabilities. As Macron puts it “these days, if you don’t have military credibility, in a world where authoritarian powers are on the rise again” you don’t get to sit at the table. Arguably, progress has been made there, with the launch of the European Intervention Initiative, the European Defense Fund, and the Permanent Structured Cooperation. European defense budgets are on the rise. As the French defense minister Florence Parly explained at the Atlantic Council last March, France is quite clear-eyed about the long-term effort required to address European shortfalls and about the value of US support.

The second strand to engage is Russia—because Europeans cannot ignore their large neighbor. This does not mean, of course, being naïve about Russian intentions. The third, and arguably most important piece of the puzzle, is to get Europe to think geopolitically. The brunt of the interview seemed to revolve around a call for Europe to wake up to its potential on the world stage. Europe must think about issues such digital policy, trade, or technology not solely through an economic lens, but also realize that these are increasingly becoming instruments akin to hard power—instruments that Europe, through the European Union, is well placed to wield. Is that so different from Ursula von der Leyen, the incumbent Commission president, presenting a “Geopolitical Commission”? From Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte noting that “the EU needs a reality check…if we only preach the merits of principles and shy away from exercising power in the geopolitical arena, our continent may always be right, but it will seldom be relevant”?

There are many entertaining discussions to be had about whether Macron’s interview epitomizes the return of Gaullo-Mitterrandism or is simply the French equivalent of an early morning tweet. There is certainly a debate to be had about whether the form, wording, and timing of Macron’s comments were useful. But Macron’s argument is much more about Europe’s future than simply a judgement on NATO’s present. He is asking a very important question: “how can Europe survive—and thrive—in a world of carnivores?” This is where those who care about the transatlantic alliance should be engaging him.

#### 4. Functional Limits — forcing the aff to win a “U.S. key” advantage — *not just “NATO key”* — significantly limits the number of viable cases. This creates a more manageable research burden for everyone, enabling and encouraging higher-quality research and case-specific preparation. This improves clash and education.

#### 5. No Infinite Regression — our solvency advocate proves the counterplan is predictable and relevant. Even if other counterplans should be excluded, *this* counterplan is legitimate. Case-by-case theory judgment is best — one-size-fits-all rule-making ignores contextual differences and needlessly sacrifices education at the altar of “logic.”

#### 6. Reject Argument, Not Team — voting aff creates a perverse incentive that encourages students to pursue theory gripes at the expense of substance. This hurts topic and policy education.

## Quad CP

### 1NC — Quad CP

#### Next off is the Quad Counterplan.

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its defense innovation cooperation with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and cybersecurity.

#### Emerging tech cooperation with the Quad is key to counter China — the counterplan revitalizes the partnership.

Luong and Chahal 22 — Ngor Luong, Research Analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, Nonresident Fellow in the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council, and Husanjot Chahal, Research Analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, former Security Analyst at the World Bank, holds an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University, 2022 (“The Future of the Quad’s Technology Cooperation Hangs in the Balance,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 14th, Available Online at https://www.cfr.org/blog/future-quads-technology-cooperation-hangs-balance, Accessed 07-12-2022)

U.S. President Joe Biden last month made a historic trip to Tokyo, where he met with the prime ministers of the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad: Australia, India, and Japan. The four leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific, as well as their interest in collaborating on critical and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI).

AI has taken center stage for the Quad. In the last five years, all four countries have announced national AI strategies aiming to leverage the technology for societal development, economic prosperity, and military power. Beyond national agendas and investments, the Quad countries also see multinational technology collaboration with like-minded democracies as key to responsible AI development. Promising to promote an accessible and secure technology ecosystem, Quad-led AI collaboration could also help counter China’s disruptive behavior in the region, particularly the country’s malicious use of AI for surveillance, censorship, and misinformation.

While the Quad is not a formal alliance, its flexible structure, atop a strong foundation of bilateral and multilateral ties, allows room for experimentation and agility in collective efforts. During previous meetings, the Quad launched the Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group and released joint statements on technology design, development, governance and use. At the Quad Summit in Tokyo, they followed up with a number of initiatives including the official launch of fellowships for leading STEM graduate students, and a new memorandum of cooperation on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN. The Quad countries also introduced several new initiatives, among them an Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, a Quad Investors Network, a Quad Cybersecurity Partnership, and an International Standards Cooperation Network to share information on technical standards.

But moving from statements to coordinated and collective action is no easy task. Regulatory barriers such as differences on national data sharing laws can hinder the implementation of joint initiatives. Moreover, different geopolitical priorities, as illustrated by India’s reluctance to join the sanctions against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, could sour the relationship. In addition, each of the Quad countries has significant economic and trade ties with China, which could further complicate the group’s collaborative technology agenda.

The May 2022 summit therefore comes at an opportune time, as the future of the Quad as a strategically important forum for technology cooperation hangs in the balance.

Our recent report from Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) examined trends in joint AI-related research publications and investment in AI companies within the Quad over the past decade. Our findings show that while Australia, India, and Japan each have robust AI research partnerships and investment ties with the United States, the three Indo-Pacific nations collaborate far less with one another.

Looking at internationally co-authored scholarly publications between 2010 and 2020, it appears that AI researchers in Australia, India, and Japan collaborated with U.S. AI researchers at least five times more often than they did with one other. Similarly, while the United States is the largest foreign investor in Australian, Indian, and Japanese AI companies, there is little AI investment activity between the three Indo-Pacific countries.

Moreover, despite increasing tensions with Beijing, each of the Quad countries’ AI ecosystems are closely intertwined with China’s powerful AI research apparatus and market. In fact, China is the top research partner for the United States and the second leading partner for the rest of the Quad members. And not only does the United States have far more AI investment activities with China than with Australia, India, and Japan individually, but each of these three Quad members have closer ties to China than they do with one another.

Scientific research collaborations and financial activities often operate on a separate plain from national security imperatives. Indeed, there is much to gain from an open scientific system and global flows of investment capital. And in a sense, the Quad’s close linkages with China will hardly come as a surprise given that the country is a global leader in scientific research and has a massive economy and technology market.

That said, there are valid concerns about research integrity and security, as well as overdependence on the Chinese market, technology, and capital. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched numerous simultaneous strategies to advance China’s global position as a science and technology powerhouse, including by relying on foreign technology transfer and intellectual property theft from leaders in emerging technologies such as the Quad countries. The CCP is also using AI-enabled technologies for human rights violations against the country’s minority population, and exporting AI surveillance technologies worldwide.

Over the past several years, the Quad countries have all launched different initiatives to strengthen their domestic AI ecosystems, expand research and investment ties with one another, and enforce greater scrutiny over China’s misuse of technology. For example, the governments of Japan and India signed the 2018 Japan-India Digital Partnership agreement to link Japanese venture capital investors to Indian startups. The recently introduced Quad Investors Network will bring together investors with the goal to increase access to capital for emerging technologies within and across the Quad countries.

Meanwhile, India and the United States launched the U.S.-India Artificial Intelligence Initiative in 2021 to promote bilateral R&D collaboration through networking and workshops, among others. As these initiatives begin to take shape, tracking their progress will help inform policymakers across the Quad countries of gaps and opportunities to expand collaboration among all members.

As the Quad agenda on technology cooperation continues to evolve, it's worth remembering that ad hoc groupings like the Quad work best when the barriers to coordination between the countries involved are low and the potential payoffs are high. In this vein, one potentially promising area for collaboration is on privacy-preserving machine learning techniques (PPML) that could enable data sharing on commercial and non-commercial datasets without triggering privacy concerns and could reduce cybersecurity risks by protecting individual data while preserving its usefulness. The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council has already initiated efforts to identify common projects utilizing privacy-enhancing technologies. As for the Quad, the four countries can co-fund joint research or coordinate investments into PPML and other techniques like synthetic data and advanced simulations that make personal data less relevant for AI systems.

The White House’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is clear about the need for U.S. allies and partners to strengthen their ties with one another. Boosting AI-related collaboration between Australia, India, and Japan can reassert the Quad as a pillar of stability in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as help the United States achieve its strategic objectives. With all eyes on the Quad, the group must deliver on its promises.

#### Adopting the counterplan alone is key to the Quad’s credibility and effectiveness — the perm poisons relations with India, hamstrings allied China policy, and weakens NATO.

Ranhotra, 22

[Sanbeer Singh, political researcher for TFIGlobal, April 3, 2022, “NATO attempts to undermine India and Quad in the Indo-Pacific”, TFIGlobal, <https://tfiglobalnews.com/2022/04/03/nato-attempts-to-undermine-india-and-quad-in-the-indo-pacific/>, accessed 7-13-2022, BB]

NATO is a shady organization. First, it expanded eastward in Europe – breaking all promises made to the former Soviet Union that it will never do so, and now, it is looking to make an entry into the Indo Pacific. Mind you, NATO would have been welcomed with wide arms to the region had it not been playing its dirty games against select countries. However, at the behest of the Biden administration, NATO is looking to undercut the influence of India in this crucial region. New Delhi will not tolerate this.

Recently, after the G7 summit in Brussels, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held talks with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg said the bloc would work more closely with “Asia-Pacific partners”, which include “Japan as well as South Korea and Australia.”

Where’s India, Mr Stoltenberg?

There were two very stark anomalies. First, the NATO Secretary-General did not mention India. What that means is that NATO is looking to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific without India. NATO wants to undercut India’s influence in the region, and project it as a player which does not matter. So, while every QUAD country figures prominently in NATO’s Indo-Pacific plans, India finds no name on the list.

Secondly, the NATO chief referred to the Indo-Pacific as the “Asia Pacific”. This is the terminology that China uses for the region. So it gives a clear picture of the catering deeds that Nato is currently into. How will NATO counter China when it cannot even muster the courage to use the right terminology?

But wait, using the term “Asia Pacific” cuts out India from the picture even further! So, just because India refuses to toe the line of the Biden administration and NATO on several issues, the bloc has decided to alienate New Delhi.

But any strategy to counter China in the Indo Pacific will fail unless India is onboard with it. France, which is by far the most proactive European power in the Indo Pacific considers India a brother in arms. The two have strong defense ties, and that is what China fears.

India also has strong bilateral and strategic ties with Japan, Australia, and South Korea. So, if the NATO chief thinks he can swoop in and steal New Delhi’s thunder in the Indo Pacific, he is in for a rude shock.

Biden Weakens Quad

Here’s an interesting fact. The NATO chief is not side-lining India on his own accord. His strings are actually being pulled by an old man from within the White House. Quad was supposed to be a military alliance against China. Yet, on the security front, it has not made much progress ever since Biden took charge of the United States. The Quad has limited its focus to the economic front.

But that was done strategically. Biden always wanted to involve NATO in the Indo-Pacific, minus India in order to deal militarily with China. The Biden administration does not want to work with India to counter China. India is rather ruthless when it comes to engaging with China. For somebody who is scared of Xi Jinping, that factor did not really play well with Biden.

Every Quad country except India is being pulled into NATO’s security net in the Indo Pacific. Biden is trying to replace Quad with NATO. What Biden does not know is that Japan, Australia, and even South Korea will refuse to work against China unless India is back on board.

#### Quad credibility is key to effective disaster relief.

Bose, 22

[Sohini, Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in Kolkata and a Nonresident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2, 2022, “Quad Cooperation on Disaster Management Prospects for Revitalizing the Partnership”, NBR, <https://www.nbr.org/publication/quad-cooperation-on-disaster-management-prospects-for-revitalizing-the-partnership/>, accessed 7-14-2022, BB]

Do disaster management agencies in Quad member states communicate and share information to improve each other’s disaster preparedness, and how effective has this been in reducing damage?

Since 2004, when the current Quad members had first come together as the Tsunami Core Group, they have collaborated on a bilateral or a trilateral basis in disaster management. For example, India and the United States signed a bilateral disaster relief initiative in July 2005 to better integrate their disaster response capabilities. India and Japan signed a memorandum of cooperation in disaster management to engage in disaster risk reduction. With Australia, India collaborates on the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, where reducing disaster risk is a major purview. The United States and Japan cooperate in the emergency response, and their foreign development agencies (the U.S. Agency for International Development and Japan International Cooperation Agency) have worked together on recovery projects. The United States and Australia have a memorandum of understanding to strengthen emergency management cooperation in response to disasters. Australia and Japan engage in joint exercises and disaster relief operations through their Reciprocal Access Agreement. Furthermore, the United States, Japan, and Australia conduct disaster relief operations through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue. These countries also participate in India’s Malabar naval exercises, where HADR is the main component.

Indeed, communication is cardinal in all these collaborations, as information sharing is a key aspect of exchanges in disaster management. Nonetheless, as individual entities, each country has its own disaster management mechanism, and hence there are bound to be discrepancies in structure, funding, and even assistance programs. While the existing cooperative mechanisms may facilitate the Quad’s engagement in disaster management, these differences would also have to be accommodated. Success can only be gauged in terms of the ability of the Quad to effectively provide coordinated responses in the event of disasters and enhance preparedness in its member countries. So far, apart from its recent initiative of supporting Tonga’s emergency and recovery activities following the volcano eruption and tsunami in January 2022, the only instance of the Quad countries offering coordinated HADR was as the Tsunami Core Group in 2004, which was a humanitarian as well as diplomatic success.

#### That prevents disease and environmental collapse and turns the Alliance Fragmentation advantage.

Brattberg, 13

[Erik, fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, November 21, 2013, “The case for US military response during international disasters”, The Hill, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/190954-the-case-for-us-military-response-during-international/>, accessed 7-15-2022, BB]

The scale of the U.S. military’s response to the disastrous Haiyan Typhoon in the Philippines has been impressive. The deployment of USS George Washington along with other smaller vessels has allowed for the delivery of over 600 tons of relief supplies. Moreover, U.S. military transport has already moved thousands of humanitarian workers into the disaster-stricken Tacloban and airlifted almost 5,000 survivors into safety.

As natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies are becoming more common worldwide, the U.S. will increasingly be called in to assist during other disasters. What’s more, weak and fragile states with inadequate emergency response capacities, infrastructure and public health services are particularly vulnerable to severe natural disasters. Here, military response is crucial to getting relief efforts up and running during the immediate post-disaster phase.

{mosads}But military-led disaster relief is not only a humanitarian imperative – it can also serve a larger strategic imperative as a part of U.S. foreign policy. Compounding the strategic importance of the US military’s role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are four key reasons.

First, and most obviously, providing disaster relief helps boost U.S. soft power in the world. By assisting in humanitarian emergencies, the U.S. military sends a message that it’s a global force for good. The importance of this kind of ‘soft-power diplomacy’ cannot be underestimated, especially in times when the US is perceived as losing influence in the Asia-Pacific region to China. Responding to disasters can also lead to a more positive attitude towards the U.S. – as was the case following U.S. assistance during the flood in Pakistan in 2010.

Second, disaster relief can help contain some of the negative consequences of major disasters from spreading elsewhere in the world. This is particularly the case in weak states where crises can easily spill over national boundaries in the forms of massive refugee flows, the spread of infectious diseases, or environmental collapse. Case in point: the robust U.S. intervention in Haiti after the earthquake in January 2010 prevented what could otherwise have been huge refugee flows to the U.S.

Third, disaster relief is also an opportunity for the U.S. military to forge stronger multilateral security relationships with other countries’ militaries. In the Philippines, U.S. troops have worked alongside troops from several other countries. As the U.S. looks to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific in the future, these kinds of activities can serve a clear purpose of building trust and developing military-to-military ties. As the Pentagon currently winds down its military presence in Afghanistan, relief efforts can also provide essential real-life training opportunities for American troops. Moreover, they can serve to legitimize US military presence in certain parts of the world where it is currently disputed.

### Quad Key To Disaster Response

#### The Quad is key for disaster preparedness and disaster response.

Bose, 22

[Sohini, Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in Kolkata and a Nonresident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2, 2022, “Quad Cooperation on Disaster Management Prospects for Revitalizing the Partnership”, NBR, <https://www.nbr.org/publication/quad-cooperation-on-disaster-management-prospects-for-revitalizing-the-partnership/>, accessed 7-14-2022, BB]

At its meeting in May, the Quad highlighted several previous focal points of policies and explored new initiatives, including frameworks of disaster management. This raises questions about whether the political will exists for such intergovernmental cooperation. Arsalan Ahmed spoke with Sohini Bose, a junior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in Kolkata and a nonresident fellow at NBR, about her work on natural disaster management. She discusses how multilateral cooperation through the Quad to mitigate the threat from natural disasters can be helpful for member countries as well as the broader Indo-Pacific.

How did the Quad form out of the joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami?

The Quad traces its origin to the ad hoc Tsunami Core Group, comprising India, the United States, Australia, and Japan, which was created to deliver a coordinated response after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, one of the deadliest disasters in modern history. Unfortunately after its formation, the Quad’s overtly conventional strategic-security image made it difficult for the grouping to function sustainably in the face of Chinese discontent. As a result, the Quad has begun exploring other areas of collaboration for its survival.

The entire Indian Ocean region is referred to as the “world hazard belt” due to frequent cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, and droughts. Meanwhile, the Ring of Fire covers much of the rim of the Pacific Ocean, making the region prone to multiple volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. Consequently, natural disaster management seems to be a prime area of cooperation for these like-minded Indo-Pacific countries.

In the four phases of disaster management (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery), how can the Quad best serve as an avenue of regional cooperation?

Disaster management is operational at four stages, two of which are particularly relevant for the Quad. These are disaster preparedness and disaster response.

With respect to disaster preparedness, all the Quad countries have developed sophisticated systems of dealing with disasters, each excelling in different ways. For example, Japan has an efficient earthquake early-warning system, while India has a tsunami-alert system for the Indian Ocean and Australia has the same for the Pacific Ocean. The United States has also developed tools for mapping disaster vulnerability. From this, there is ample space for information sharing, technical knowledge, and best practices that are worth learning, and bad practices that must be avoided.

The Quad can thus engage in developing and coordinating better early-warning systems and capacity-building initiatives by hosting workshops and training programs. This would not only enhance the prowess of its member states but also benefit those countries that might seek to partner with the Quad. As the fact sheet released by the White House in the buildup to the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo in May 2022 claimed, Quad partners will convene technical experts to enhance cooperation for additional disaster mitigation and HADR workshops. They will also work together to improve crisis preparedness and early warning. In the same manner, the Quad can host joint disaster management exercises, which would train the participating countries in delivering better disaster responses.

With regard to disaster response, each of the member countries is an internationally recognized provider of HADR. Hence, the Quad can engage in search and rescue or relief operations in the event of a disaster. Some hiccups, however, could hinder such initiatives—for example, the disparity in HADR funding between countries. Australia’s reliance on civilian forces and bilateral engagements for providing disaster relief might also make it difficult to involve a military-oriented approach to disaster response.

Nonetheless, this avenue is worth exploring and may prove effective in the event of another disaster as calamitous as the 2004 tsunami. The Quad emphasized building links between response agencies of member states to provide timely and effective HADR support to the region in its Joint Statement on Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, released in February 2022. At the recently concluded May summit, leaders established the Quad Partnership on HADR in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen their collaboration and effectively respond to disasters in the region.

### Quad Key To Vaccines

#### The Quad is key to vaccine development – new partnership plans to manufacture over 1 billion vaccines over 2022 alone

Laskar, 22

[Rezaul H., Foreign Affairs Editor at Hindustan Times, “Quad announces measures to boost vaccine partnership”, Hindustan Times, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/quad-announces-measures-to-boost-vaccine-partnership-101644602205436.html>, accessed 7-15-2022, BB]

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad on Friday announced measures to boost its vaccine partnership, including the delivery of the first batch of Quad-supported jabs in the first half of 2022 and a Covid-19 Global Action Plan to enhance coordination in recovery efforts.

The foreign ministers of India, Australia, Japan and the US reviewed the Quad Vaccine Partnership, which was launched in March last year, during their meeting in Melbourne. The partnership envisages the production of one billion doses of US-developed vaccines in India with American and Japanese funding.

“We look forward to the delivery of the first batch of Quad-supported vaccines in the first half of this year,” said a joint statement issued after the Quad ministerial meeting.

The statement said a Global Action Plan for enhanced engagement will be launched to coordinate the response to the Covid-19 pandemic. US secretary of state Antony Blinken told a joint news conference that a meeting is being convened on February 14 on the Global Action Plan that will “drive greater leadership and coordination across regions and sectors to end the pandemic”.

The Quad Vaccine Partnership has made “rapid progress in expanding vaccine production at the Biological E Ltd facility in India, which aims to deliver at least 1 billion vaccines by the end of 2022”, the joint statement said.

In addition, the Quad members have collectively provided more than 500 million vaccine doses out of their pledges to donate more than 1.3 billion doses globally. They are also helping train healthcare workers, combat vaccine hesitancy and augment infrastructure, especially cold chain systems, for “last mile” vaccine delivery, the joint statement said.

Australian foreign minister Marise Payne said her country will bolster the Quad Vaccine Partnership through a further investment in a regional health security initiative for the Indo-Pacific.

External affairs minister S Jaishankar said the meeting had reviewed the Quad’s ongoing efforts to combat the pandemic and “agreed to expedite delivery of safe and affordable vaccines, support capacity building, and augment infrastructure for ‘last mile’ delivery”.

The Quad’s efforts to build resilient supply chains, enhance availability of trusted critical technologies, counter disinformation, and uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system will also contribute to global economic resilience, he added.

The meeting also discussed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the delivery of vital infrastructure that is climate-resilient, and supporting maritime security for Indo-Pacific partners, including strengthening maritime domain awareness, developing offshore resources, and combating challenges such as illegal fishing.

Jaishankar also said the Quad will strengthen existing people-to-people linkages through education programmes and think tank dialogues.

The joint statement said recent natural disasters and the Covid-19 pandemic have highlighted the need to “build and maintain resilience against such events”. The Quad members pledged to strengthen collaboration between their response agencies to provide timely and effective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to the region.

#### Vaccine development is key to resolve future pandemics, which will continue to multiply

Timothy Huzar, 21. [Timothy J. Huzar is an interdisciplinary scholar whose work explores philosophical issues around politics, violence, narration, and care. "Scientists call for ‘pan-virus vaccines’ to prevent next pandemic," Medical news Today, https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/scientists-call-for-pan-virus-vaccines-to-prevent-next-pandemic]//PJ

Pandemics have been increasing over the past 20 years. The swift development of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines was in part due to the structure of the virus. Future viruses that could cause pandemics may be more “evasion-strong.” Investing in the development of vaccines that can respond to a wide variety of virus mutations is key to preparedness, scientists argue. Scientists from the Scripps Research Institute in San Diego, CA, have published a commentary arguing that governments should invest in new vaccine technology to help in the fight against future pandemics. In the article, which appears in the journal Nature, the experts suggest that vaccines that make use of “broadly neutralizing antibodies” could target numerous strains of a virus family, such as coronaviruses or influenza. This could offer comprehensive protection against particularly dangerous viral strains that may emerge in the future. Future pandemics The current COVID-19 pandemic is a recent example of the dangers that easily transmissible and potentially deadly viruses pose to humans. Scientists note that pandemics have been increasing over the last 20 years. Researchers suggest this is driven in part by land-use change such as deforestation and intensive farming practices. These can bring wild animals into closer proximity with humans and livestock, increasing the risk of zoonotic viruses crossing between species. And until the world’s governments respond to these underlying factors, pandemics will pose a significant risk. ‘Evasion-strong’ viruses However, in their new commentary, Dr. Dennis R. Burton and Dr. Eric J. Topol argue that one way of dealing with this threat is investing in vaccine technologies that can respond to a wide variety of virus types. They claim this is particularly urgent because the rapid development of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines was in part possible due to the structure of the virus. Future viruses may not be so amenable to rapid vaccine development using conventional technologies. SARS-CoV-2 has a large attachment site, through which it replicates itself within the host organism’s cells. This structural quality means it is relatively easy to develop vaccines that can stick to the virus’s attachment site, stopping it from working. SARS-CoV-2 is in this sense “evasion-lite,” meaning it does not rely on evading a person’s antibodies to proliferate but by quickly triggering the infection in a person before they have built up an immunological response. However, some viruses are more “evasion-strong.” Dr. Burton and Dr. Topol highlight HIV, which can stay hidden from a person’s immune system for years and generate a vast number of strains within the body. If a respiratory virus with these properties emerges, it will take far longer to develop an effective vaccine, while the potential effects of the virus could be far worse if allowed to develop into a pandemic. New vaccine technology To account for this, Dr. Burton and Dr. Topol argue there should be investment in research around “broadly neutralizing antibodies.” These antibodies are able to effectively respond to a variety of strains of the same virus, not just one particular strain. This means they could be valuable in responding to new mutations of a dominant virus — such as SARS-CoV-2 — as well as potentially offering protection against novel strains of particular virus families, such as coronaviruses.

#### Future pandemics could cause extinction

Lakshmi Supriya, PhD ’21, April 19, Author of the book under review: Eleftherios Phedias Diamandis, is a Greek Cypriot-Canadian biochemist who specializes in clinical chemistry. He is Professor & Head of Clinical Biochemistry in the Department of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. He is also Division Head of Clinical Biochemistry at Mount Sinai Hospital and Biochemist-in-Chief at the University Health Network, located in Toronto, “Humans versus viruses - Can we avoid extinction in near future?” NEWS MEDICAL LIFE SCIENCES, https://www.news-medical.net/news/20210419/Humans-versus-viruses-Can-we-avoid-extinction-in-near-future.aspx

Although we are made up of human cells, we have almost ten times that of bacteria just in our guts and more on our skin. These microbes not only affect locally but also affect the entire body. There is a balance between the good and bad bacteria, and any change in the environment may cause this balance to shift, especially on the skin, the consequences of which are unknown.

Although most bacteria on and inside of us are harmless, gut bacteria can also have viruses. If viruses don’t kill the bacteria immediately, they can incorporate into the bacterial genome and stay latent for a long time until reactivation by environmental factors, when they can become pathogenic. They can also escape from the gut and enter other organs or the bloodstream. Bacteria can then use these viruses to kill other bacteria or help them evolve to more virulent strains.

An example of the evolution of pathogens is the cause of the current pandemic, the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Several mutations are now known that make the virus more infectious and resistant to immune responses, and strengthening its to enter cells via surface receptors.

The brain

There is evidence that the SARS-CoV-2 can also affect the brain. The virus may enter the brain via the olfactory tract or through the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) pathway. Viruses can also affect our senses, such as a loss of smell and taste, and there could be other so far unknown neurological effects. The loss of smell seen in COVID-19 could be a new viral syndrome specific to this disease.

Many books and movies have described pandemics caused by pathogens that wipe out large populations and cause severe diseases. In the essay, the author provides a hypothetical scenario where a gut bacteria suddenly starts producing viral proteins. Some virions spread through the body and get transmitted through the human population. After a few months, the virus started causing blindness, and within a year, large populations lost their vision.

Pandemics can cause other diseases that can threaten humanity’s entire existence. The COVID-19 pandemic brought this possibility to the forefront. If we continue disturbing the equilibrium between us and the environment, we don’t know what the consequences may be and the next pandemic could lead us to extinction.

### Quad Key To Laundry List

#### Quad is key to avoid a laundry list of extinction scenarios – its credibility is key

Oak, 21

[Niranjan Chandrashekhar, Research Analyst at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 26, 2021, “Evolving Idea of the Quad: Emerging Technology”, Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses, <https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/quad-emerging-technology-ncoak-261021>, accessed 7-13-2022, BB]

Over the years, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (**Quad**) has expanded its agenda to adapt itself to face the gen-next threats in the Indo-Pacific, most notably the emerging technology. The Quad was created as an ad hoc group to help the Indo-Pacific littoral states in the aftermath of the Tsunami in 2004. Although the first iteration of the Quad in 2007 was short-lived, the latest iteration promises that Quad is here to stay for decades to come. This inference can be reached based on the expansive agenda that the Quad has drawn for itself, which looks beyond narrow security calculations in the region. The first in-person summit of the **Quad leaders delved upon not only the security situation in the Indo-Pacific but also multiple areas, including the supply of COVID-19 vaccines, climate crisis, terrorism and emerging technology**. By making the emerging technology one of the cornerstones of the grouping, the Quad has **shown its resilience to stay relevant in the fast-changing strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific**. Therefore, it is pertinent to look at the evolution of the second iteration of the Quad and how the minilateral is seamlessly synergising technology with its original agenda of security.

Evolution of the Quad

Amid the belligerent behaviour of China in the maritime continuum of the Indo-Pacific and growing trust and comfort between the four democracies1 , **the Quad re-emerged on the sidelines of** the 31st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (**ASEAN) Summit** and 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, 2017. Four working-level meetings—November 2017, June 2018, November 2018 and May 2019—involving officials from the foreign ministries of Delhi, Washington, Tokyo and Canberra focused on “a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region” benefitting all in the region and the world at large.2 They also **touched upon connectivity, sustainable development, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), cyber security and ASEAN centrality**.3 The separate statements from the four capitals also mentioned about the respect for sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity of all nations in a transparent, economically viable and financially responsible manner.4

In September 2019, the working-level meeting of the Quad was elevated to the ministerial-level meeting when the United States (US) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hosted his counterparts from India, Japan and Australia in New York. Although the leaders did not issue a joint statement post meeting, the issues raised were similar to those raised during the working-level meetings.5 The first ministerial meeting saw a limited expansion of the agenda as the Quad countries “conducted a tabletop counter-terrorism exercise in November 2019 and convened a meeting of cyber experts the following month”.6 As COVID-19 gripped the world in early 2020, the senior officials’ consultation of the four countries “underscored the importance of enhancing the resilience of supply chains” and **added pandemic** **and best practices** to deal with the same in the agenda of the meeting.7 The second ministerial meeting of the Quad in Tokyo, held in October 2020, discussed “post COVID-19 **international order**” and issues related to “**the resilience of supply chains**” in addition to the maritime security issues of the Indo-Pacific.

### They Say: “NATO Deficit/NATO Good”

#### CP solves and guarantees follow on — Quad is key to innovation cooperation and countering China — and Quad gets other countries involved – especially authoritarian countries

Oak, 21

[Niranjan Chandrashekhar, Research Analyst at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, October 26, 2021, “Evolving Idea of the Quad: Emerging Technology”, Manohar Parrikar Institute For Defence Studies and Analyses, <https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/quad-emerging-technology-ncoak-261021>, accessed 7-13-2022, BB]

The joint statement following the Quad leaders’ virtual summit in March 2021 mentioned “critical technologies” three times. The leaders resolved that the Quad “will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific”.11 The minilateral group also launched “a critical- and emerging-technology working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative technologies of the future”.12 Building on the spirit of technological cooperation, the Quad took a holistic view of the emerging technologies and associated issues. In the realm of 5G mobile networks, the Quad, during the first-ever in-person summit in September 2021, decided to deploy “secure, open, and transparent 5G and beyond-5G networks” from trustworthy vendors. The statement exuded confidence about coming up with the “open, standards-based 5G technology”. Individually, the Quad countries devised formal and informal policies to deny entry to untrustworthy telecom vendors.13 The leaders also announced sector-specific contact groups to develop technical standards for emerging technologies. They launched the Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use with the purpose of “guiding not only the region but the world towards responsible, open, high-standards innovation”.14

Sensing the vulnerabilities in the supply chains, the Quad leaders decided “to map the supply chain of the critical technologies and materials”15 and diversify the same. Further, India, Japan and Australia launched Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) to counter Chinese dominance of the supply chains in the region.16 The need to diversify the supply chains away from China was felt intensely in the light of deteriorating relations between China and members of Quad. As Amitendu Palit has argued, the repositioning of strategic supply chains, especially in the field of semiconductors and telecommunications, was part of a broader strategy to decouple from China and “to develop a coalition of like-minded countries for taking on an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific”.17 In the realm of Artificial Intelligence, the Quad countries are working with other like-minded countries for an initiative titled “Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence”18 under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that promotes inclusive and responsible use of Artificial Intelligence.

Domestically, India is taking baby steps to shape the rules and norms vis-à-vis emerging technologies such as 5G and Artificial Intelligence on international platforms. The country is debating the issues related to data sovereignty vigorously. It has also come up with an Approach Document on Artificial Intelligence.19 Bilaterally, India is collaborating with like-minded countries in the field of emerging technologies. India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2021, to enhance cooperation in Information and Communications Technologies, covering 5G technologies, telecom security, submarine optical fibre cable system to islands of India, and spectrum management, among others.20 Similarly, India and Australia have set up the India–Australia Joint Working Group on Cyber Security Cooperation.21 The two countries have also signed the Memorandum of Understanding on critical minerals.22 India is also cooperating with ASEAN for capacity building and knowledge sharing in the areas of Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G, among others, to achieve the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2025 (ADM2025).23 Separately, India and the US have resolved to “revive the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in early 2022, to accelerate high technology commerce in key areas”.24 In October 2020, India joined Japan and Five Eyes Alliance countries to demand access to end-to-end encrypted communication from big tech companies.25

Thus, in addition to its existing agenda of securing free and open Indo-Pacific, the Quad is fast embracing the emerging technology as a critical area to build upon. By spindling around the emerging technologies, the Quad is successfully expanding horizontally. Similarly, with the initiatives such as the Quad plus—which included the foreign secretary-level meeting of New Zealand, Vietnam, South Korea and the foreign ministers-level meeting of Brazil, South Korea, Israel to discuss COVID-19—the Quad is stretching laterally. As authoritarian societies are better equipped to extract data from their citizens than free societies26 , the Quad is trying to offer an alternative model different from the coercive vision of the authoritarian states in the Indo-Pacific. With the emerging technology intruding into our daily lives and changing how nations create power and wield it against one another27 , the Quad is proving to be a prudent minilateral to cope with the technological churn in the Indo-Pacific.

#### Its momentum is accelerating and it’s expanding – guarantees Asian support

Goldberg, 22

[Jeff, director of regulatory policy at NDIA, June 24, 2022, “Quad Needs U.S. Tech to Secure Indo-Pacific”, National Defense, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/24/quad-needs-us-tech-to-secure-indo-pacific>, accessed 7-13-2022, BB]

Despite the protests from China, the momentum behind the Quad is accelerating. Cooperation has increased, and there are talks surrounding the expansion of this arrangement to include other regional powers. What does such cooperation mean for the United States and its defense industrial base?

Following the recent Quad meeting, the White House released a statement addressing key areas of future cooperation. “Critical and Emerging Technologies” were specifically highlighted and the following topics were addressed.

It was announced that the “Quad will cooperate on technical exchanges and testbed activity to advance interoperability and telecommunications cybersecurity.” Furthermore, the Quad members launched a “consortium of investors that seeks to advance access to capital for critical and emerging technologies within and across the Quad.”

Finally, the member nations launched a “Quad Cybersecurity Partnership” that will “aim to prevent cyber incidents, prepare national and international capabilities for potential cyber incidents, and/or respond quickly and effectively to a cyber incident, when or should one occur.”

#### Turns case — India’s membership is key to counter China without militarizing the Quad – and CP is key to amend internal struggles between France and other NATO countries among other impacts

Trivedi, 21

[Atman, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and has over twenty years of foreign policy and trade experience with expertise in India and the broader Asia region, “A reinvigorated Quad is becoming a key element of the new US administration’s Asia policy—just not in the way you expected.”, Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/a-reinvigorated-quad-is-becoming-a-key-element-of-the-new-us-administration/>, accessed 7-14-2022, BB]

A reinvigorated Quad is becoming a key element of the new US administration’s Asia policy. Its members—Australia, India, Japan, and the US—convened virtually in March at the leader level. Amid multiple global crises, they wisely opted to focus on concrete ways to deliver for their people and the region. The grouping sought to prove that democracy still works, as President Biden likes to say. The Quad Leaders’ communique set the bar high: cooperation on “the defining challenges of our time.”

Largely across US party lines, the consensus is building that China’s economic and military aggression ranks high among defining global challenges. But rather than construct an anti-China military alliance, the Quad has so far opted for a pragmatic and unifying focus on urgent global problems. That decision in part acknowledges India’s reluctance to antagonize China, especially while their border dispute remains unresolved. The smaller ASEAN countries and, to a lesser extent, even linchpin US ally South Korea, are wary of being jostled about by major power competition. More fundamentally, the region wants to tackle pressing issues like the pandemic and climate change.

Hopes were high in the early spring that the Quad’s ambitious plan for India to manufacture one billion vaccines, with financial and logistical assistance from the others, could help bring the COVID-19 pandemic to a swift conclusion. Southeast Asia was to be a primary beneficiary. But that was before a catastrophic second wave struck India, and the delta variant laid siege to unvaccinated Americans. The in-person Quad Leaders summit should clarify where the promising vaccine partnership stands.

The coalition also identified climate change as a top priority back in March. Since then, the countries appear to have stepped-up their cooperation in the last few months. For instance, Special Envoy John Kerry launched a new climate financing mechanism while in India last week. With COP26 mere weeks away and faith in global efforts wavering, the Quad countries need to demonstrate their firm commitment to cleaner technologies and support for emissions reduction.

The partners will also discuss progress related to critical and emerging technologies—now a significant dimension of preserving free and open societies. They will exchange views on reducing escalating tensions over the Taiwan Strait and addressing the tragedy unfolding in Myanmar. While defense ties are not the leading edge of the Quad, the leaders may not pass up the opportunity for discrete conversation about Western Pacific and Indian Ocean security.

The US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s reemergence elevates longstanding security concerns for India, in particular. New Delhi’s dodgy neighborhood has undoubtedly grown more dangerous. India-focused terrorist groups are likely emboldened by the return of an especially strict variant of political Islam to Afghanistan. In the past, the Taliban provided a playground for violent extremists targeting India and the West. The growing imperative for India to secure continental borders could distract from Asian maritime activities, unless likeminded friends can help it manage the increasing risk of terrorism.

The Quad Leaders will be meeting right after the big reveal of AUKUS, a new Indo-Pacific coalition launched by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. AUKUS should complement the Quad’s early focus on non-military issues. Unlike it, the newcomer will be focused squarely on defense, related science, and technology cooperation. This emphasis reflects Washington’s serious determination to work with allies to create a favorable balance of power to deter China. Europe also remains critical to this project. It is worth exploring whether India or Japan can use growing Indo-Pacific cooperation with France to help smooth over Paris’s recent public disagreement with Canberra, Washington, and London.

The essential point remains this: In the past 18 months, China has resorted to economic coercion against Australia and Europe, military coercion against India, and elevated regional anxiety levels through heightened sovereignty claims, often far from established borders. To the extent AUKUS can induce greater caution and restraint from China around its periphery, that should be a welcomed development for India, the Quad, and the region.

The Quad and likeminded democracies are all eagerly exploring overlapping security arrangements in response to a shifting power balance. While they do so, it is vital that these liberal societies take the necessary steps to secure democratic institutions against the polarizing forces of nationalism, populism, and xenophobia. Distracted or divided democracies often have a way of letting domestic politics seep into foreign policymaking, which can lead to national interests being defined more narrowly to the detriment of international partners.

### They Say: “CP Doesn’t Solve Quad Credibility”

#### The counterplan is vital to strengthen the Quad — emerging technology cooperation is key.

Goldberg, 22

[Jeff, director of regulatory policy at NDIA, June 24, 2022, “Quad Needs U.S. Tech to Secure Indo-Pacific”, National Defense, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/24/quad-needs-us-tech-to-secure-indo-pacific>, accessed 7-13-2022, BB]

This list of ambitious objectives, while not exhaustive, has clear implications for U.S. industry. Not only will U.S. industrial forces be called upon to cooperate with key allies, but they are doing so with a purpose.

Based on the White House statement and other administration comments, the defense industrial base will be instrumental in fostering enhanced cooperation between the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies. Whether it be information sharing or the development of essential technologies, industry will be a key instrument in U.S. efforts to deter threats in a vital region.

## Trilateral Israel-India-U.S. CP

### 1NC — Trilateral Israel-India-U.S. CP

#### Next off is the Trilateral Israel-India-U.S. Counterplan.

#### The United States federal government should establish a trilateral defense innovation partnership with the Republic of India and the State of Israel focused on artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and cybersecurity, including by establishing formal cooperation between India’s Innovations for Defence Excellence, Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development, and the U.S.’s Defense Innovation Unit, creating a startup corridor by conjoining their nation’s innovation hubs, establishing a seed fund with a substantial multi-year funding commitment, and expanding academic collaboration.

#### The counterplan solves the case and strengthens trilateral U.S.-India-Israel relations — it’s key to out-innovate Russia and China on emerging tech.

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“India, United States, Israel Should Pursue a Defense Innovation Triad,” *National Defense Magazine*, December 10th, Available Online at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/12/10/india-united-states-israel-should-pursue-a-defense-innovation-triad, Accessed 07-14-2022)

The United States and India on Sept. 3 signed an agreement to co-develop air-launched unmanned aerial vehicles as part of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative, a bilateral cooperation mechanism for defense trade and joint technology development. Under the agreement, the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory will collaborate with India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation and air force for “design, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of systems” to co-develop the UAV prototype.

Capitalizing on this agreement on air-launched UAVs, the United States and India can advance their shared defense technology goals by involving a close military partner, Israel. If these three like-minded and tech-savvy democracies join hands to bring together their defense innovation communities in Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru, it will be a crucial step in materializing a new kind of trilateral defense partnership.

The underlying assumption behind this potential collaboration is this: with the breakneck speed of advancements in emerging technologies like robotics, artificial intelligence and quantum computing, solo national efforts in developing and adopting them won’t go far.

The United States and India commenced defense technology cooperation in 2015 when they renewed the “Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship,” a bilateral defense pact. Under this agreement, they explored basic technologies in the beginning, termed as “pathfinder projects.” The intent was to harness America’s advanced defense industrial base to India’s desire to achieve self-reliance in defense technology through the “Make in India” campaign.

But despite their synergies, both countries were unable to make good on this collaboration as they discussed and explored many projects in the next few years, only to abandon them later. Some of the initial projects included the RQ-11B Raven unmanned aerial system, mobile electric hybrid power sources and a digital helmet mounted display system.

Therefore, the present agreement on air-launched UAVs is significant as it marks the first time that both countries appear to have made progress beyond initial deliberations. It leverages the U.S. and Indian governments’ defense research establishments to deliver the next-generation combat capability.

Leveraging this progress in bilateral defense technology cooperation, the United States and India must look at ways to achieve more from their partnership.

One way to do this is by shaping trilateral cooperation involving Israel, with a focus on emerging technologies. Such a partnership would build on Israel’s robust bilateral military ties with the United States and India. U.S.-Israel defense cooperation already has a strong research and development component to innovate capabilities ranging from missile defense to anti-tunnelling systems. Likewise, India and Israel have carved out a solid defense trade and R&D partnership including the development and operationalization of the Barak-8 air-and-missile defense system.

U.S.-India-Israel trilateral cooperation on emerging technologies will capitalize and expand on these existing bilateral synergies. A focus on startups and the deep defense innovation in Israel and the United States offers a clear pathway to initiate and nurture this cooperation.

The Pentagon has tapped into Silicon Valley’s innovations by setting up the Defense Innovation Unit. It works closely with the tech industry and startups to shortlist, fund and develop emerging technologies including AI, autonomous systems and cyber.

Israel too has created a thriving defense innovation base centered in Tel Aviv. This has made Israel a technologically advanced military power and earned it the “startup nation” nickname.

India is following the lead set by Israel and the United States in tapping startups for defense innovation. Under a new flagship initiative called the “Innovations for Defence Excellence” (iDEX) program, India is asking its domestic startup ecosystem, particularly in Bengaluru, to arm the Indian military with technologies like soldier protection systems, secure hardware encryption devices, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, and AI-based satellite image analysis, among others. This is also bringing commercial participation from the United States as many Indian startups have investments from Silicon Valley venture funds like Artiman Ventures (Tonbo), Accel and IDG Partners (Axio Biosolutions) and WRVI Capital (ideaForge).

There is an opportunity to take this one giant step forward by creating a startup corridor that conjoins the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru.

This corridor can potentially cover emerging technologies like quantum science, AI, drones, blockchain, autonomy and robotics, 5G/6G, additive manufacturing, and advanced battery technology and power sources.

For many of these technologies, Israel and the United States have already reached an advanced stage of research and cooperation, compared to India which is still discussing the implications of some technologies like AI and quantum computing, and expanding its technological capabilities in others such as robotics. Their acquisition will augment options for the Indian and American militaries in dealing with an aggressive China.

Beijing has anchored its flagship national policies such as “Made in China 2025” on these strategic technologies. Beijing perceives them as multi-use, thereby blurring the distinction between civil and military applications. It has also joined hands with Moscow to develop new technologies. As a result, the United States, with the largest spending on defense R&D among the democratic states, no longer enjoys the absolute technological lead it earlier had.

China’s determined pursuit of tech supremacy coincides with its confrontationist attitude against neighbors and adversaries, as seen most recently in the border standoff with India in the Himalayas and escalated violations of Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. These developments make it imperative for the United States to bolster its existing R&D activities in emerging technologies by enlisting allies like India and Israel.

The idea of trilateral cooperation is not new. In recent years, Indian American diaspora associations and Jewish American associations in the United States have repeatedly argued for creating a technology triangle between the three countries. Even the governments have tried their hand. In September 2020, Bonnie Glick, then-deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, mentioned that the three countries had explored initial cooperation in 5G communication technology.

Against this backdrop, the three countries can initiate discussions for a formal collaboration between India’s iDEX, Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development and the United States’ DIU. They can then institute flagship technology programs to develop use-case scenarios. Alternatively, they can establish a joint group to identify and monitor emerging technologies, before deciding to collaborate.

To enable partnerships between these defense innovation ecosystems, the three countries can create a seed fund that offers initial funding to the startups’ ideas, even before they reach the technology demonstration/prototype stage. The seed fund may take the form of a multi-year commitment from the three countries. An additional layer will be an academic collaboration among the nations’ premier tech institutions.

Another way to forge collaboration between startups is to hold hackathons where teams representing the countries will work on problem statements identified by their militaries. There is a precedent for this. In 2008, the Indian and U.S. armies held an event called MAV08 in India to develop feasible micro air vehicles technology.

Steps such as these will facilitate collaboration on defense innovation.

The idea is not without its challenges. One principal obstacle is Israel and India’s defense relations with other countries. Among these are India’s Cold War-origin defense ties with Russia. India has veered away from Russia in the last decade, with Israel and the United States becoming principal weapons suppliers.

However, New Delhi continues to purchase major equipment from Moscow, like the S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile system. This purchase has caused considerable irritation in India-U.S. ties. India has explained the rationale of acquiring this system to the U.S. government, but Washington has clarified that New Delhi is not guaranteed to get a waiver under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which imposes sanctions against countries that engage in significant transactions with the Russian security establishment. This issue is expected to generate friction as the delivery of the S-400 is scheduled to begin by the end of 2021.

Meanwhile, Israel’s defense ties with China and Pakistan can be problematic for trilateral cooperation. Israeli arms sales to China began in the 1980s and flourished over the years. But by the late 1990s, the United States, concerned by Chinese military modernization, began vetoing these sales including a highly lucrative deal involving the Phalcon airborne early warning radar system.

In 2005, the U.S. showed its resentment by imposing sanctions on Israel over the latter’s reported sales of Harpy drones to China. There have been no additional sales to Beijing since then, but Israeli media has reported instances of unofficial and illegal sales to China. It has also reported similar sales to Pakistan, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

These defense ties with other countries, overlooking the partners’ security interests, may complicate a potential trilateral teaming. However, a frank dialogue addressing these differences and developing a shared understanding of the threat environment can certainly enhance compatibility.

Rapid technological advancements today will ensure that those nations which harness and adapt them will be ahead of their competitors. Hence, the United States, India and Israel need to join hands to expand their advantage. The logic of undertaking such an effort becomes even more apparent in the face of the challenge of a once-in-a-century pandemic of COVID-19, which has strained economies and resource mobilization and distracted many countries from their strategic goals.

This trilateral partnership, therefore, holds promise for overcoming these trying times.

#### The counterplan alone is key to strengthen trilateral relations — the signal of deeper U.S. support is key.

Carafano 17 — James Jay Carafano, Vice President of National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation, former Member of the Advisory Council at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, former Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former Assistant Professor and Director of Military Studies at the Center of Military History at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point), former Fleet Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, former Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, holds a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History from Georgetown University, 2017 (“America's Future Is with India and Israel,” *The National Interest*, July 23rd, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-future-india-israel-21629, Accessed 07-14-2022)

Time for a Trilateral

The growing strategic convergence between Washington and Delhi suggests another initiative that could help advance the administration’s notion of shared responsibility. Few steps signal shifting strategic intentions more than multilateral dialogues. They presage evolving networks of relationships—particularly when the talks span multiple strategic regions. In that respect, a trilateral dialogue among India, the United States and Israel would draw the attention from friends and competitors alike.

U.S. participation in this dialogue would demonstrate that the White House is thinking of the long bridge that spans vital U.S. interests and protection of the commons across the expanse of the Indian Ocean. It would also reassure the other participants Washington sees them as valued global strategic partners—not just regional allies.

Here are five natural issues where high-level consultation among these like-minded nations could prove highly productive.

Getting Serious About Cyber.

Cyber will unquestionably be a cornerstone of the U.S.-India strategic relationship. There are exciting opportunities for both countries. Already a small-cyber power punching above its weight, Israel fits in nicely between the interests and capabilities of the other two countries.

Pondering One Belt One Road.

Hard thinking about the opportunities and challenges posed by China’s initiative ought to be paired with a discussion of what role the United States should play in making its economic presence felt across the expanse of the Indian Ocean. China’s biggest tool these days is the checkbook. What is Washington going to bring to the table, where and why? Learning the perspectives of nations from different parts of the commons linking East and West can help the United States develop the right answers to these questions.

Countering Islamist Threats.

From terrorist attacks to Islamist ideology, the United States, Israel and India have the same problem—stopping terrorist murderers, dangerous ideologues and building common cause with the breath of the Islamic world that rejects the violence and extremism that affects them worst of all. Few topics merit joint discussions and action more.

Seeing the Sea.

Situational awareness in the maritime domain is a priority for all the three countries. These are topics where sharing ideas make sense.

Defending the Free World.

U.S.-Indian defense cooperation is the face of the future. F-16 production in India is one big idea on the table. There are many more. With global supply chains for major defense equipment that might well include suppliers and manufactures across multi-tiers in all three countries, discussing the possibilities together at one table might spark some innovations.

Start at the Start

A trilateral dialogue might profitably address a long list of topics, from energy to artificial intelligence. The five ideas presented above are a logical place to start. All that’s needed is the will to get a high-level dialogue going—a dialogue that can move the United States to the next level of global diplomacy.

#### That solves the case and a long list of catastrophic risks including terrorism, global authoritarianism, the LIO, climate change, water scarcity, agriculture, space, energy, and hybrid war.

Sabu and Dani 21 — Jithin Sabu, Senior Research Associate at the CUTS International Washington DC Center and the Centre for International Trade, Economics, and Environment (India), holds an M.A. in Developmental Studies from the Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati (India), and Tanvi Dani, Research Intern at CUTS International, 2021 (“Leveraging India-Israel-US Trilateral Cooperation,” CUTS International Washington DC Center Briefing Paper Number 3, August, Available Online at http://www.cuts-wdc.org/pdf/briefing-paper-3-india-us-israel\_trilateral\_cooperation.pdf, Accessed 07-14-2022, p. 1-6)

Introduction

India, Israel and the US have robust democratic systems and shares common values, on which their continual cooperation hinges. There was constant upscaling of bilateral relations between India-US, India-Israel and US-Israel in the past decades. The three countries conducted a trilateral virtual summit in 2020 to discuss trilateral partnerships in technology, strategic affairs and development. They are currently cooperating to develop an open, reliable and safe to use next-gen 5G technology.

However, the three countries are yet to utilise their full potential for a strong and sustainable trilateral partnership in many areas. A broader and close-knit defence cooperation network between these democracies is the need of the hour. This Briefing Paper looks into the trilateral cooperation between the three countries and the potential areas to collaborate trilaterally.

Background

India, Israel and the US have robust democratic systems and shares common values, on which their continual cooperation hinges. The three also boast of big free-market economies and thus, bilateral trade between each of the countries has been significant since India opened up its economy in the 1990s.

Since the last few decades, bilateral trade and cooperation between Israel and India have scaled new heights. Apart from actively cooperating in agriculture and academics, India has become the largest importer of Israeli defence equipment. Israel has aligned itself with the Make in India initiative programme and has set up bilateral sub- working groups on Artificial Intelligence (AI), innovation, and technology transfer.

On a similar note, India-US relations are at an all-time high, spanning multiple areas of bilateral cooperation. Recent developments between these countries include the US conferring India with the title of a Major Defence Partner in 2016, India receiving Strategic Trade Authorization-1 Status in 2018,i and co-development through the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) mechanism since 2012. India and the US have also deepened cooperation in information sharing, interoperability and maritime cooperation.

Likewise, being the first country to recognise the statehood of Israel in 1948 and Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2017, the US has developed a strong bilateral relationship with Israel. The strategic partnership between the US and Israel has been booming for decades and successfully established a thriving defence technology corridor.

Overall, the three nations have robust bilateral cooperation mechanisms in various areas, including defence and technology. In addition to developing robust bilateral ties, there has been progress in achieving trilateral cooperation in recent years.[end page 1]

The three countries conducted a trilateral virtual summit in September 2020 to discuss partnerships in technology, strategic affairs and development. During the summit, it was decided that the three countries will cooperate in developing open, reliable and safe to use next-generation 5G technology.

However, the three countries are yet to utilise the full potential for a strong and sustainable trilateral partnership in many areas. The current times dictate the need for a broader and close-knit defence cooperation network between these democracies. The three countries share common interests in the Indian Ocean region. The trilateral cooperation of the three is vital in countering any threat to their common interests by any regional powers.

Apart from that, the three countries face threats of Islamic terrorism and the rising authoritarianism in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Europe. A trilateral strategic agreement on information and intelligence sharing between the three countries can be helpful in coping with these challenges.

India and the US are already cooperating in trilateral initiatives in African and Asian countries for global development on clean energy, regional connectivity and disaster risk reduction. The US and Israel have trilateral partnerships with countries such as Jordan. An India-Israel-UAE trilateral partnership is also in the works.

As countries believing in a rules-based international order where all the countries develop and share the benefits of development equitably, India, Israel, and the US have a responsibility to solve the world's developmental challenges with transparent and open activities. Therefore, the three democracies should strengthen their resolve to cooperate trilaterally.

Prospects of Trilateral Relationship

It is essential to highlight that trilateral collaboration via start-ups in Tel Aviv, Bangalore, and Silicon Valley will be highly beneficial to circumvent the current lengthy defence equipment acquisition process. Furthermore, it will provide an opportunity for fledgling Indian, Israeli and American start-ups to market their emerging technologies through a non-bureaucratic mode and earn both profits and expertise.

Additionally, innovations in emerging and hybrid technologies can be utilised for other non-defence and non-military purposes. To achieve a long-lasting partnership, a strategic path has to be followed by the three nations, starting with the initiation of a formal dialogue between the DIU, iDEX and Maf’at to identify potential areas of research collaboration.

**[\*\*\* Text Box Starts Here \*\*\*]**

Lohia Aerospace Systems

Lohia Aerospace Systems is a key private defence sector player in India, which combines Israeli and Indian defence technology. The group acquired Israel-based Light & Strong Ltd, Israel’s largest private producer of aerospace focused carbon fibre composite components for Israel’s Aerospace and Defence industry. They leverage the Israeli know-how in military technology manufacturing and bring high-end technologies in the defence composites domain to India.

**[\*\*\* Text Box Ends Here \*\*\*]**

Next, the three militaries should aim interoperability to understand each other’s force structure, preferably through joint exercises. Most importantly, a joint start-up defence technology corridor can be set up in Tel Aviv, Bangalore and Silicon Valley to ramp up R&D into hybrid warfare techniques.

Any such trilateral cooperation is set to encounter political obstruction. To counter this, steady steps such as India inviting Israel to the G-20 Summit in 2023, and US designating India as a major non-NATO ally need to be implemented. This is easier said than done. But the three nations should utilise this minuscule head start to accelerate growth in hybrid defence technologies.

In short, this trilateral partnership between the defence powerhouses can be a strong bulwark against the development of sophisticated technologies in authoritarian countries. [end page 2]

With Israel and the US showing keen interest in India’s Make in India initiative, the loosening of domestic FDI restrictions, and increasing the ease of doing business, potent defence entrepreneurial trilateral bases can be set up in the start-up cities of the three countries.

The Covid-19 crisis and burgeoning aggression by the authoritarian states have heightened the aspiration for faster innovation and better, high-tech solutions to health, security, and environmental concerns.

Challenges to Trilateral Partnership

Trilateral cooperation has been discussed for quite some years, but there are a few apparent challenges in the conceptualisation of this partnership. Firstly, India retains some of its defence cooperation deals with Russia (former the Soviet Union) and has recently ordered the Russian S-400 missile defence system.

Considering that the US sanctions any country buying weapons from its erstwhile Cold War adversary through the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), India could be sanctioned too. Furthermore, Israel has defence ties with adversaries of India and the US, which could displease them. The US sanctioned Israel after it supplied Harpy Drones to China in 2005.

Nevertheless, other challenges like strict FDI regulations and tax burdens have been relaxed under the Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP). Additionally, under the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020, two kinds of lease agreements - - foreign and Indian -- have been devised to smoothen and shorten the foreign defence acquisition process.

Moreover, the DPEPP has eased the burden on start-ups and MSMEs by establishing the Defence Investor Cell (DIC) as an intermediary between them and the central, state and other authorities.ii

Additionally, the sudden departure of former PM Benjamin Netanyahu and the arrival of his political rival Naftali Bennet in Israeli politics might have implications over Israel’s relationship, both with the Biden government in the US and the Modi government in India.

While Trump, Netanyahu, and Modi shared a rapport conducive to greater integration between the three nations, it remains to be seen whether Biden will maintain interest in a trilateral partnership with Bennett at the helm.

Even before the pandemic, the US-Israel and US- India security and trade architecture was fairly robust and integrated. The weak link in a possible trilateral partnership is undoubtedly India-Israel. While in the recent UN vote on Palestine, India’s decision to abstain sent a message of fluctuation.

It was necessary to convey that India would not move against Israeli interests on the international stage. Nevertheless, India’s soft stance on the Palestinian issue might not bode well with the far-right Israeli PM and the effects of this need to be closely monitored.

Potential Areas of Trilateral Collaboration

a) Defence Technology

The private defence manufacturers and start-ups in the three countries can collaborate for defence innovation. Partnering with the technical hub of the US -- the Silicon Valley - by recruiting directly from the valley and co-locating, the US Department of Defence’s DIU (Defence Innovation Unit) was able to produce a submarine-launched unmanned aerial system in eight months, avoiding the lengthy bureaucratic process of the Defence Department.iii

Taking inspiration from this success, India launched its own iDEX programme to achieve collaboration with start-ups, academia and R&D institutes to identify and implement new technologies. Israel has a superior defence innovation industry centred around Tel Aviv. They possess a close-knit network of military, academia, defence industry, start-ups and investors synchronised through the Ministry of Defence’s Directorate of Defence Research & Development (Maf’at).iv

Currently, a strong defence industrial base exists in Bangalore and Hyderabad where Israeli [end page 3] and American firms collaborate with the local defense and aerospace start-ups.

The recent corporatisation of the Indian ordnance factory boards provides ample opportunities for the private sector in the US and Israel to collaborate with the newly created Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) in innovation and production of modern equipment and weapons.

The three countries should collaborate on emerging technologies, which utilise Artificial Intelligence (AI) and blockchain technology, that can be used for cyber defence and resilient communications and a defence Internet of Things.

b) Health

Even before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Israel and India cooperated strongly in healthcare and worked together on augmenting the quality of healthcare infrastructure.

The advent of pandemic has further strengthened the resolve to cooperate, as both nations have suffered heavy casualties. This resulted in India and Israel signing an agreement to cooperate in healthcare and medicine on December 21, 2020.

Furthermore, there is extensive scope for further collaboration in the field of healthcare. Israel has developed technologically superior emergency healthcare infrastructure (ambulance riding emergency responders) and entrepreneur Avi Jorisch has promised that “it is

c) Digital Leadership and Innovation (5G and onwards)

In the recent virtual trilateral summit between the three countries, a trilateral partnership in the areas of digital leadership and innovation was announced. The collaboration would focus on “delivering the next generation 5G technology in a way that is ‘open, interoperable, reliable and secure’”vi.

This trilateral cooperation in 5G-technology is a good start and would help challenge the dominance of some authoritarian countries in the realm of critical technologies. The cooperation should expand to other digital space areas, such as creating a joint defense system against cyber threats and hacking of critical supply chains.

The three countries can jointly explore the opportunities in the digital economy space by focussing on the next-generation technologies such as the blockchain technology. Collaboration in the areas of technology-enabled innovations such as renewable energy, electric vehicles, advanced robotics, and augmented and virtual reality will be significant in the changing global context.

d) Cooperation in Dealing with Climate Change and Water Scarcity

India, Israel, and the US can collaborate to develop innovative solutions to tackle climate change and deal with water scarcity. In Bangalore’s Tech Summit-2020, entrepreneur Avi Jorisch from Israel expressed hope that Israel and India would produce sustainable energy.

He pointed out Israel’s extraordinary achievement of becoming water self-sufficient despite having 60 per cent desert land by leveraging advanced technologies. For instance, Israel has perfected water desalination, a project initially created in the US. It has built about 400 desalination plants, including one in California and another one in Chennai.

Since bilateral cooperation in this arena is well underway, the trilateral partnership can work on wastewater recycling, drip irrigation for Indian [end page 4] farmers and crafting other innovative technological solutions to environmental problems. It can make ‘clean and affordable energy for all’ a reality in the three countries. This will help achieve SDG 7 and contribute to the global efforts in tackling the issues arising due to climate change.

e) Agriculture

Agriculture is a vital sector where the three countries should collaborate to install a modern and sustainable system with high productivity. The use of smart farming solutions such as AI-enabled agricultural technology, increasing agricultural biodiversity, smart logistics for post-harvest deliveries, adoption of automation and future technologies are areas where the three countries can jointly undertake research and explore opportunities.

Collaborations between the agri-tech start-ups in the three countries have to be encouraged. The use of Artificial Intelligence in the farming sector, such as AI-enabled systems to detect pests and weeds, agricultural robotics, in predictive analytics and precision farming, in crop and soil health monitoring systems and in weather forecasting to detect unpredictable weather conditions, will gain further impetus through the collaborations of the start-ups.

f) Skill Development, Innovation and Entrepreneurship

The three countries can collaborate in initiatives aimed at skill development, especially of the youth, in emerging technologies like Blockchain, AI and Data science India and the US can share existing frameworks like the ‘Project Future Ready’ launched by a partnership between Dell Technologies, American India Foundation, National Skill Development Corporation and the University of Mumbai.

This platform aims to equip the future workforce through “career mentoring, leveraging online skilling platforms and providing market

aligned skills training for employability and inculcating entrepreneurial mind-set”vii.

Israel and India have instituted similar initiatives like the ‘India-Israel Global Innovation Challenge’, which seeks to work on innovative solutions in agriculture, health and digital health. These research competitions encourage the youth to participate in brainstorming solutions for common crises while providing an avenue for upcoming entrepreneurs and innovators.

These positive bilateral partnership experiences can be taken forward in the trilateral partnership for extracting greater value in developing the future workforce and coming up with collaborative solutions.

Other areas in which the three countries, their specialised defence agencies and start-up cities can collaborate include, and are not limited to, quantum science, artificial intelligence, blockchain, UAV & Drones and 5G/6G. All three nations have excellent facilities to pursue R&D on these disruptive hybrid technologies.

For example, while Israel has developed an academic and industrial consortium to research on quantum technology, the US’ National Quantum Initiative Act with a US$1.2bn allocation and India’s National Mission on Quantum Technology and Applications are all engaged in studying the applications of quantum technology. Blockchain is another beneficial technology for cybersecurity and communications which India, US and Israel can collaborate on, led by Israel’s expertise.

Conclusion

Through political changes, consensus and trust-building between the three countries, a trilateral partnership can be achieved as win-win proposition. Collaborating on defence innovation will strengthen the relationship by allowing each nation to utilise their technological pool of resources and highly trained human resources in science and technology. [end page 5]

The trilateral partnership has a host of strategic and pragmatic benefits for each of the nations involved. The US, Israel and India share a common interest in combatting international terrorism. Towards this end, an effective and organised intelligence sharing mechanism can be helpful for each of them. Furthermore, the partnership can assist in thwarting their unruly neighbours and rivals.

In addition, this trilateral cooperation can also help add a new member (unofficially) to the Indo-Pacific security architecture. The Quad is growing steadily and might need extra military and logistical support, which Israel could provide.

Countries like China have been achieving steady progress in hybrid defence technologies like AI, quantum computing, robotics and drones through industrial strategies such as “Made in China 2025”. The US’ loss of competitive advantage in hybrid defence technologies like AI, quantum computing, robotics and drones because of the steady progress in these technologies in other countries can be countered by a joint initiative of the three countries.

India has much to gain from the trilateral cooperation in multiple domains such as defence, space, technology and innovation, in modern arenas of the digital economy, and in combating climate change by providing clean and affordable energy to all. Israel could also capitalise on a trilateral cooperation to gain unlimited access to the Indian market and the markets of India’s traditional allies in Asia and Africa.

### Top-Level + Net-Benefit Explanation/Extension

#### Instead of increasing U.S. emerging tech cooperation with *NATO*, the counterplan increases U.S. cooperation with *India* and *Israel*. This solves the case by uniting three leading tech democracies with robust start-up ecosystems and thriving innovation hubs — that’s Patil.

#### This also creates a strong trilateral alliance that prevents a long list of global catastrophic risks including terrorism, global authoritarianism, the LIO, climate change, water scarcity, agriculture, space, energy, and hybrid war — that’s Sabu and Dani.

#### Adopting the counterplan *alone* is key because it signals strong U.S. support. This changes India and Israel’s perception that the U.S. will treat them as “junior partners” and supercharges trilateral cooperation in other areas — that’s Carafano.

#### This outweighs and turns the case. Catastrophic risks are interlocking and wide-ranging. Actively resist the cognitive biases that write-off these “laundry list” impacts because they lack a “specific scenario.”

Kuhlemann 19 — Karin Kuhlemann, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at University College London (UK), Solicitor and Senior Associate at the Financial Conduct Authority—a financial regulatory body in the United Kingdom, holds an LL.B. from the University of London (UK), 2019 (“Complexity, creeping normalcy, and conceit: sexy and unsexy catastrophic risks,” *Foresight*, Volume 21, Number 1, Available Online at https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10060670/3/Kuhlemann\_Complexity%252C%20creeping%20normalcy%252C%20and%20conceit%20-%20final%20revisions%20%28clean%252C%20refs%20corrected%29%20non-anonymised.pdf, Accessed 04-03-2022, p. 7-9)

**[Note: GCRs = Global Catastrophic Risks]**

4. Sexy and unsexy risks

Existential risks are sexy

Some global catastrophic risks are sexier than others. There is something about them that catches our imagination. A meteor strike that consigns humanity to the fate of the dinosaurs. An outbreak of a highly contagious, highly deadly disease that spreads around the globe before we even know what is happening. Hastily deployed nuclear weapons that precipitate a devastating nuclear winter. The emergence of an all-powerful artificial superintelligence that regards humans as a threat, or (say) as useful raw materials for paperclip manufacture, and decides to hunt down and kill every last one of us. Sexy risks, I suggest, are neat, quick, and techy.

Epistemic neatness

Sexy risks have relatively clear disciplinary homes. It is not particularly difficult to identify the academic fields that would be best placed to understand these risks, even if multiple disciplines may need to be involved in devising or implementing potential responses. Astronomers are best placed to investigate the risk of asteroid and comet impacts; likewise, epidemiologists and biologists in relation to pandemics, physicists and meteorologists in relation to the risk of a nuclear winter, and computer and neuro scientists together with philosophers in relation to AI risks. One need not work in the field to have a good intuitive grasp on where to look for the experts on sexy risks. The reasonably transparent disciplinary ownership bypasses much of the well-known difficulties in conducting inter- and multi- disciplinary research, and is likely also conducive to public trust on these experts. [end page 7]

Sudden onset

Sexy risks are expected to crystallise abruptly, with obviously catastrophic outcomes from as little as a few hours to, at most, a few short years. There may be an unexpected strike, or a tipping point; suddenly all hell breaks loose. Or at least, this is how we tend to imagine these risks to unfold. With the arguable exception of long ago global pandemics21, we have no real experience with these risks.

Technology is involved

Sexy risks have a close relationship with rather flattering ideas about human ingenuity and intellectual prowess. Technological progress is seen as either the cause (nuclear war, deadly AI) or the only plausible solution (destruction or deflection of collision hazards in space, new vaccines to solve pandemics; solar flare shields). For many of us there is intrinsic intellectual appeal in thinking about potential technological fixes that could swiftly save large numbers of people from untimely death or untold suffering. Others may find even greater appeal in thinking through the ways in which existing or anticipated future technology could unleash powers we cannot control, to catastrophic consequences; a fittingly Promethean punishment for humanity’s titanic inventiveness, perhaps.

Collective action GCRs are unsexy

Unsexy risks, in contrast, are conceptually disturbing, “wicked” problems (Head and Alford, 2015; Levin et al., 2012) that strain the mind’s eye. Among these risks are climate change,22 topsoil degradation and erosion, biodiversity loss, overfishing, freshwater scarcity, mass un- and under- employment, fiscal unsustainability, and last but not least, the black elephant23 of overpopulation.

Unsexy risks arise from gradual damage to collective goods which are indispensable to the survival and flourishing of human beings and human societies. The harm is neither a matter of blameless bad luck, nor blameable conduct by villainous or blundering agents. Instead, the harm is driven by the aggregate impact over time of human populations, people behaving as they normally do, going about our individual lives in fairly ordinary ways. Unsexy risks are messy, creeping, and politicised.

Epistemic messiness

Unsexy risks resist precise definition and do not to map well onto traditional disciplinary boundaries or institutional loci of governance. Robust research into the causes of and possible solutions to unsexy risks require the combination of perspectives from multiple wildly different disciplines, which is a daunting prospect to many researchers and a poor match to how centres of research tend to be organised and funded. For example, in order to achieve an in-depth understanding of overfishing, it is not enough to understand the biological processes involved (e.g. catching valuable species at a higher rate than fisheries can replenish, the disproportionate removal of mature fish with higher reproductive fitness, etc). One must appreciate the all major facets of the problem, including its drivers, whether demographic (population growth generating greater demand for fish and a greater number of people seeking livelihoods through fishing), economic (e.g. drivers of over-capacity of in the fishing sector), or behavioural (environmentally damaging fishing techniques and practices) as well as social factors complicating a solution (e.g. the prevalence of pirate fishing and modern slavery in certain countries’ [end page 8] fishing fleets). And last but not least, one must be able to engage with the ethical and legal framework to which any solution would need to conform, as overfishing, like all other unsexy risks, is closely related to people’s freedoms and livelihoods.

The epistemic messiness makes research inherently more complicated in practice. It also reduces the chances of there being individual experts able to advise policy-makers and productively engage with the public. Instead, in relation to unsexy risks we tend to see fractional expertise from individuals situated within non-overlapping silos (natural scientists, philosophers, legislators, social scientists, economists, activists), whereby most experts are only able to speak knowledgeably about specific, disjointed aspects of the GCR. Those other aspects of diagnosing or mitigating the risk which fall outside the expert’s field are liable to neglect, mischaracterisation or misunderstanding, for example by misguided reliance on false or outdated received wisdom. Much like the proverbial blind men patting seemingly different creatures and struggling to conceptualise the overall elephant, these fractional expertises can lead to contradictory pronouncements, undermining public trust in experts while creating a misleading impression that the very existence of the unsexy risk is a matter of subjective opinion.

Gradual build up

The complexity of unsexy risks is not assisted by their incremental onset. These are “boiling frog” phenomena that play out in slow motion – at least as perceived by humans. The creeping nature of unsexy risks obscures the extent and momentum of accumulated and latent damage to collective goods24, while shifting baselines25 tend to go unnoticed, misleadingly resetting our perception of what is normal26. Even where we recognise that something is a problem, we may still not recognise the underlying, catastrophic trendline, or just how much damage is already baked into states of affairs that we come to regard as normal.

Farmsteads slowly turning into desert (UNCCD, 2017; Gomiero, 2016). Unusually mild winters and exceptionally hot summers gradually becoming the norm (Hansen, Sato and Ruedy, 2012). Wildlife quietly vanishing (Dirzo et al., 2014; Ceballos et al., 2017; Hallmann et al., 2017). First one, then another, then several major cities facing major water shortages (Welch, 2018; Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016). Commercial fishermen going farther and farther afield to catch any fish, and using ever more extreme techniques (McKie, 2014; Roberts, 2012). Younger generations increasingly struggle to get decent work, while public debt continues to balloon (ILO, 2018; WEF, 2017). These are manifestations of unsexy risks, the symptoms of an underlying ailment we do not quite comprehend, or do not want to acknowledge.

### They Say: “NATO Deficit/NATO Good”

#### Sufficiency Standard — even if the plan is “better,” the counterplan is sufficient to solve the case. That’s 1NC Patil, 1NC Sabu and Dani, and…

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“Inserting India Into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation,” Gateway House Paper Number 30, March, Available Online at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DefTech\_Doc-04.pdf, Accessed 07-14-2022, p. 27)

5. Conclusion

Rapid technological advancements today will ensure that those nations which harness and adapt them will be ahead of their competitors. It is imperative that India, the U.S. and Israel join hands to expand their advantage. Each country with its unique advantage in the field of science and technology, innovation and start-ups can make a significant contribution to this collaboration. This trilateral partnership holds the promise to advance regional stability and international security.

#### Specifically, Trilateral Cooperation Solves —

#### 1. Proven Innovation Leadership — the combined capabilities of India, Israel, and the U.S. are sufficient to win the emerging tech race.

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“Inserting India Into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation,” Gateway House Paper Number 30, March, Available Online at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DefTech\_Doc-04.pdf, Accessed 07-14-2022, p. 15-23)

3. Capitalising on Defence Innovation and a Start-Up Ecosystem

Collaborating and building on defence innovation capabilities is key to achieving a long-term advantage in defence research and development. Therefore, to develop an India-Israel-U.S. defence technology partnership, the necessary starting point must be the existing defence innovation bases or start-up ecosystems in Israel and the U.S. These have provided the required technological capabilities to their respective militaries for years. India too has begun to harness the potential of the start-up ecosystem as part of its broader efforts to achieve self-reliance in defence.

In the U.S., compared with the initial technological innovation which originated in government-funded research facilities, today the locus has decisively shifted to the start-up ecosystem in Silicon Valley. This shift happened due to:

1. A decline in the defence R&D budget (from more than 1.2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1976, to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2019).38

2. Investment by the flourishing tech majors like Google and Amazon, in innovative technologies such as robotics and quantum computing.39

3. The enormous amount of venture capital investment in tech start-ups.40

The 2017 National Security Strategy acknowledged that the private sector had taken a lead over federal government agencies and underlined the need for the federal government to tap into these private capabilities.41 The Pentagon still spends a substantial amount of money on R&D as compared to many other industrialised economies—$59 billion as per the 2021 budget request.42 However, its pace of R&D and innovation is simply insufficient to maintain a lead over China, which not only stole technologies from the West but also consistently expanded investment in R&D over the last two decades and drafted its private sector into this effort. These investments have intensified under the “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy.44

One prime example of Silicon Valley’s lead in emerging technologies is quantum computing [end page 15] technology which can be applied to a variety of defence applications such as navigation, radar systems and sensing.45 Even as the U.S. plays catch-up up with China in quantum research, American tech giants IBM and Google have already achieved breakthroughs. In 2019, IBM unveiled Q System One, the first commercial quantum computer.46 This was followed by Google, which claimed quantum supremacy while unveiling Sycamore, its own quantum computer.47

The Pentagon has tried to tap into Silicon Valley innovations by setting up the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU, earlier known as DIUx). Headquartered in Mountain View, California, in the heart of the Valley, DIU works closely with the tech industry and start-ups to shortlist, fund and develop emerging technologies including AI, autonomous systems, cyber, space, human systems, and advanced energy and materials.48 A key obstacle for engaging start-ups in the defence sector is that start-ups view the defence establishment as bureaucratic and its acquisition procedures as cumbersome.

But by co-locating itself in the Silicon Valley and hiring staff from the tech and start-up community, the Pentagon has attempted to align itself with the vibrant start-up ecosystem and cut through traditional bureaucratic red tape to develop new technology and integrate it into the military.49

DIU has faced resistance from the risk-averse defence bureaucracy, but it promises to bring a change. For instance, working with partners from the Valley, the DIU developed and demonstrated a submarine-launched unmanned aerial system within a record time of eight months from the project’s commencement in May 2019.50 By September 2020, this system had already been deployed in the submarine fleet, something which typically takes years in the Department of Defense’s standard— often described as ‘antiquated’—acquisition procedure.51

Compared to the U.S., Israel takes a more organic approach to defence innovation, by synchronising the military, academia, defence industry, start-ups and investors. This has created a thriving defence innovation base centered around Tel Aviv and positioned Israel as a technologically advanced military power. [end page 16]

There are multiple factors undergirding Israel’s approach to defence innovation.

• Foremost is the Jewish perception of ‘siege mentality’ — a belief that the world is predisposed to behave negatively towards them. Since its creation, Israel has been surrounded by hostile neighbors, which has led to the ingrained belief, in Israel’s national and military leadership, that the only way to overcome this hostile strategic environment is by attaining a qualitative military edge over its adversaries.53

• Another factor is a “double feeding” phenomenon — whereby knowledge about the military’s technological requirements constantly circulates through the ecosystem due to conscription or compulsory military service. So, people who have served in the military become part of the tech industry, academia and start-up ecosystem, and are well aware of their military’s requirements.54

• Conscription also means that most of Israelis get an exposure to technology, either through the intelligence apparatus, coding or cyber security.55 This creates a valuable tech-savvy resource pool for the country’s technological-industrial ecosystem.

• Funding is also important: Israel has consistently topped the global charts for spending upwards of 4% of its GDP on R&D.56

These factors make Tel Aviv the second-best innovation base, after Silicon Valley, earning Israel the tag of “Start-up Nation”.57

Due to Israel’s geography, this ecosystem is close-knit with most of the critical actors being co-located. This ingrained advantage has been utilised by the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s Directorate of Defense Research & Development (also known as Maf’at), Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the industry and start-ups to apply emerging technologies for defence use. For instance, the Iron Dome system developed with U.S. assistance uses AI to analyse incoming missiles and determine if people are in danger.58 Likewise, the IDF has used AI to understand videos and read out the events taking place on the screen.59

The IAI too has sought to promote start-ups through an accelerator track, which encourages select start-ups to develop new technologies based on AI.60 [end page 17]

India has begun to look at start-ups as a way to equip its military with niche technology capabilities. Drawing from the U.S.’ DIU experience, India launched a Defence Innovation Organisation and Innovations in Defence Excellence (iDEX) program in 2017 to work with the R&D institutes, academia, industry, start-ups and individual innovators to create solutions to overcome the military’s technological shortcomings.61 Early technologies identified by iDEX for R&D include soldier protection systems, secure hardware encryption devices, GPS anti-jam devices, unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, and 4G/LTE tactical local area network, among others.62 According to the government, more than 300 start-ups are currently engaged by the iDEX program.63 To learn more from DIU experience on engaging start-ups, India and the U.S. have also agreed to assign Indian liaison officers to the DIU’s unit in Silicon Valley.64

There is an opportunity to take this one step forward by joining hands with Israel and the U.S. on emerging technologies. This potential collaboration must conjoin the three innovation hubs of Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru to capitalise on their respective strengths and declared national technology priorities. As Table 2 shows, Bengaluru and Hyderabad, separated by roughly 550 kms., have a vibrant defence industrial base65 with multiple defence public sector units, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) research establishments, private sector companies (including joint ventures with American and Israeli companies) and several start-ups in the defence and aerospace sector which are already contributing in various capacities to India’s defence and space needs. [end page 18]

[Several tables omitted — see URL; end pages 19-21]

As evident, Israel and the U.S. have already reached an advanced stage of research and cooperation for many of these technologies — compared to India which is still discussing the implications of some technologies like AI and quantum computing, and expanding its technological capabilities in others — such as robotics.82

These are disruptive technologies and will shape military doctrines and direct the nature of future warfare. A glimpse of this disruption was available during the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September-November 2020 over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory. During the fighting, Azerbaijan deployed armed drones (purchased from Israel and Turkey) and smart weapons to inflict significant damage on Armenia, which relied on its air defences and tanks.83 [end page 22]

This example, along with similar experiences from the battlefields in Syria and Libya, demonstrates that “software-first” technologies like AI-enabled drones and robotics will play a decisive role in determining the outcomes of the wars of the future.84

This collaboration also offers opportunities for the Indian IT companies which have done coding for the Indian military, to play a major role. Companies such as Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro and HCL Technologies can help the Indian military better identify global technological trends and participate in defence innovation.

These technologies provide a good foundation for trilateral defence cooperation, which will give a technological edge to their respective militaries. Acquisition of these capabilities will particularly augment options for the Indian and American militaries in dealing with an aggressive China, which has adopted a hybrid warfare strategy against its adversaries.

#### 2. Catalyzes Private Sector — trilateral cooperation incubates and accelerates emerging tech innovation.

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“Shaping the Israel-India-US defense technology partnership,” *The Times of Israel*, June 14th, Available Online at https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/shaping-the-israel-india-us-defense-technology-partnership/, Accessed 07-14-2022)

Israel-India defense ties have flourished since establishing formal diplomatic relations in 1992. In July 2017, Narendra Modi became the first-ever Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel, signaling a full normalization of the relationship. During Modi’s visit, the bilateral ties were upgraded to a strategic partnership. A core element of this relationship is robust defense cooperation.

There is an opportunity to take this bilateral cooperation forward and expand it to a trilateral one by shaping a start-up collaboration between India, Israel and the US. Such a potential collaboration can focus on emerging technologies like robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing. This collaboration will build on the national technological priorities of these three like-minded, tech-savvy democracies.

A shared threat perception of being surrounded by hostile neighbors has driven Israel-India proximity. Israel’s annual arms sales to India of an average $1 billion are the mainstay of this relationship. It has supplied India drones, radar systems, satellite imagery, hand-held thermal imagers and night vision devices, proving particularly valuable in counterterrorism operations.

Both countries have co-developed and operationalized the Barak-8 missile defense system. Israel has also participated in India’s initiative of developing a domestic defense-industrial capability. Israeli companies like Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems have established joint ventures with Indian partners to build niche subsystems and homeland security systems. In fact, Israeli companies have quickly identified and used the unique technological solutions offered by Indian companies. A prominent example is Bengaluru-based Tonbo Imaging, whose specialized electro-optics technology is part of Israel’s precision-guided bombs for years.

Just like Israel-India defense cooperation, India-US defense ties too have flourished. Their collaboration spans defense sales and technology co-development and co-production. Moreover, India’s aerospace sector has also become an active participant in the global supply chain of Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

Capitalizing on these bilateral synergies, the three countries can come together to advance their shared technological goals. The rapid development of emerging technologies is making a solo national effort to develop and adopt them inadequate. The tech lead of the US and its allies has diminished in the last few years as China and Russia have collaborated to attain a competitive advantage.

Israel and the US have already begun to collaborate on some emerging technologies. That collaboration has to expand to enlist India, the principal US partner in the Indo-Pacific. The financial logic of such partnership becomes even more apparent with the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has strained economies and resource mobilization and distracted many countries from their strategic goals. Such potential cooperation will enable cost-sharing for innovation, leading to optimal use of finite budgetary resources and achieving economies of scale.

The idea of trilateral cooperation is not unknown – but it is unfulfilled. In recent years, Indian American diaspora associations and Jewish American associations in the US have repeatedly raised the idea of a technology triangle between the three countries. Similarly, in September 2020, Bonnie Glick, then Deputy Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, revealed that the three countries had explored initial cooperation in 5G communication technology.

Establishing a startup corridor involving Tel Aviv, Silicon Valley, and Bengaluru, which brings together the existing defense innovation communities located in these geographies, can be a crucial step in materializing this trilateral partnership. This corridor can cover eight emerging technologies initially: quantum science, AI, drones, blockchain, autonomy and robotics, 5G/6G, additive manufacturing, and advanced battery technology.

In some technologies like AI and quantum science, Israel and the US have already reached an advanced stage of research and cooperation, compared to India, which is in the early stages of research. But all of these technologies figure prominently in the three countries’ national technology priorities. Therefore, they will provide a good foundation for trilateral defense cooperation. It also promises to give a technological edge to their militaries, develop interoperability, and reinforce American and Israeli companies’ access to the Indian defense market.

To take forward the idea of a start-up corridor, the three countries can initiate discussions for a formal collaboration between India’s Defence Innovation Agency, Israel’s Directorate of Defense Research & Development and the US’s Defense Innovation Unit. They can then institute flagship technology R&D programs to develop use case scenarios. The three countries can create a seed fund to enable partnerships between the respective defense innovation ecosystems. Such a fund will offer initial funding to the start-ups’ ideas, even before reaching the technology demonstration stage. The seed fund may take the form of a multi-year commitment from the three countries.

Another way to forge collaboration between start-ups is to hold hackathons where teams representing the three countries will work on problem statements identified by their militaries. An additional layer will be an academic collaboration among the three countries’ premier tech institutions. Potential partners can be the Indian Institutes of Technology (India), Weizmann Institute of Science (Israel) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (United States).

Finally, India will host the G20 Summit in 2023. The G20 does not deal with defense cooperation issues, but it is the world’s most influential economic multilateral forum. More importantly, its members include 11 of the world’s top 20 arms exporters. The host country can invite non-G20 members through the regional consultation mechanism process. India can leverage this to make a symbolic gesture and invite Israel to attend the G20 Summit. With its unique experience in start-ups and innovation, Israel will fit the bill at the G20 meetings.

Technology has become the main driver of contemporary international relations, shaping emerging potential alliances. Keeping up with this broader trend, Israel, the US, and India can take the lead to

**[[[\*\*\*Note Starts Here\*\*\*]]]**

The article appears to cut off a word (or several words?) early. The caption for the photo at the top of the article is repeated after the word “to”: “A ‘Rocks’ air-to-surface ‘bunker buster’ missile displayed at the Aero India trade show in Bangalore, India, in February 2019. (Rafael Advanced Defense Systems).” When cutting this card, no text has been omitted from the article.

**[[[\*\*\*Note Ends Here\*\*\*]]]**

#### 3. Start-Up Corridor Key — it incubates and commercializes emerging tech.

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“Inserting India Into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation,” Gateway House Paper Number 30, March, Available Online at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DefTech\_Doc-04.pdf, Accessed 07-14-2022, p. 25)

3. Develop a Silicon Valley-Tel Aviv-Bengaluru start-up corridor

A critical aspect of this trilateral collaboration will be a start-up corridor involving Silicon Valley, Tel Aviv and Bengaluru, which can bring together the innovation communities located in these geographies to contribute to this partnership. To enable these partnerships, a seed fund can be created by the three countries to offer initial funding to the start-ups’ ideas, even before they reach technology demonstration/prototype stage. The seed fund may take the form of a multi-year commitment from the three countries. As in the case of Israel, the military establishments can encourage the start-ups by incubating their ideas and technologies and also provide an avenue for commercialisation by being their first customers. A positive step has already been taken to lubricate the possibility: Air India has begun direct Bengaluru-San Francisco flights;88 a partnership will create the demand for Bengaluru- Tel Aviv flights as well. Academic collaborations between institutions from the three countries can be explored. Potential partners can be the Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad (India), Weizmann Institute of Science (Israel) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (United States).89

#### 4. Achieves Interoperability — it will be baked-in to the trilateral partnership.

Patil 21 — Sameer Patil, Fellow at the International Security Studies Program at Gateway House—an Indian foreign policy think tank, former Assistant Director of the Joint Intelligence Committee at India's National Security Council Secretariat, holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), 2021 (“Inserting India Into U.S.-Israel Defence Technology Cooperation,” Gateway House Paper Number 30, March, Available Online at https://www.gatewayhouse.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/DefTech\_Doc-04.pdf, Accessed 07-14-2022, p. 24)

2. Define interoperability for the three militaries

A key dimension shaping this trilateral partnership will be developing interoperability among the three militaries. For this, the three partners should define their conceptions of interoperability and elaborate which elements of the force structure should be interoperable. A useful definition of interoperability from the U.S. Department of Defence is “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces, and to use services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”86 The three militaries should also institute an annual joint exercise to develop and understand the challenges in achieving interoperability.87 Such an exercise should be geared towards countering hybrid warfare.

### They Say: “India and/or Israel ‘Say No’”

#### India and Israel “say yes” — they’re already committed to bilateral cooperation, but the counterplan is key to deepen and broaden it.

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The Israeli Defence Minister, Benjamin Gantz, recently concluded a long-pending visit to India. Both countries decided to expand their defence cooperation during his visit, focusing on the emerging technologies. Gantz and his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, signed the ‘India–Israel Vision on Defence Cooperation’ to put together a comprehensive 10-year roadmap to identify new areas of collaboration. The two ministers also exchanged a ‘Letter of Intent’ to enhance cooperation on futuristic defence technologies.

This focus on technological cooperation precedes the robust ties in the defence and security sector, spanning arms sales, military exchanges, and counterterrorism engagement. This article gives a broad overview of the bilateral defence relationship and suggests a way forward for defence technology cooperation.

Since establishing ties in 1992, India and Israel have traversed a long path. Driven by the shared threat perception of being surrounded by hostile neighbours, both countries deepened their exchanges in multiple spheres, including extensive people-to-people contact. The defence and security partnership provided the anchor for this bilateral interaction. The Kargil War of 1999 cemented this cooperation when Israel was one of the few countries to provide direct military assistance to India. Notably, these robust ties precede the India–US defence cooperation which materialised much later.

Defence trade

Since then, India has tended to rely more on Israeli technology and equipment for border security and counterterrorism. This has made India the largest purchaser of Israeli weapons in the last decade, surpassing even the United States, Israel’s principal military ally in West Asia (see figure 1).

[Graphic Omitted — see URL]

India’s arms purchases have provided Israel’s defence-industrial base with steady and much-coveted access to a sizeable market. This passage to the Indian market is even more significant for Israel’s defence industry since the United States, concerned with the qualitative upgrade of Chinese military capabilities, had vetoed Israeli arms sales to China in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

[Graphic Omitted — see URL]

[Graphic Omitted — see URL]

These equipment and platforms have undoubtedly strengthened the Indian surveillance and operational capabilities, particularly in the Kashmir Valley and on the borders. For example, Israeli sensors, Heron drones, hand-held thermal imaging devices, and night vision imaging equipment have proved advantageous for the Indian Army in checking infiltration on the Line of Control and counter-insurgency operations in the Valley’s hinterland. Likewise, last March, the Indian Army leased four Heron drones from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) to deploy them on extended surveillance missions on the Line of Actual Control, amidst the border stand-off with China.

Defence technology cooperation

Beyond defence trade, India and Israel have also been engaged in defence technology cooperation. The symbol of their success is the Barak-8 air and missile defence system. Co-developed by the IAI and India’s Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO), Barak-8 is available in land and maritime versions. It can intercept targets like fighter aircraft, drones, ballistic, and cruise missiles up to 150 km. Further, IAI is also collaborating with the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to convert second-hand Boeing-767 civilian aircraft into mid-air refuellers for the Indian Air Force.

Building on the success of Barak-8, in September 2020, India and Israel established a bilateral sub-working group on defence industrial cooperation. This group is expected to facilitate further technology transfers to India, enable utilisation of bilateral resources, and share industrial capabilities.

Israel’s participation in ‘Make in India’

Supporting the Indian government’s focus on building national defence-industrial capabilities, Israeli companies have forged partnerships with the Indian private sector. This replicates the pattern followed by the major American aerospace companies, which too have built successful commercial collaborations with their Indian private sector partners.

The IAI, Elbit Systems, and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems have set up joint ventures with Bharat Forge, Tech Mahindra, Adani Group, and Tata Advanced Systems to produce niche sub-systems and homeland security systems. For instance, IAI’s subsidiary, ELTA Systems, has a joint venture with the Tata Advanced Systems, called Hela Systems, which manufactures communications, electronic warfare, and homeland security systems. Another collaboration between Elbit Systems and Bharat Forge, called BF Elbit Advanced Systems, supplies artillery guns, guided munitions, and mortar systems to the Indian military. Notably, Israeli companies have quickly identified and utilised the niche technological solutions offered by Indian companies. For instance, Bengaluru-based Tonbo Imaging’s specialised electro-optics technology has powered Israel’s precision-guided bombs for years.

Of course, a big challenge for these companies is uncertainties related to India’s protracted defence acquisition procedure. For instance, in 2019, Elbit Systems was declared the lowest bidder—L1, in the bid to purchase towed artillery gun systems for the Indian Army. Yet, after extensive price negotiations, the government shelved the order, preferring indigenous alternatives. Similarly, plans to acquire an additional fleet of Phalcon airborne warning and control system-enabled planes have stalled for years.

Stepping-up defence collaboration

But beyond these usual challenges, there is a real opportunity for New Delhi and Tel Aviv to advance cooperation. The agreement on enhancing partnership in futuristic defence technologies is an effort in the right direction. Given Israel’s strong focus on R&D, both sides can collaborate on technologies such as additive manufacturing and advanced battery technology and power sources, besides usual flagships such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, and robotics.

To realise the true potential of this partnership, what is needed now is the identification of mutually beneficial technologies, followed by a formal collaboration between Israel’s Maf’at (Directorate of Defence Research & Development) and India’s DRDO along with greater engagement between their respective innovation ecosystems. This will create a sustainable path for collaboration between the two tech-savvy democracies.

#### Status quo cooperation proves they’ll both “say yes,” but the counterplan is key to formalize the partnership and make it effective.

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2. Imperative for a Trilateral Defence Technology Partnership

Despite its flourishing technological-industrial innovation base, the U.S. is now confronted with the reality that it no longer enjoys the absolute lead in many emerging technologies, especially in the defence sector such as drones, robotics, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing. Its principal adversaries, China and Russia, have pursued the same set of technologies to reduce their capability gap with the U.S. and attain competitive advantage. In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin had declared that the country which takes the lead in AI will rule the world.3 China has identified these technologies as strategic technologies and anchored its flagship national policies such as “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy on them.4 In the Chinese Communist Party’s conception, these technologies are multi-use, which blurs the distinction between civil and military, thereby allowing the Party to utilise these technologies not just for national governance and industry, but for defence and security as well. Beijing has also joined hands with Moscow to collaborate and innovate on these technologies.5

China’s confrontationist attitude against its neighbors and adversaries— as seen in the ongoing border standoff with India in Ladakh—coupled with its determined efforts to take the lead in emerging technologies, make it imperative for India, the U.S. and other like-minded countries to bolster their existing research and development activities in such technologies. Though technological advancements are taking place at breakneck speed, it is clear that a solo national effort in developing and adopting critical technologies won’t go far. Therefore, India and the U. S. need to expand their effort and enlist another close partner, Israel, to advance their technological goals. The financial logic of such an effort becomes even more apparent in the face of the challenge of a once-in-a-century pandemic of COVID-19, which has strained economies and resource mobilisation, and distracted many countries from their strategic goals. If such cooperation is undertaken, it will enable cost-sharing for innovation, leading to optimal use of finite budgetary resources and achieving economies of scale.6 [end page 9]

For the United States:

• Israel is a principal military ally in West Asia. It is a technologically advanced partner for research and development in emerging technologies in defence and cybersecurity and also other domains such as renewable energy and food security.7 Israeli defence companies such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) have an extensive engagement with U.S. defence companies like Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Silicon Valley majors such as IBM, Intel and Google have tapped into Tel Aviv’s start-up ecosystem for years.

• India has emerged as a principal U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific and offers a large market for its defence industry. The U.S. has developed a thriving defence and security partnership with India since signing the “Framework Agreement for Defence Cooperation” in 2005 (renewed in 2015).8 In 2020, the ties were elevated to a “comprehensive global strategic partnership.”9

For Israel:

• Substantial American foreign and military aid has enabled Jerusalem to achieve a qualitative military edge over its quantitively superior Arab neighbors.10 Israel has used American aid to innovate and develop military hardware such as the Iron Dome and David’s Sling missile and air defence systems, providing its territory and population much-needed protection from rockets and projectiles fired from neighboring territories. As a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the U.S., it gets specific military benefits like advanced defence technologies on a priority basis and intelligence-sharing.11 The high degree of mutual trust between the two countries is also evident with Israel being the only country to receive unfettered access to American military technology and equipment such as the F-35 fighter jet.12

• India is the largest purchaser of Israel’s weapons, which has provided the latter’s defence industry much-needed, stable access to a larger market and funding for its R&D.13 There is also extensive people-to-people contact between the two countries. Joining hands with India in expanding the scope of bilateral defence cooperation to include the U.S., will not only reinforce its access to the Indian market, but also offer opportunities for exports to emerging markets in Asia and Africa—India’s traditional defence export destinations. [end page 10]

For India:

A potential trilateral defence cooperation will build on the robust bilateral defence and security cooperation developed in the last decade with the U.S. and Israel. Both countries are major defence suppliers to India. They have also taken the initial steps in joint R&D with India’s state-owned defence R&D base.

• Israel: Driven by the shared threat perception of being surrounded by hostile neighbors, India-Israel relations have come a long way since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992.14 Israel’s annual arms sales to India averages $1 billion and is the mainstay of the bilateral relationship. The purchase of various radar and missile defence systems along with drones and avionics (see Table 4 in appendix) from Israel have augmented the Indian military’s surveillance and operational capabilities.15 Israel has supplied India satellite imagery, hand-held thermal imagers and night vision devices which have proved particularly valuable in counterterrorism operations.16

Israel has aligned itself with the ‘Make in India’ initiative which has prioritised the development of a domestic defence industry.17 Both countries have co-developed and operationalised the Barak-8 air and missile defence system.18 They have expanded this cooperation by setting up a bilateral sub-working group on defence industrial cooperation, in September 2020, to focus on technology transfer, co-development and co-production, AI, innovation and joint export to friendly foreign countries.19

The three major Israeli defence companies—IAI, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Elbit Systems—have multiple, long-term joint ventures with Indian private sector companies including Bharat Forge, Tech Mahindra, Adani Group and Tata Advanced Systems to produce niche sub-systems and homeland security systems (see Table 5 in appendix). For instance, the joint venture between Elbit Systems and Adani Defence and Aerospace operates in Hyderabad, the only facility outside Israel which produces the Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).20 In fact, Israeli companies have been quick to identify and use the unique technological solutions offered by Indian companies. A prominent example is Bengaluru-based Tonbo Imaging, whose specialised electro-optics technology has been part of Rafael and IAI’s precision-guided bombs for years. 21 [end page 11]

• United States: Since formalising defence cooperation, India has been inching up the ladder in the U.S. defence bureaucracy: In 2016, it acquired the unique status of ‘Major Defense Partner’ which opened access to advanced American defence technology. In 2017, the updated National Security Strategy described India as a “leading power and stronger strategic and defense partner”.22 This was followed by India receiving the Strategic Trade Authorisation-1 status in 2018, enabling it to access dual-use high technology items—a major breakthrough as India had been denied these technologies for a long time.23

Defence trade and technology co-development and co-production are the two most important dimensions of this relationship. Between 2005 to 2020, the bilateral defence trade was $20 billion (see Table 4 in appendix). 24 American defence equipment has added considerable value to the Indian military’s power projection and surveillance capabilities, particularly in the Indo-Pacific domain.

Beyond defence trade, India’s persistent efforts to achieve self-reliance in defence have offered opportunities for bilateral engagement in technology co-development and co-production through the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) mechanism, created in 2012.25 While the initial focus of this cooperation was on basic technologies—identified as ‘pathfinder projects’,26 the approach has evolved into a focus on customised technologies, which are mutually beneficial. Current projects include co-development of air-launched drones and lightweight small arms technology (see Table 1).27 Also as part of the DTTI, the U.S. is working with India on aircraft carrier design. These technologies are still in the exploratory phase and therefore demonstrable progress is slow.

[Table Omitted — see URL][end page 12]

Through commercial joint ventures between American and Indian companies, India has built a substantial defence-industrial capability, enabling domestic players, like the Tata Group and Bharat Forge, to manufacture and export subsystems as an active participant of the global supply chain (see Table 5 in appendix).28

It is these existing bilateral partnerships that a trilateral cooperation will seek to synergise and expand. A focus on emerging technologies, taking advantage of the deep defence innovation in Israel and the U.S., will offer a clear pathway to initiate and develop this cooperation.

The idea of a trilateral cooperation is not unknown—but it is unfulfilled. In recent years, Indian American diaspora associations along with Jewish American associations in the U.S. have repeatedly raised the idea of a technology triangle between the three countries.29 Similarly, in September 2020, Bonnie Glick, then Deputy Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) revealed that the three countries had explored initial cooperation in 5G mobile communication technology.30

### They Say: “Pakistan DA”

#### Not Unique — tensions and arms racing are already high because of perceived India-Israel defense cooperation.

Arad 18 — Shimon Arad, Ph.D. Candidate at the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa (Israel), former Colonel in the Israeli Defense Forces, 2018 (“How Israel and Pakistan Can Avoid a Nuclear Showdown,” *The National Interest*, February 19th, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-israel-pakistan-can-avoid-nuclear-showdown-24554, Accessed 07-18-2022)

The advancement of Pakistan’s nuclear-missile capabilities and Israel’s growing military ties with India are increasing their respective military relevance for each other. In the absence of formal diplomatic relations and against the backdrop of a prevailing antagonistic public dialogue, the need for an effective and discreet channel of communication between Islamabad and Jerusalem to mitigate misunderstandings and misperceptions about each other’s intentions is growing.

An Antagonistic Dialogue

A high degree of suspicion and mistrust exist between Israel and Pakistan. In particular, Pakistan seems to presume the worst about Israel. At the end of December 2016, a fake-news story triggered a nuclear Twitter confrontation between Israel and Pakistan. A website called “AWD News” claimed that Israel’s defense minister had threatened to destroy Pakistan with a nuclear attack if it sent ground troops to Syria on any pretext. Although clearly fake (the website misidentified the Israeli defense minister as Moshe Ya’alon, who resigned in the previous May), Pakistan’s defense minister hastily tweeted a nuclear threat and warned Israel that “Pakistan is a nuclear state too.”

The growing security relationship between Israel and India, serves to enhance conspiracy theories about the existence of an Indo-Israeli alliance against Pakistan. Thus, unsurprisingly the recent visit by Israel’s prime minister to India in January 2018 produced a bellicose Pakistani response. The foreign minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, stated that Pakistan could defend itself “despite this nexus between India and Israel” that is based on their enmity with Islam. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu wisely reacted by stating that “We (Israel) are not enemies of Pakistan and Pakistan should not be our enemy either”.

The latest decision by the U.S. administration to suspend most of the military assistance to Pakistan has also given rise to suggestions that the United States may be part of this anti-Pakistan allegiance. The chairman of the Senate, Mian Raza Rabbani, recently warned that a nexus between the United States, Israel and India is emerging and the Muslim world needs unity to deal with that problem.

It is unclear to what extent this confrontational attitude truly represents what Pakistan’s leaders believe about Israel or to what extent they based on internal and Islamic considerations and constraints. Hussain Nadim recently claimed that among the high-ranking security personnel, politicians and diplomats “there is a high acceptance and willingness to engage with Israel”, but they refrain from doing so because of the fear of political and religious backlash.

The Significance of Israel-Indian Military Cooperation

From a military perspective, the Israeli-Indo security relationship and the modernization it brings to the Indian armed forces is understood by Pakistan to create vulnerabilities in fundamental military areas undermining the conventional balance of power in South Asia. This security relationship is perceived to have provided India with substantial advantages in the modern aspects of warfare such as: network-centric and electronic warfare capabilities; intelligence and information dominance; day and night maneuverability; long-range modern strike capabilities from the air and the sea that threaten Pakistan’s strategic sites and assets; and antiballistic missile defense systems that improve India’s ability to defend against Pakistani missiles.

To counter this, Pakistan is looking to enhance its security relationships with China and Russia. However, given its limitations in competing with India in a conventional arms race, Pakistan is working to improve the integrity of its second-strike capabilities and to develop its nuclear fighting capability to offset India’s conventional advantages.

#### No Arms Racing Impact — it doesn’t cause war.

Spencer-Churchill 21 — Julian Spencer-Churchill, Associate Professor of International Relations and Director of the Canadian Centre for Strategic Studies at Concordia University (Canada), 2021 (“Embrace the Arms Race in Asia,” *War on the Rocks*, December 10th, Available Online at https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/embrace-the-arms-race-in-asia/, Accessed 07-18-2022)

There is a lot of concern that the rapid build-up in Asia of Chinese and American military power will make war more likely, and that such a war between nuclear-armed powers will be hugely destructive. In this view, arms races are wasteful tragedies that unfold when adversaries fail to negotiate security at a cheaper level of expenditures. Warnings about arms races are also used by concerned anti-war groups, and by China as part of its public diplomacy campaign. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesmen Zhao Lijian warned that “the US, the UK and Australia’s cooperation in nuclear submarines severely damages regional peace and stability, intensifies the arms race.”

But arms races do not cause war. Every case of war that followed an arms build-up was the consequence of the weakness of the attacked party. Any caution by the United States and its allies in equipping for war will reduce deterrence, and will set the circumstances for whether there is a decision to go to war in Beijing. It will tempt Beijing with the prospect of a successful fait accompli attack against Taiwan and its outlying islands of Kinmen, Wuqiu, Matsu, Pratas, Itu Aba, and Penghu.

#### No Indo-Pak War Impact — history disproves.

Ganguly 19 — Sumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University-Bloomington, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign, 2019 (“Why the India-Pakistan Crisis Isn’t Likely to Turn Nuclear: History Shows Escalation Isn’t Inevitable,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 5th, Available Online at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear>, Accessed 10-13-2019)

The Lessons Of History

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan’s original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation.

Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military’s men and materiel. The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations.

Other nuclear states have also clashed without resorting to nuclear weapons. In 1969, China, then an incipient nuclear weapons state, and the Soviet Union, a full-fledged nuclear power, came to blows over islands in the Ussuri River, which runs along the border between the two countries. Several hundred Chinese and Soviet soldiers died in the confrontation. Making matters worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong had a tendency to run risks and dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons, reportedly telling Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that even if half of mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would survive and imperialism would have been razed to the ground. Yet despite Mao’s views, the crisis ended without going nuclear, thanks in part to the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who took the first step by travelling to Beijing for talks.

There’s reason to believe that the current situation is similar. Pakistan’s overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan’s policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military.

Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the “nuclear revolution,” the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India’s nuclear capabilities.

The decision by India and Pakistan to allow their jets to cross the border represents a major break with the past. Yet so far both countries have taken only limited action. Their principal aim, it appears, is what the political scientist Murray Edelman once referred to as “dramaturgy”—theatrical gestures designed to please domestic audiences. Now that both sides have gone through the motions, neither is likely to escalate any further. Peering into the nuclear abyss concentrates the mind remarkably.

### They Say: “Permute: Do Both”

#### Links To NATO Cohesion DA — the counterplan alone doesn’t bring a controversial new proposal to NATO.

#### Doesn’t Solve Trilateral Relations — cooperating with NATO *and* India and Israel perpetuates their treatment as junior partners who always take a backseat to the U.S.’s “main allies.” Only the counterplan alone signals the U.S.’s serious commitment to the trilateral partnership. That’s crucial to its sustainability and effectiveness — that’s Carafano. The impact is a long list of global catastrophic risks that only a stronger trilateral alliance can solve — that’s Sabu and Dani.

## Unilateral/Domestic CP

### 1NC — Unilateral/Domestic Innovation CP

#### Next off is the Domestic Innovation CP.

#### The United States federal government should:

#### • reform its EDT reprogramming and authorization restrictions and its DOD EDT review and procurement process;

#### • establish a National Security Innovation Committee;

#### • expand non-defense R&D funding in areas pertinent to national security, including semiconductors;

#### • secure the American EDT pipeline; and

#### • collaborate with American universities to protect sensitive projects.

#### The first plank solves EDT innovation and tech leadership — dual-path budgetary reform is key.

Zakheim 21 (Dov S. Zakheim, senior advisor at the CSIS, vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, former undersecretary of Defense and CFO for the DOD; "Reform the Pentagon’s budget process, or lose our military and tech advantages", 4-2-2021, The Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/546097-reform-the-pentagons-budget-process-or-lose-our-military-and-tech-advantages/, DOA: 7-15-2022)//ATJ

What do artificial intelligence, quantum computing, the Defense Innovation Unit and reprogramming requirements have to do with one another? The answer is, “Everything.” For unless both Congress and Department of Defense (DOD) seriously reform the manner in which they move funds from one appropriations account to another, the DOD’s ability to introduce new technologies rapidly will be seriously compromised — and with it, potentially, the nation’s defenses.

The development and fielding of new technologies involve a considerable amount of risk. Not all programs that are attractive on paper actually will succeed in the laboratory. Not all that succeed when subjected to developmental testing will succeed when put to the operational test. The earlier a potential cutting-edge program is determined unlikely to succeed, the sooner its funds should be transferred to a different program, via a system termed “reprogramming.” Unfortunately, congressional restrictions render it exceedingly difficult to transfer funds from one new program to another with any degree of alacrity.

As currently mandated, Congress permits the Defense Department to transfer only $6 billion from one appropriations account to another in any given fiscal year; of that amount, one third — termed Special Transfer Authority — draws from the Overseas Contingency Operations accounts. The $6 billion that can be transferred represents less than 1 percent of the department’s annual budget. The chief financial officers of most corporations have far more discretion when moving funds from one account to another.

Congressional restrictions do not end there, however; indeed, they only begin with a DOD proposal to move funds across accounts. Above a threshold that Congress has specified for programs in each appropriation account, the DOD must first obtain approval from the Office of Management and Budget, and then from each of the four defense oversight committees: the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the two defense subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. (Any transfer of intelligence-related funding also requires the approval of the two congressional intelligence committees.)

The thresholds that Congress has set for programs can only be described as risible. For example, the Defense Department can only move funds from a given research and development budget line item, or one in the procurement account, without prior committee approval from every one of the four committees if that line item totals less than $10 million, or less than one-ten-thousandth of the total appropriations account. Moreover, if the funds are intended for starting a new program, the $10 million threshold cannot be exceeded over a three-year period. Should the department wish to reduce a line item, it also must obtain congressional approval for any actions involving cuts in excess of either $10 million or a fifth of the program in question, whichever is the smaller amount.

If the congressional restrictions were not enough, the Defense Department has made life more difficult for itself by conducting only one review of programs in between submission of its annual budget requests. In 2003, when serving as DOD comptroller, I proposed adding “execution” to the planning, programming and budgeting process, reflecting the so-called mid-year execution review. It was in this review that funds from slow-spending programs could be transferred to those spending more quickly, as long as the congressional committees agreed to the transfers.

At the same time as I proposed to codify “execution” into the process, I also envisaged that the Defense Department would conduct at least two execution reviews in addition to the long-standing mid-term review. Sadly, while this was incorporated into the system, the additional reviews were not. By way of comparison, in the corporate world, such reviews, and the transfers they engender, are held as frequently as weekly or even daily.

The combination of congressional limitations and DOD inflexibility undermine any effort to transfer funds rapidly, from a hi-tech program that appears to be going nowhere to one that is far more promising. The rigidity of the system also renders it more difficult for organizations such as the Defense Innovation Unit to transfer funds from disappointing or slowly developing commercial programs to those of greater military promise that also offer more rapid introduction in the field.

If Congress is as serious as it claims to be about ensuring that America secures and maintains the lead over China and Russia in artificial intelligence and other high-technology applications for military operations, it should revisit and revise those seemingly arcane budget rules that stifle innovation and military modernization. And, in parallel, the Defense Department should do all it can to ensure that the funds it receives from Congress can be applied both quickly and efficiently. In this way both Congress and the DOD could most effectively foster and reward the innovation that would ensure American military dominance on the battlefield for many years to come.

#### The other planks solve EDT competition — focus on basic research is key to operationalizing future EDT benefits

* “war for talent”
* Avoids DoD O/S DA because the NSIC will provide a budget report to congress – that means its priced in all the time
* NSIC solves businesses not wanting to invest in basic research – clarifies what the government wants to fund, giving stability to pursue it

Talent et al. 19 (Jim Talent, holds a BA in political science from Washington University, with the Arnold J. Lien Prize as the most outstanding undergraduate in political science, and a JD from the University of Chicago Law School, adjunct professor at the Washington University Law School, former US Senator for Missouri, Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, member of the Defense Policy Board, senior fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center; Robert O. Work, holds a BS in biology from the University of Illinois, MA in Systems of Management from the University of Southern California, MS in System Operations from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a MA in International Policy from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, member of the IISS, distinguished senior fellow and CEO of CNAS, former Deputy Secretary of Defense (32nd), former Undersecretary of the Navy and Deputy and Principal Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy acting with the Secretary’s authority in management of the Department of the Navy, Senior Fellow for Maritime Affairs and Vice President of Strategic Studies in the CSBA, focusing on Department of Defense transformation and defense strategy; Lisa Atherton, holds an MA in Business from the College of William and Mary and a BS in legal studies from the US Air Force Academy, CEO of Textron Systems; Stephanie Murphy, US representative for Florida’s 7th congressional district, holds an MS in foreign service from Georgetown University and a BA in economics from the College of William and Mary; Jim Banks, US representative for Indiana’s 3rd congressional district; Donald J. Rosenberg, executive vice president of Qualcomm, former senior vice president of Apple, member of the International Advisory Board, holds a JD from St. John’s University School of Law; Christian Brose, CSO of Anduril Industries, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, managed the production and final passage of 4 NDAA’s; Nadia Schadlow, former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Advisor for Strategy, holds an MA and **PhD** both in government from the SAIS at Johns Hopkins; Eric S. Edelman, former US Ambassador to Turkey, former Under Secretary of Defense, former Vice President for National Security Affairs, holds a **PhD**, M Phil, and an MA all in US diplomatic history from Yale; Raj Shah, former Deputy Assistant to the President, holds a BA in government from Cornell University; Mike Gallagher, holds a BA from Princeton, holds an MSSI at National Intelligence University, and 2 MA’s in security studies and government from Georgetown University, and a **PhD** in Cold War history; Matthew Waxman, member and international affairs fellow of the council of foreign relations, studied political science and international studies at Yale University; Andy Kim, holds a BA in political science from the University of Chicago and an MPhil and PhD from Oxford University; "The Contest for Innovation: Strengthening America’s National Security Innovation Base in an Era of Strategic Competition", December 2019, Ronald Reagan Institute, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/355498/the\_contest\_for\_innovation\_report.pdf, DOA: 7-13-2022)//ATJ \*NSIB = National Security Innovation Base, defined as “the ecosystem of capital, research, knowledge, capabilities, policies, incentives, and people that turns ideas into innovations and transforms discoveries into useful technology and products to protect our national security.” (p. 10).

I. Directing, Coordinating, and Incentivizing the NSIB

The technologies central to the 21st-century national security landscape are changing the future of competition and conflict. These technologies include advanced computing, quantum technology, artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous capabilities, cyber, advanced wireless communications (5G and beyond), hypersonic weapons, and microelectronics, among others. In this dynamic technological environment, to achieve competitive advantage, the United States must strive to be a “first mover” whenever possible and a “fast second mover” if surprised by an opportunistic competitor. The United States must also try to protect crucial technologies by fostering their development in the United States or allied nations and providing safeguards to ensure they are secure and reliable. Given the nature of this open competition, however, the United States must also hedge against those technologies that cannot be fully protected. We should, in essence, build higher fences around fewer things.

Findings:

1. The U.S. government lacks a formal structure that provides for more information sharing and collaboration among the disparate segments of the NSIB. This is the least developed and perhaps the most critical function the government can carry out.

2. The federal share of total R&D—at its lowest in over 60 years in 2018—has decreased, giving way to commercially driven R&D.12 This trend has created both positive and negative consequences for the NSIB. On one hand, this shift has increased the total level of R&D funding in the U.S. marketplace. On the other hand, motivated by short-term performance and commercial relevance, U.S. companies have moved away from the basic research often necessary to drive generational technological advances and instead focused on shorter-term strategies tied to quarterly earnings.

One manifestation of this trend is that today’s biggest American technology companies focus more on optimizing their current products and services rather than investing in follow-on basic research—the kind that earned American companies Nobel Prizes in the past.13

3. Universities are a critical node of the NSIB. Their research in sensitive areas, including government supported work on sensitive technologies, is vulnerable to foreign spying and IP theft. At the same time, the openness and attractiveness of American universities help promote scientific innovation and expand the American knowledge base.

USG outreach to academia should be coordinated across all agencies supporting the NSIB. It should include better communication of both the threats and the opportunities for those working within the NSIB. The partnership needs to be integrated between law enforcement, counterintelligence, government labs, and policy officials.

4. USG engagement with companies and universities has helped raise awareness of the challenge but faces limitations in information-sharing and messaging.

• Inconsistencies across USG agencies with regard to declassifying information about Chinese activity hamper the ability to bring charges against intellectual property thieves and decrease the effectiveness of warnings about the scale and effectiveness of China’s efforts.

• Even when information is declassified, the government lacks the tools and resources to disseminate the information effectively.

Recommendations:

1. Congress should authorize an interagency coordination body—the “National Security Innovation Committee”—that is responsible for enabling, developing, guiding, and safeguarding the NSIB. This entity would consolidate and elevate the existing agency lines of authority rather than create a new layer of bureaucracy. Its work should be strategic and not reactive.

• The committee’s goals would be to foster innovation in the United States or among our close allies, protect cutting-edge innovation from theft and exploitation by our strategic competitors, and establish safeguards to ensure national security applications are secure and reliable.

• The committee would aim to facilitate common purpose and coordinated effort among the federated NSIB ecosystem, from the traditional defense and national security community to private-sector innovation centers and academia. This effort should aim to focus the NSIB ecosystem on the innovations most important to the national competition, but not in a way that dampens its greatest strength—dynamism—or introduces bureaucratic obstacles, which are the enemy of innovation.

• The committee would clarify what the U.S. government expects of the NSIB, as the private sector elements of the ecosystem often struggle to identify sustainable technological investments in potentially vulnerable funding streams over time.

• The committee would formally designate the critical areas in national technological competition and maintain an understanding of the dual-use technologies being developed in the NSIB.

• Once identified, these technologies must be prioritized with long-term budgeting commitments. As such, the committee should be responsible for coordinating and submitting a unified budget analysis to Congress each year to evaluate all of the activities across the USG related to the NSIB. This analysis will bring clarity to the scope and breadth of investments in NSIB priorities and help policymakers rationalize and prioritize strategic investments.

• The committee would have the responsibility to manage information sharing across the government and the authority to task relevant government agencies with developing and executing policies relevant to the NSIB.

• The committee would provide a pathway for the private sector to provide input on its work.

• Congress would include an annual reporting requirement from the committee, assessing the state of the U.S. NSIB and the government’s efforts to protect it.

• The committee should be chaired by the DOD and include representatives from other government agencies with equities related to national security innovation. Members should include the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury along with White House stakeholders such as the National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of American Innovation, as well as other agencies as Congress deems appropriate. Representatives from the various agencies should be designated by the secretaries or agency heads but not below the under-secretary level.

2. The USG should expand funding for R&D and proposals for non-DOD arms of the government—e.g., the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, and Commerce—to ensure a strong U.S.-owned and U.S.-based manufacturing center in key sectors, such as semiconductors.

Congress should authorize a new competitive grant program to fund basic research in areas important to 21st-century competition, such as AI, autonomy, quantum technology, or advanced computing. The grant program should be administered in coordination with the DOD to fill gaps in DOD funding.

3. While not sufficient to prevail in this competition, protecting American technology and intellectual property is a critical part of the U.S. approach. Efforts to secure the supply chain, such as the recent Executive Order securing the information and telecommunications supply chain, and rules establishing cyber protection standards will be an important part of arresting Chinese IP theft and countering one of their greatest strengths. Necessary, but not sufficient, steps include the following:

• The U.S. government should establish, maintain, and publicly release a list of academic institutions and other organizations that have a history of improper technology transfer, IP theft, or cyber espionage, or that operate under the direction of the PLA or Chinese intelligence services. The government should ban individuals who are either members of the PLA or affiliated with one or more of the organizations on this list from obtaining an F visa or J visa to the United States.

• The State Department should strengthen Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) for visas where there is potential for the illegal transfer of sensitive or dual-use technology. These SAOs, commonly known as Visas Mantis, should include a presumption of denial for visa applicants flagged by the State Department as potentially problematic. The State Department should inform companies in critical technology areas when they are recruiting or hiring individuals whose visa applications are flagged as such.

• The USG needs new tools to combat economic and industrial espionage. One such tool could be a new interagency committee and process to allow victims of IP theft to confidentially report and provide evidence to federal agencies to consider adverse action against foreign individuals and entities the government determines have unlawfully acquired IP from a U.S. person.

4. The USG and universities should work together to protect the integrity of sensitive research projects—especially those funded by the DOD, the intelligence agencies, and the Department of Energy—including sharing best practices, bolstering university security protocols, and improving compliance. Cooperation and communication between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and universities on these issues also needs to be improved. This should include nonclassified projects that have security implications.

• The DOD and the Intelligence Community fund unclassified but sensitive research projects at U.S. universities; however, they do not have good visibility on foreign participation in those projects. The USG should increase the required transparency of participants of this research, maintain a database of sensitive research projects, and develop a better understanding of foreign efforts to penetrate federally funded research projects.

• Universities should strongly consider policies that limit and ultimately reject funding from companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, that are closely linked to adversarial governments seeking to gain access to sensitive research.

• Technology produced by companies banned from the Federal Entities List should not generally be used in university research, especially research funded by the federal government.

5. The USG should pursue research partnerships with universities, similar to the existing programs with Purdue, MIT, and Georgia Tech, as a way to consolidate talent. By ensuring collaboration throughout the innovation process, sponsoring agencies can ensure efficient allocation of resources by preventing repetitive research while maximizing academic expertise. As part of these partnerships, the USG must clearly communicate the risk of espionage to universities.

## RMA Advantage Answers

### 1NC — RMA Advantage Answers

#### 1. U.S. Wins Tech Race Now — it won’t fall behind in defense R&D.

Sapolsky and Gholz 21— Harvey M. Sapolsky, Professor Emeritus at MIT, the former Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, M.P.A. and Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government at Harvard University, Eugene Gholz, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, former chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association, 2022 (“The defense innovation machine: Why the U.S. will remain on the cutting edge,” Journal of Strategic Defense, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2021.1917392)

It is not that the United States cannot lag behind in some fields of militarily relevant technology or be surprised on the battlefield. Technology advances on many fronts and is pioneered in many places. Technological investment by potential adversaries surely can raise the costs to the United States of blithely sticking to operational concepts that previously promised great effectiveness at low cost.8 However, the United States has been mobilized on such scale, for so long, with a special emphasis on applying its vast science and engineering resources to its defense, that it will not readily fall behind in weapons technology or quality.

The United States invests heavily in defense-related research and development (R&D) activities. Figure 1 shows the past 40 years of history of U.S. inputs to defense research and development. Currently the United States invests more than 75 billion USD each year in defense R&D plus billions more in Department of Energy R&D investment for nuclear weapons. That is about two-thirds of what all other countries in the world, American friend or foe, spend on defense R&D.9 China is the only great power that spends more on its entire defense effort than the United States spends on just defense R&D. Seventy-five billion dollars is more than Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or Japan spends on defense.10

#### 2. AI Not Key To Military Power — it has no current military applications.

Horowitz 18 — Michael C. Horowitz, professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania, received the 2017 Karl Deutsch Award from the International Studies Association presented annually to a scholar under age 40 who is judged to have made the most significant contribution to the study of international relations and peace research, 2022 (“Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” *Texas National Security Review*, May, Available Online at https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/#article)

It is important to distinguish these potential technological innovations from military innovations. While military innovations are often linked to changes in technology,41 it is not always the case. Military innovations are significant changes in organizational behavior and ways that a military fights that are designed to increase its ability to effectively translate capabilities into power.42 The use of aircraft carriers as mobile airfields by the United States and Japan is a prototypical example. While AI could potentially enable a number of military innovations, it is not a military innovation itself, and no applications of AI have been used in ways that would count as a military innovation at this point.

Because AI research and technology are still in their early stages, usage of AI in warfare is not even yet analogous to the first use of the tank in World War I, let alone effective use of combined arms warfare by the Germans in World War II (the military innovation now known as blitzkrieg). This limits analyses about how narrow AI might one day affect the balance of power and international politics. Most research on technology and international politics focuses on specific, mature technologies, such as nuclear weapons, or on military innovations.43

#### 3. China Won’t Win The EDT Race — it’s too dependent on foreign innovation.

Frey and Osborne 20 — Carl Benedikt Frey, Oxford Martin Citi Fellow, Future of Work Director at the Oxford Martin School at Oxford University, author of *The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation,* Michael Osborne, Professor of Machine Learning at the University of Oxford, a Fellow at the Oxford Martin School, Co-Founder of Mind Foundry an organization which has a mission to enable Humans and AI to work together to solve the world’s most important problems, 2022 (“China Won’t Win the Race for AI Dominance,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 19th, Available Online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-19/china-wont-win-race-ai-dominance)

Decentralized experimentation and decision-making will likewise be critical if the world is to harness the benefits of artificial intelligence. China is at a disadvantage in this regard. The country’s recent surge in patent filings is often cited as evidence of its innovativeness, but simply counting patents isn’t a good way to measure innovation: studies show that ten percent of patents account for roughly 90 percent of total patent value, meaning that the vast majority are of little value. Patent citations offer a more useful indicator, and if we look at the 100 most cited patents since 2003, not a single one comes from China. Moreover, China’s leading artificial intelligence companies, including Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu, are merely copies of Facebook, Amazon, and Google, tailored to the Chinese market.

As the late economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron observed, when a country lags behind the technological frontier, imitation and the adoption of foreign technology can take it a long way—and, in general, the further a country has fallen behind, the greater the role the state must play in driving industrial catch-up. Thanks to state investment in mass production technology, the Soviet Union grew rapidly during much of the Cold War, as did Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Indeed, numerous scholars have attributed the “Asian Miracle” to state-driven industrial catch-up. But while they were successful in closing some of the gap, these countries never managed to overtake the United States. Unlike imitation, which can be planned and coordinated, innovation is a voyage of exploration into the unknown, to paraphrase the economist and philosopher Friedrich von Hayek. And switching from imitation to innovation is hard: if it were easy, most countries would be innovating at the technological frontier.

By observing that China is unlikely to overtake the United States in technological innovation, we mean in no way to downplay China’s tremendous economic achievements since Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978. China has plenty of talent, but the fact remains that, so far, Chinese innovation has mainly focused on incrementally improving technologies that were conceived elsewhere. Chinese companies currently lead the world in the development of 5G, for example, but their work builds on several previous generations of telecommunications technology. What Huawei demonstrates is that China has significant engineering capabilities, just like Japan and indeed the Soviet Union.

#### 4. No Global Hotspots Solvency — NATO has given up on out-of-area missions.

Got 21 — Antoine Got, Young Leader in Foreign and Security Policy with the Global Fellowship Initiative at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland), former Staff Officer in the Baltic Sea Region Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Belgium), former Staff Officer in Crisis Response Systems and Exercises at NATO, 2021 (“Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance’s Out-of-area Efforts?,” Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis, Issue 18, December, Available Online at https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/ssa-18-december-2021, Accessed 07-18-2022, p. 2)

Key Points

• In recent years, the out-of-area crisis-management activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have been limited compared to the heyday of such endeavours in the 1990s and early 2000s. As the alliance prepares to unveil its next Strategic Concept, questions have been raised over the future of its out-of-area aspirations.

• Underpinning this is a debate framed, on the one hand, by calls for NATO to revert to projecting more influence globally, while others argue that the organisation should remain firmly anchored in the territorial defence of its member nations, as seen since 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea. It will be difficult for the next Strategic Concept to reconcile these competing visions.

• However, this dichotomy is outdated in many ways. The (re)appearance of great- and middle-power competition, the transnationalisation of security challenges and transformations in the nature of warfare itself are imposing new demands on NATO that in many ways will force the organisation to look beyond its member nations’ borders.

• While existing out-of-area activities illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability, the alliance clearly remains hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. After its experience in Afghanistan, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high.

• This is unfortunate, because out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and a middle ground exists between these types of deployments and the political costs of inaction. To remain a prominent crisis-management actor, NATO must continue to apply the wide array of non-Article 5 instruments at its disposal for the best possible outcomes before, during and after conflict.

### Extend: “U.S. Wins Tech Race Now”

#### It’s all political — current weapons are enough

Sapolsky and Gholz 18 — Harvey M. Sapolsky, Professor Emeritus at MIT, the former Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, M.P.A. and Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government at Harvard University, Eugene Gholz, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, former chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association, 2022 (“Calm Down, Folks: Enemies Still Fear US Military Tech Innovation,” *Defense One*, May 17th, Available Online at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/05/us-military-innovation-doing-just-fine-thanks/148287/)

The complaints that the United States is falling behind are part of the political process. So are new government organizations like the Defense Innovation Unit – Experimental. Because we already have the best weapons, proponents for new systems must claim that we are failing and need new initiatives. That is how they gain their budgets. And just as we have a thick infrastructure to develop weapons, we have also a thick network of threat assessors worrying that we aren’t worried enough

#### Allied open democracies are better for innovation than other forms of government.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/ 2020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/%202020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html))

The reason is simple: the competition and creativity generated by start-ups is good for the Allied defence ecosystem. Allied open democracies and open educational models bring about levels of creativity which other forms of government are unable to do. This maximises disruptive innovation efforts and, as such, forces incumbents (large companies) to compete with new, fresh thinking – it builds resilience.

**The U.S. is currently winning the AI race against China.**

JAMES **COOPER AND** KASHYAP **KOMPELLA** 02/03/**22** (OPINION CONTRIBUTORS, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/06/10/the-biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-force/, “No, China is not winning the AI race”, Retrieved 2/23/22)

The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. **Technology is** rightly **seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse**, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s [ambition to dominate](https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025) high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips.  In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the [Chinese focus](https://www.afr.com/technology/is-china-winning-the-ai-race-20200805-p55imu) on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. **Some have gone so far as to conclude that**[**the West has already lost the AI race**](https://www.wired.co.uk/article/why-china-will-win-the-global-battle-for-ai-dominance)**.** Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, **the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success**. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment. [An example](https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/innovation-spotlight-providing-adverse-action-notices-when-using-ai-ml-models/) of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well. Around the globe, Big Tech’s rising power has resulted in calls for more oversight. In a drastic move that stunned the industry and analysts alike, **the Chinese government**[**recently rewrote**](https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2021/11/08/xi-jinpings-crackdown-on-chinese-tech-firms-will-continue)**the rulebook for the country’s technology industry.** In effect, China is vacating entire swaths of digital and creative industries, arenas that serve as training grounds and talent factories for other industries. **This more restrictive approach** may not bode well **for China’s AI industry in the long term.** China may find itself constrained on the extent of automation and AI in its manufacturing sector — labor-intensive manufacturing remains China’s main strength, and a high degree of automation can result in job losses, labor unrest, and instability. Meanwhile, there is bipartisan support for AI in the United States. Former [President Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump) proposed [increasing funding](https://thehill.com/policy/technology/482402-trump-budget-proposal-boosts-funding-for-artificial-intelligence-quantum) for AI development through the National Science Foundation. The [National AI Initiative Act](https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/hrpt617/CRPT-116hrpt617.pdf#page=1215) of 2020 signaled a sense of urgency and suggested that several federal agencies create a national strategy on artificial intelligence. **The Biden administration has formed the A**rtificial **I**ntelligence **Research Resource Task Force to develop a roadmap to foment AI research and spark innovation nationwide. There is draft legislation, at both the state and federal level, to promote responsible use of AI and prevent its misuse**. Strong objections to the use of facial recognition and other AI systems by law enforcement in the U.S., raised by civil liberties advocates, have led some local authorities, such as the City of San Francisco, to [ban such systems](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/business/facial-recognition-software-controversy.html?action=click&module=MoreInSection&pgtype=Article&region=Footer&contentCollection=Technology). To use a Silicon Valley phrase, these debates are “not a bug, but a feature.” They shine a light on the limitations of AI systems and help to set the “rules of the road” for proper use of AI. **This will establish the U.S**. **as a global leader in AI regulation**, once lawmakers and regulators do their work. China, meanwhile, has faced strong [global criticism](https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/05/03/china-new-data-breach-exposes-facial-recognition-and-ethnicity-tracking-in-beijing/#5623644334a7) for using facial recognition software to [monitor and surveil Uyghurs](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html?module=inline.) in its Xinjiang region. China has outlined a set of [AI ethics principles](https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/01/04/china-s-new-ai-governance-initiatives-shouldn-t-be-ignored-pub-86127), but the jury is still out on enforcement and how they function in practice. The increasing number of AI research papers and [patents](http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/files/2021/12/22-Wake-Forest-J.-Bus.-Intell.-Prop.-L.-43.pdf) by Chinese researchers is often cited as proof that China has caught up with the United States in this field. The increased focus is good for the Chinese AI ecosystem, and it will help them solve China-specific problems. But dominance in this emerging strategic industry is not guaranteed. **The U.S. has several strategic advantages, including: the strengths of its higher education and research institutes**, which attract the best STEM talent from across the world; **the**[**largest venture capital ecosystem**](https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/tracking-ai-investment/); **and the largest number of** technology unicorns (**start-ups with private valuations** greater than $1 billion).  Beijing says Taiwan is 'not Ukraine,' has always been part of China Big Tech allies point to China, Russia threat in push to squash...**China is not overtaking the U.S. in artificial intelligence.** The current evidence and trajectory paint a clear picture: The conditions for AI to flourish, such as incentives to experiment, freedom to pursue opportunities without restrictions, and the coming guardrails to prevent misuse, favor U.S. leadership. This is still the United States’s game to lose — though maybe both countries could win through collaboration. To solve planet-scale problems such as climate change, we are going to need AI solutions from both competitors.

#### Even if America were to share capabilities, allies still lags behind

Sapolsky and Gholz 18 — Harvey M. Sapolsky, Professor Emeritus at MIT, the former Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, M.P.A. and Ph.D. in Political Economy and Government at Harvard University, Eugene Gholz, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, former chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association, 2022 (“Calm Down, Folks: Enemies Still Fear US Military Tech Innovation,” *Defense One*, May 17th, Available Online at https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/05/us-military-innovation-doing-just-fine-thanks/148287/)

U.S. investment has created a thick infrastructure of laboratories, test facilities, technology development centers, and program analysis units that is unmatched anywhere. It includes government agencies, universities, and firms, and it involves the efforts of hundreds of thousands of individuals. It is an amazing system, devoted entirely to developing better weapons, better ways of killing with advanced technologies.

Three uniquely American factors drive the system. First, there is inter-service rivalry. Most nations have a dominant service, their army or their navy, determined by their geography. The United States, a continent away from troubles, has rivalrous services, each vying for prominence and pushing for technologies that further its role as America’s best defender. Despite pledges of jointness, we have several armies (the Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations), several air forces (the Air Force, Navy, Army, Marine Corps), and a Navy and a half (Coast Guard), and we have just added a Cyber Force and are talking about a Space Force. Decentralization and competition spur innovation.

Another factor is the desire to avoid casualties. Surely people in all countries love their children and wish to avoid having them killed in wars, but the United States has done something about it, perhaps because it fights mostly wars of choice, is very democratic, and is very rich. That is surely the drive behind our leadership in aviation, nuclear weapons and precision weapons, drones, and robots. We are at the cutting edge of technology because we have to be.

Third, the United States is a nation of immigrants, drawing talent from across the globe. Jewish refugee scientists helped give U.S. nuclear weapons; German engineers, our ballistic missiles. More recently, the Predator drone had an Israeli immigrant father.

Yes, Silicon Valley and technology investors are impressive. But much of what leads to very rapid success in the commercial sector has little to do with defense. Many fast-growing companies, for example producers of sports-related cellphone apps or new lifestyle concepts for food and exercise, do not avoid defense work because they fear its bureaucratic rules.

In relevant technical areas, there should be little fear that the United States won’t set the pace. Our major defense contractors are skilled systems integrators, used to brining complex technologies together into viable weapon systems that can survive in difficult battlefields great distances from our shores. Systems integrators have two contracting faces, one to deal with complex government politics and rules and the other to make commercial arrangements with “regular” companies. They are skilled bridgers and brokers.

#### The US leads in the AI tech race now.

Neil Savage, 12/9/2020 (Neil Savage is a science writer based in Lowell, Massachusetts, “The race to the top among the world’s leaders in artificial intelligence,” <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03409-8>, Retrieved 8/20/2021)

As nations vie for leadership, AI research output is increasing rapidly. According to our analysis of journal publications and conference papers tracked by the Dimensions database, the global output for AI research grew from just over 52,000 globally in 2000 to roughly 403,000 in 2019, representing an increase of more than 600%. Now the most popular specialization among computer-science PhD students in North America, AI is set to continue its steep, upward trajectory. Rising revenues The United States has historically been the leader in AI-related research output, having accumulated the highest number of publications over the past two decades. But China has ramped up its output in recent years. In each year from 2016 to 2019, China produced more AI-related papers than any other nation, according to Dimensions. Over this period, China’s output of AI-related research increased by just over 120%, whereas output in the US increased by almost 70%. In 2019, China published 102,161 AI-related papers, and the US published 74,386. India, which came in third, published 23,398. Publication numbers aren’t the whole story, says Jeffrey Ding, a PhD student at the Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, UK, who studies China’s AI strategy. In the AI Index Report, which uses citation numbers to measure the quality of AI papers, papers from China were cited about 20% less than the world average in 2019, whereas papers from the US were cited about 40% more than average. “Just pumping out raw numbers of papers that don’t have a lasting impact isn’t really useful,” says Ding. “It’s more important to keep up with the technology frontier.” A Nature Index analysis for this supplement looked at the number of AI-related articles published in the 82 high-quality natural-science journals tracked by the index, which primarily concern the application of AI to research in the broad fields of chemistry, the physical sciences, life sciences, and Earth and environmental sciences. Between 2015 and 2019, the US was the leader, with the UK, Germany and China in second, third and fourth place, respectively. But China has increased its output in journals tracked by the index. Although it was the fourth-most prolific country in the index in 2015, with roughly half as many AI-related papers as Germany, China crept up over the next three years, then leapt to second place in 2019, showing an increase of 340%. The US, UK and Germany slightly more than doubled their output over the same period. For the near future, Ding says, the US is likely to remain the world leader in AI. “Though China has some exceptional universities, such as Tsinghua University, the US dominates in terms of maybe the top 20 universities doing AI research, and that is reflected in the quality of the papers. It’s very unlikely that China will become the singular innovation centre by 2030.” Many countries see AI as providing a competitive edge, not only economically, but militarily, says Husain. He likens the competition in AI to the Space Race of the mid-twentieth century, in which the US and the Soviet Union vied to be the first to achieve milestones in space travel. “The Space Race yielded contributions that differentiated the American technological ecosystem from all others for decades to come,” says Husain. “If a country invests heavily in this area, it will yield technologies that will form the pillar of defence capability and economic differentiation for the rest of the century.” Technologies that can be developed based on AI will indeed have both economic and military benefit, says Daniel Araya, a policy analyst at the Center for International Governance Innovation, a think tank in Ontario, Canada. “We’re talking new weapons, data-driven innovation for industry and automation, and redesigning how our society works from the ground up.” Husain points to Germany, which maintains a strong economy that relies on exports of products such as machine parts and automobiles, even though lower-income countries can provide low-wage labour for manufacturing. Germany has been able to compete by using automation to keep manufacturing costs down, while keeping quality and productivity high. AI could reinforce this advantage by powering the next generation of automation technologies. “Anybody that has mastery over this technology and is investing in implementing it retains an economic lead,” says Husain. Institutions in Germany, such as the Fraunhofer Society, Europe’s largest application-oriented research organization, have been emphasizing Industry 4.0, a national strategic initiative from the German government to introduce more digital innovation and advanced robotics into manufacturing and supply-chain management. In China, the ability offered by AI systems to monitor public spaces and scan Internet traffic in an effort to glean user intentions may provide the state with improved tools for social control, enhancing its capability for monitoring the population or censoring information. Even in countries that don’t officially track their populaces, facial-recognition technology, such as that produced by New York-based company, Clearview AI, is being used by law enforcement to identify suspects. The technology has been met with deep concern by some researchers, who say that biases built into its algorithms could result in ethical and human rights abuses. Amid the controversy that surrounds certain applications of AI, some groups are highlighting the good it can do. In 2019, the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, a scientific society in Menlo Park, California, launched its Artificial Intelligence for the Benefit of Humanity award, a US$1-million prize funded by Squirrel AI, an education technology company based in Shanghai, China. The inaugural winner, Regina Barzilay from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in Cambridge, Massachusetts, received the award in September 2020 for developing a machine-learning algorithm that can examine mammograms and predict which women are at a higher risk of breast cancer. Barzilay has also developed a pattern-recognition algorithm that predicts which molecules might make good candidates for new medications. Publishing in the journal Cell, Barzilay and her colleagues described how their system identified a molecule, dubbed halicin, as a potentially potent new antibiotic (J. M. Stokes et al. Cell 180, 688–702; 2020). When the molecule was synthesized and tested, it was found to kill antibiotic-resistant bacteria. Barzilay continues to work on halicin and hopes to progress it to clinical trials. Money to spend With an eye to the potential benefits of AI-based technologies, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) announced in August 2020 that it is establishing five new institutes focused on different topics, each led by a different university, and each to receive $20 million over five years. One, led by the University of Oklahoma in Norman, will use AI systems to improve climate forecasting accuracy. Another, at the University of Texas at Austin, will focus on the next generation of machine-learning algorithms. A third, led by the University of Colorado Boulder, will apply AI technologies to teaching and learning. The fourth, headed by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, will explore the discovery and synthesis of new materials and drugs using AI systems. And a fifth, led by MIT, will investigate how AI can improve research in fundamental physics. The NSF has put out a call for proposals for eight more AI institutes, which it plans to announce next year. “We have a long history of supporting basic research in artificial intelligence,” says Erwin Gianchandani, the NSF’s deputy assistant director for computer and information science and engineering. In addition, the US Department of Agriculture’s National Institute of Food and Agriculture has committed to funding another two institutes each with $20 million over five years to apply AI to questions of crop yield, pest resistance and food distribution. Access to massive data sets on which to train machine-learning systems is one advantage that both the US and China have, says Araya. Europe, on the other hand, has stringent data laws, which protect people’s privacy, but limit its resources for training AI algorithms. “So, it seems unlikely that Europe will produce very sophisticated AI as a consequence,” he says. “China is at the opposite end of the spectrum, where it has few data protections, and huge access to varied and diverse pieces of data.” The NSF doesn’t make decisions based on global competition, says Rebecca Keiser, the organization’s first chief of research security strategy and policy. Her position is designed to safeguard the security of federally funded research, while promoting international collaborations. “We think of it more in terms of the impact that our funding is going to have, rather than from a nation perspective. The fact that it also contributes to US global science leadership is fabulous,” says Keiser. As for competing against China in AI, she says, “We don’t really know how much, and where, they’re investing, so it’s hard to compete against that.” With funding from other major US agencies, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and National Institutes of Health, the US government expected to spend almost $5 billion on unclassified AI research in 2020. Other countries are investing, too. The UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council gave out nearly £160 million (US$212 million) in 2020. The European Commission, which has been supporting research through its Horizon 2020 programme, says public and private investment in AI should reach €20 billion (US$23 billion) across Europe by the end of 2020. Even with other countries placing emphasis on AI research, including Israel, Japan, Singapore and Australia, the race comes down to China versus the US, Araya says. The refinement of AI systems is driven not simply by academic questions, but by applying the systems’ intelligence to practical problems. Countries will probably make advances by using AI in areas where they already have expertise, says Ding, such as automation in Germany or robotics in Japan. Having so many researchers around the globe tackling all aspects of AI should advance the whole field, says Keiser. “It’s always good to have a bit of healthy competition.”

#### The OECD solves the case—they have agreed to support the responsible and ethical approach to AI.

John R. Allen, 3/24/2021 (President of the Brookings Institution, “It is time to negotiate global treaties on artificial intelligence,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/03/24/it-is-time-to-negotiate-global-treaties-on-artificial-intelligence/>, Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The good news is there are some international entities that already are working on these issues. For example, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence is a group of more than a dozen democratic nations that have agreed to “support the responsible and human-centric development and use of AI in a manner consistent with human rights, fundamental freedoms, and our shared democratic values.” This community of democracies is run by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and features high-level convenings, research, and technical assistance.

### Extend: “AI Not Key To Military Power”

#### Agile bureaucracies, not the best technology, will win the global tech competition race.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/ 2020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html](https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/%202020/09/01/building-a-resilient-innovation-pipeline-for-the-alliance/index.html))

Today, NATO’s competition is a global one and the race is one of technological adoption – that is, the acceptance, integration and use of new technology in society. From artificial intelligence to quantum and everything in between, governments are in a race to leverage these technologies at scale and speed – first adopter advantage for emerging disruptive tech could not be more prevalent in the world of geopolitics and deterrence. Indeed, the nations that win this race may be those with the most agile bureaucracy rather those with the best technology.

#### Technological innovation rarely influences the balance of power.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

Decades of research demonstrates that the impact of technological change on global politics — whether it is change in economics, society at large, diplomacy, or military power — depends much more on how governments and organizations make choices about the adoption and use of new capabilities than on the technologies themselves.48 Scholarship on military innovation by Barry Posen, Stephen P. Rosen, and others shows that technological innovation alone rarely shapes the balance of power.49 Instead, it is how militaries use a technology that makes a difference.50 A military’s ability to employ a technology depends in part on the complexity of the technology, how difficult it is to use, and whether it operates in predictable and explainable ways. These factors influence the trust that senior military leaders have in the technology and whether they use it.51 Additionally, the more bureaucratically disruptive it is to adopt a technology, the more challenging it can be for older, more established organizations to do so — particularly if the organization is underinvested in research and development designed to integrate new technologies and ideas.52

#### Competition for AI technology will be multilateral and not bilateral.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

The commercial drivers of AI technology, and the speed with which new algorithms diffuse, would make competition much broader than it was during the bilateral space race. Competition is much more likely to be multilateral, featuring countries and companies around the world. A better analogy might be to the competition surrounding the development of Second Industrial Revolution technologies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. France, Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and others vied for supremacy in steel production, chemicals, petroleum, electricity, and other areas.

#### The AI technology itself is not key to military power—it is how it is used.

Michael C. Horowitz, 2018 (Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Retrieved 6/11/2022 from <https://tnsr.org/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-international-competition-and-the-balance-of-power/>)

Military and economic history suggests that the effect of narrow AI could be quite large, even if suggestions of AI triggering a new industrial revolution are overstated. Adoption capacity theory shows that changes in relative military power become more likely in cases of military innovations that require large organizational changes and the adoption of new operational concepts. Even if the United States, China, and Russia were to end up with similar levels of basic AI capacity over the next decade, the history of military innovations from the phalanx to blitzkrieg suggests it is how they and others use AI that will matter most for the future of military power.

### Extend: “No Global Hotspots Solvency”

#### After Afghanistan, NATO has re-focused on collective defense — they’ve given up on hotspot crisis management.

Morcos and Ellehuus 21 — Pierre Morcos, Visiting Fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Deputy Head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division at the French Foreign Service, holds an M.P.A. from Sciences Po (France), and Rachel Ellehuus, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Principal Director of European and NATO Policy in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, holds an M.A. in European Affairs and Political Science from the College of Europe (Belgium), 2021 (“Fall of Kabul: Inconvenient Truths for NATO,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 27th, Available Online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/fall-kabul-inconvenient-truths-nato, Accessed 07-18-2022)

The Future of Transatlantic Cooperation

In addition to the effects the Afghanistan crisis might have on Europe is the question of how it might change NATO and transatlantic cooperation. Former UK prime minister Theresa May called for a “reassessment of how NATO operates,” echoing President Macron’s plea for reforming the transatlantic alliance.

One likelihood is that this experience will accelerate NATO’s focus away from out-of-area crisis management and toward collective defense. Even prior to the Afghanistan crisis, allies’ political will to participate in costly, open-ended missions outside of NATO’s area of responsibility was decreasing. Since 2014, NATO has refocused on collective defense, and several allies have simultaneously doubled down on national security priorities (e.g., France on terrorism and Italy on managing the consequences of illegal migration). As a result, any future out-of-area missions may have a smaller footprint and be low intensity.

Allies are also likely to be more discerning about when and under what conditions they join operations, particularly when they will be dependent on U.S. assets. They may seek more specifics on the duration, end-states, and exit plan of a mission; seek assurances in terms of support; or demand a greater say in shaping or leading the mission. A sense of obligation or loyalty to the United States will no longer be enough to generate forces. This is already perceptible in Iraq where Europeans are ready to take more responsibility in NATO’s training mission on the condition that Washington maintains some degree of military backing (e.g., force protection, airlift, and intelligence).

Finally, allies may gravitate toward more agile coalitions of the willing. While NATO’s consensus-based decisionmaking and established force generation processes were once preferred because they lent unity of purpose and staying power to a mission, working through NATO may now be viewed as at once more cumbersome and less flexible.

### 1NC — Status Quo Solves [Be Careful!]

#### Status Quo Solves —

Pons 22 — Juan Pons, Contributor at *Atalayar* (a Spanish magazine) and *Hispaviación* (a Spanish publication covering the aviation industry), Retired Colonel in the Spanish Army, former Colonel Director of the Military School of Educational Sciences of the Spanish Ministry of Defense, former Professor of Communication and International Relations at the Spanish General Military Academy, 2022 (“Disruptive dual-use technologies, a major focus of NATO's new Strategic Concept,” *Atalayar*, June 30th, Available Online at https://atalayar.com/en/content/disruptive-dual-use-technologies-major-focus-natos-new-strategic-concept, Accessed 07-03-2022)

An important line of action taken by NATO risks going almost unnoticed because it is not clearly and explicitly included in the Strategic Concept that the 30 leaders of NATO countries have just approved in Madrid.

But it is implicitly included in the text of the document that will guide transatlantic affairs over the next decade. It is an initiative to reinforce the defence organisation's commitment to science, industry and cutting-edge technologies, a crucial way to maintain superiority in the face of the threat posed by Russia and the challenge from China.

To prevent such a measure from being lost among the 49 paragraphs of the document that defines the way forward for NATO, its Secretary General, the Norwegian Jens Stoltenberg, wanted to bring his name to the fore at the press conference that closed the first day of the summit of heads of state and government held on 29 June in Madrid.

The NATO Council officially endorsed the so-called Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). Its raison d'être is to support the creation in the United States, Canada and the European nations of the Alliance of a significant community of public and private research teams, start-ups and test centres focused on developing emerging dual-use technologies.

As expressed in the Strategic Concept, the Allies are aware that so-called deep and disruptive technologies bring "both opportunities and risks", that they "alter" the nature of conflicts, that they are becoming increasingly strategically important and that they are "key" in global competition between states. Thus, NATO understands that "technological primacy is increasingly influencing success on the battlefield".

Artificial intelligence, the first priority

What is the package of new future technologies that the Alliance is interested in pursuing? Seven were selected first and now there are ten, the first of which is artificial intelligence. NATO's top brass is concerned about Beijing's significant investment in this new field of technology, so it is not surprising that it is high on the Alliance's list of priorities.

Next in importance are quantum technologies; Big Data and advanced computing; hypersonic technology; bioengineering and human capability enhancement; multiple space applications; novel propulsion systems; new energy sources; innovative materials and manufacturing processes; and autonomous land, naval and airborne vehicles and weapons systems.

What is to be achieved is spelled out in paragraph 24 of the newborn roadmap for the future NATO. It is nothing more than "promoting innovation and increasing investment in emerging and disruptive technologies to maintain our interoperability and military advantage". It seeks to test, evaluate and validate new technologies that address critical defence challenges and contribute to the Alliance's deterrence component.

Among DIANA's objectives is to build and oversee an innovation ecosystem of around 50 test centres to help emerging companies support Alliance technology needs through competitive grant programmes. Specifically, the new NATO roadmap aims to "accelerate our digital transformation, adapt our command structure to the information age and improve our cyber defence, network and infrastructure capabilities".

NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, the Dutchman David van Weel, is aware that "innovation no longer comes from the defence sector as it did until the end of the 20th century". It comes from areas "where we are no longer present, so we have to reconnect". The aim is to strengthen transatlantic cooperation in critical technologies and to make a quantum leap forward with respect to the Science for Peace and Security Programme that the Alliance launched in 1958 and redefined in 2013.

DIANA one site in the UK and one in Canada

More than 20 Allied nations have decided to pool resources and invest around 1 billion euros over the next 15 years in a venture capital fund dedicated to innovation, with grants of up to 200,000 euros. It is this group of nations that has formed the NATO Innovation Fund, the instrument that will feed DIANA with resources.

The purpose of this multi-sovereign fund is to ensure that NATO maintains its technological edge over third countries, namely China and Russia. Each year, some 70 million will be invested in exploring dual-use technologies with direct potential application in defence and security systems, equipment or products.

### Extend: “Status Quo Solves”

#### Status quo NIF and DIANA programs are sufficient — and the U.S. is providing enough support.

Harper 22 — Jon Harper, Managing Editor of *DefenseScoop*—*FedScoop*’s publication covering the Pentagon and military technology, 2022 (“New $1B NATO innovation fund will back wide range of emerging tech,” *FedScoop*, June 30th, Available Online at https://www.fedscoop.com/new-1-billion-nato-innovation-fund-will-back-wide-range-of-emerging-technology/, Accessed 07-04-2022)

NATO leaders on Thursday officially launched a $1 billion innovation fund that will invest in companies working on a slew of dual-use technologies with great military potential.

Billed as the world’s first “multi-sovereign” venture capital fund involving 22 nations, it is intended to make long-term investments in startups and other entities developing emerging technologies that the alliance is interested in including artificial intelligence, autonomy, big-data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement; novel materials; energy; propulsion and space.

“This fund is unique,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said during a signing ceremony at a summit in Madrid where alliance leaders inked a letter of commitment pledging to support the initiative. “With a 15-year timeframe, the NATO Innovation Fund will help bring to life those nascent technologies that have the power to transform our security in the decades to come, strengthening the Alliance’s innovation ecosystem and bolstering the security of our one billion citizens.”

The summit was attended by President Biden, his alliance counterparts and other world leaders.

Together with the new Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), the fund will help the alliance “harness the best new technology for transatlantic security,” Stoltenberg said at a press conference Wednesday. The DIANA initiative will provide innovators access to facilities that they can tap into, including more than 60 test centers across Europe and North America.

DIANA “will support NATO’s efforts to boost interoperability and ensure that every Ally has access to cutting-edge technological solutions for military needs,” according to a White House fact sheet released Wednesday.

The United States will contribute to that initiative by facilitating access to U.S. test centers and other technology “accelerator sites” in the “extensive and diverse U.S. innovation sector,” according to the White House.

During the summit, NATO also unveiled a new Strategic Concept that emphasized the need to adopt emerging technologies to improve the alliance’s defense capabilities.

#### The status quo is sufficient to beat Russia and China.

Gill 22 — Jaspreet Gill, Defense Networks and Emerging Tech Reporter at *Breaking Defense*, 2022 (“NATO leaders establish new €1B innovation fund, accelerator,” *Breaking Defense*, June 30th, Available Online at https://breakingdefense.com/2022/06/nato-leaders-establish-new-e1b-innovation-fund-accelerator/, Accessed 07-03-2022)

NATO leaders this week launched a new innovation fund and defense innovation accelerator initiative in an effort to stay ahead of technological advancements and cyber challenges posed by Russia and China.

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO secretary general, said today during a signing ceremony at the close of the alliance’s Madrid Summit the first-of-its-kind fund will invest €1 billion in startups and deep-tech funds across 22 participating nations over the next 15 years.

“Maintaining our technological edge has helped to keep our alliance strong and our nations safe for more than 70 years. But today, nations that do not share our values, like Russia and China, are challenging that lead in everything from artificial intelligence to space technologies,” he said. “It is essential that we do everything in our power to remain at the forefront of innovation and technology.”

Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom all signed on to the fund.

The fund is meant to work alongside the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), mentioned in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept [PDF], which brings together governments, the private sector and academic [[[academia — fixed presumed typo]]] to bolster its technological edge.

DIANA will support the development of dual-use emerging technologies, including AI and quantum-enabled technologies. During this week’s summit, allied leaders pledged that innovators will be provided access to more than 60 test centers across Europe and North America for DIANA.

DIANA “will support NATO’s efforts to boost interoperability and ensure that every Ally has access to cutting-edge technological solutions for military needs,” according to a June 29 White House fact sheet. “The U.S. will contribute by facilitating access to U.S. entities, such as test centers and accelerator sites, drawn from across the extensive and diverse U.S. innovation sector.”

Also stated in the alliance’s new concept, the first time that document has been updated since 2010, are plans to enhance cybersecurity, an area that is “contested at all times.” The concept warns that a single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities could reach the level of armed attack.

“We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behavior in cyberspace and space,” according to the strategy. “We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we defense for our collective defense and security.”

Leaders this week established a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond to malicious cyber activities. The rapid response cyber capability was built on lessons learned from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the White House stated. To that point, the US “will offer robust national capabilities as part of this support network.”

NATO has also decided on a “strengthened” package of support to Ukraine meant to accelerate the delivery of non-lethal defense equipment, improve its cyber defenses and support modernizing its defense sector, the Madrid summit declaration states.

## Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers

### 1NC — Alliance Fragmentation Advantage Answers

#### 1. Status Quo Solves — the Madrid Summit confirmed closer cooperation between NATO and Asia-Pacific allies.

Legarda 22 — Helena Legarda, Lead Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies—a German think tank, holds an M.P.P. in Public Policy from Harvard University, 2022 (“China and Russia Bring NATO and the Indo-Pacific Together,” *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, July 14th, Available Online at https://ip-quarterly.com/en/china-and-russia-bring-nato-and-indo-pacific-together, Accessed 07-14-2022)

The Indo-Pacific is a long way from Madrid, but at the most recent NATO summit held in the city, it played a very prominent role. The leaders of NATO’s four Indo-Pacific partners—the “Asia-Pacific Four” (AP4) South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—were invited for the first time to attend this decisive summit, where allies endorsed a new Strategic Concept. This roadmap for NATO’s next decade maintains a strong focus on Russia as the most direct threat to the alliance, but it also addresses the “systemic challenges” posed by China, which is a first.

Despite the focus on Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific has now firmly entered the NATO horizon. China’s partnership with Russia, together with Beijing’s decision not to distance itself from Moscow after the invasion, have played a key role in highlighting the linkages between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters. This may lead to an increased presence of individual NATO allies in the Indo-Pacific, in cooperation with regional partners—an outcome that China had sought to prevent.

The China-Russia Factor

All NATO allies share a growing concern about China’s geopolitical rise and power projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the rules-based international order and the global balance of power.

Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs, but it is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe and its periphery. And Beijing’s “strategic partnership” with Russia, reaffirmed even in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, plays a key role in shaping many allies’ threat perceptions. Joint Sino-Russian military exercises in both Europe and East Asia over the last few years have become a particular point of concern for nations in both theaters.

NATO’s role in confronting any security challenges posed by China in the Euro-Atlantic area is evident. But what—if any—the alliance’s role in the Indo-Pacific should be has long been a contentious point.

Some NATO members, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, maintain a regular military presence in the Indo-Pacific, while others do not see the need to deploy to Asia now that Russia has revealed itself as a clear and direct threat to Europe and/or do not have the capabilities. But what seems clear is that the alliance will not operate collectively in the Indo-Pacific any time soon. “There’s no way that NATO will move into the South China Sea,” according to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg.

How, then, does the alliance plan to “stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation” in the face of China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies”, especially in the Indo-Pacific?

Enter the Global Partners

The answer is more about a global approach than a global presence. And cooperation with NATO’s global partners in the Indo-Pacific region is a central piece of the puzzle.

The presence of the “Asia-Pacific Four” in Madrid is a step toward this goal. It is also a clear sign that NATO allies and their Indo-Pacific partners share the concerns over Russia and China’s behavior on the international stage.

While the security challenges that NATO allies face today are quite different from those that partners in the Indo-Pacific must confront, there seems to be a realization on both sides that closer cooperation is the only way to effectively protect the rules-based international order. Asian partners have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and have imposed sanctions on Moscow in response. And in return, they seek to secure NATO (including European) support for any potential conflicts in Asia. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida put it most plainly in Madrid, “I feel a strong sense of crisis that Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow.”

Despite fears that the Western sanctions policy is bringing China and Russia closer together, the fact is that Sino-Russian alignment is also unifying NATO and moving Euro-Atlantic countries closer together with their allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Unintentionally, Beijing and Moscow have managed to draw the linkages between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security that they had long fought against.

#### 2. Alliance Fragmentation Inevitable — differing threat perceptions and competing national interests prevent closer NATO-Pacific alignment.

Legarda 22 — Helena Legarda, Lead Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies—a German think tank, holds an M.P.P. in Public Policy from Harvard University, 2022 (“China and Russia Bring NATO and the Indo-Pacific Together,” *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, July 14th, Available Online at https://ip-quarterly.com/en/china-and-russia-bring-nato-and-indo-pacific-together, Accessed 07-14-2022)

Mind the Divergences

Despite this show of unity in Madrid, however, the newly forged alignment on China among NATO allies and with global partners should not be overstated. There may now be a common threat perception, but when it comes to responses, there is a wide diversity of views and approaches.

Within Europe, the perspective that systemic rivalry should be the dominant framework through which relations with China are viewed is not fully shared. And the US view of China as the “pacing threat” has many opponents within NATO, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, for whom Russia is instead the main challenge. Others, like Germany and France, have pushed back against attempts to lump together Russia and China (something Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ foreign policy advisor Jens Plötner warned against publicly), and to consider them as equal threats.

Divergences also exist among NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners, who have very different foreign policies and views of China, as well as their own unique interests in pursuing greater coordination with NATO. Australia and Japan, both members of the Quad (the others are the United States and India), are the most closely aligned with Washington when it comes to relations with China, although they have both emphasized the need to maintain stable ties with Beijing.

Attempts by the Chinese leadership to bring about a thaw in relations with Australia after the election of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese seem to be going nowhere, however, as Canberra has signaled a continuation of the previous government’s tough stance on China. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s delivery of a list of demands to rebuild the relationship—which included “regarding China as a partner rather than a rival” and “not targeting any third party or being controlled by any third party” (a clear reference to the US)—drew an immediate response from Albanese who bluntly stated, “Australia doesn't respond to demands.”

And in Japan, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has taken a harder stance on China’s activities in the region and continues to invest in Japan’s alliance with the US (which he has called the “cornerstone” of Japan’s security policy) in order to increase deterrence against China.

But while these two Quad members are seen in Beijing as being firmly on the US camp, New Zealand and South Korea are a different story. Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s government has indicated that New Zealand has no intention of joining any coalition targeting China. And the country’s close economic ties with China, alongside a longstanding principle of maintaining an independent foreign policy, are likely to constrain any potential shifts on China policy.

South Korea, meanwhile, sees China as less of a priority than North Korea and its nuclear program or the protection of its economic security. Newly elected President Yoon Suk-yeol has articulated a vision for his country as a “global pivotal state” that will pursue a values-based foreign policy, and he has announced that South Korea will launch its own Indo-Pacific strategy by the end of this year. But while Seoul is talking the talk, South Korea’s "pragmatic" approach to relations with Beijing, which seeks to avoid antagonizing China to prevent economic retaliation, runs deep. Besides, the role of South Korea-Japan tensions can’t be underestimated: close cooperation on China between Seoul and Tokyo still seems out of reach.

The Way Ahead

Full alignment on approaches to China (or Russia) within NATO and with the alliance’s Indo-Pacific partners is highly unrealistic. Not all countries see China as an equally pressing challenge. And even among those that do, the policy prescriptions vary, ranging from close alignment with the US as a deterrent against Chinese aggression, to attempts to maintain good relations with Beijing in the hope of shaping its actions and encouraging China to behave more responsibly.

#### 3. Euro-Pacific Alignment Not Key To Counter China — Asian partners are sufficient, Europe’s military won’t help, and Europe is bogged down with Russia.

Bekkevold 22 — Jo Inge Bekkevold, Senior China Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, former Political Officer and Minister Counsellor at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022 (“NATO’s New Division of Labor on Russia and China Won’t Be Easy,” *Foreign Policy*, July 11th, Available Online at https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/11/nato-strategy-china-russia-threat-europe-asia-geopolitics/, Accessed 07-15-2022)

Nonetheless, even though the new Strategic Concept sends a strong signal of trans-Atlantic unity, it is too early to conclude that it enables a joint and well-coordinated U.S.-European approach on China. The reason for caution is geography. The U.S.-China rivalry presents NATO with a different challenge than the U.S.-Soviet one. During the Cold War, from its pivotal position in the Eurasian heartland, the Soviet Union constituted a threat to the entire Eurasian rim, from Europe all the way to the Far East, and it was a two-flank challenge to the United States. Europe was the core area of the Cold War strategic theater, and this consolidated not only a united threat perception among the United States and its European allies but also a common military strategy. China’s geographic position, on the other hand, does not preordain trans-Atlantic unity in a similar way.

Moving from strategy to policy implementing the Strategic Concept, the United States and European NATO members will find that the geopolitical logic of U.S.-China rivalry will shape a new, and not always easy, trans-Atlantic division of labor in three major ways.

First, from its geographic position on the Asian rim facing the Pacific Ocean, China represents a one-flank challenge to the United States. U.S. balancing of China will thus be largely regional, focusing on the Indo-Pacific with a lower priority for the trans-Atlantic flank. In fact, the new U.S. National Defense Strategy presented in March—after the Russian invasion of Ukraine had already started—clearly states that priority will be given to deter the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific. One important outcome of the war in Ukraine—and the consolidation of the European side of NATO with Finland and Sweden as new members—is a more balanced burden-sharing within NATO, which allows the United States to channel more resources to Asia over the long term. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the debate had increasingly shifted toward putting Europe in a position to defend itself. With Germany and other European countries committing to greater defense expenditures in the wake of Russia’s war, European defenses will indeed be bolstered.

Secondly, balancing China in the Indo-Pacific theater will require the United States to lean more on Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members and other Asian partners than on NATO. In recent years, the larger European nations have eagerly deployed naval vessels to sail in Asian waters, though some of these deployments have been little more than symbolic. NATO is strengthening relations with its formal Asia-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand—with an agreement to step up cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, other new technologies, and countering disinformation. Nevertheless, it is still nebulous how exactly European militaries will add value to U.S. balancing efforts in Asia. European navies have been in constant decline since the end of the Cold War, whereas the Chinese navy has surpassed its U.S. counterpart in terms of number of vessels. China is now building the equivalent of the entire French Navy every four years. Elbridge Colby, co-founder of the Marathon Initiative, has suggested that it might serve the United States better to have Europe play to its strengths in the Euro-Atlantic area, an opinion echoed by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin. Commenting on the British deployment of its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, to the Indo-Pacific region in 2021, Austin indicated that Britain is more helpful closer to home than in Asia.

Finally, due to its limited geographic reach across Eurasia, China will remain a lesser threat to European security than Russia. With Russia an openly belligerent threat for the foreseeable future, European resources will be pinned down at home, impeding the implementation of a joint trans-Atlantic approach in the Far East. For instance, NATO plans to increase the strength of its rapid reaction force dedicated to the defense of its Eastern European members nearly eightfold to 300,000 troops. Even though U.S. armed forces will remain engaged in Europe, the bulk of NATO’s increased presence along its Eastern European frontier will have to be provided by European countries. And the security challenges in Europe’s own neighborhood are by no means limited to Russia. At a time when the United States is increasingly preoccupied in Asia, Europe faces crumbling stability in the Middle East, North Africa and other regions directly affecting Europe, not least through potential migration and refugee crises.

### Extend: “Status Quo Solves”

#### The new Strategic Concept established a framework for closer cooperation.

Legarda 22 — Helena Legarda, Lead Analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies—a German think tank, holds an M.P.P. in Public Policy from Harvard University, 2022 (“China and Russia Bring NATO and the Indo-Pacific Together,” *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, July 14th, Available Online at https://ip-quarterly.com/en/china-and-russia-bring-nato-and-indo-pacific-together, Accessed 07-14-2022)

The upswing in engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, alongside NATO’s inclusion of the European Union as a “unique and essential partner” in its Strategic Concept, however, will create new opportunities and formats for cooperation and coordination across regions and institutions.

It is important, however, to distinguish between NATO’s potential collective involvement in the Indo-Pacific and that of its member states. While the former remains exceedingly unlikely (in spite of Beijing’s claims), individual allies may leverage the alliance’s growing engagement with its global partners to step up their own presence in the region.

Beijing has sought to discourage European countries and other NATO members from becoming more involved in the region, cautioning them against doing anything that could “harm regional peace and stability” and warning of consequences. We should expect a harsh response from Beijing as it adapts to new dynamics of cooperation between NATO members and their regional partners.

#### The Biden admin is already strongly committed to Euro-Pacific alliance coordination — status quo initiatives solve.

Mohan 22 — Garima Mohan, Senior Fellow in the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, former Acting Team Leader and Coordinator at the Asia-Pacific Research and Advice Network of the European Union, former Head of the Global Orders Program at the Global Public Policy Institute (Germany), holds a Ph.D. from the Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies at Freie Universität Berlin (Germany), 2022 (“The New US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Implications for Europe,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, February 17th, Available Online at https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-us-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-implications-europe, Accessed 07-15-2022)

The Biden administration’s long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy, published on February 11, confirms what became evident in its first year—a clear shift of focus to the region and a push to strengthen the collective capacities of US partners and allies there. Coming almost five months after the announcement of the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that rattled most European countries, the strategy shows a clear effort to acknowledge the value an “engaged Europe” could bring to the Indo-Pacific.

The document builds on the engagement of previous US administrations with Asia and reflects a broad bipartisan consensus on the importance of the Indo-Pacific as “vital for the security and prosperity” of the United States. The goal is to work toward a free, open, connected, secure, and resilient region by anchoring the United States more firmly in it.

The strategy states clearly that a key driver of US engagement in the Indo-Pacific is China’s behavior. It asserts that the region faces “mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC.” It refers to China’s use of economic, diplomatic, military, and technological instruments as it pursues a “sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific,” often through coercion and aggression. The strategy mentions economic coercion against Australia, the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India, growing pressure on Taiwan, and tensions in the East and South China Seas. Therefore, the US goal in the Indo-Pacific is not just to compete with China, but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates by building a “balance of influence.”

Network of Partnerships

The Biden administration’s strategy argues that “investing at home” and “aligning approaches with allies and partners” will allow the United States to compete most effectively with China. Given the changing strategic landscape and the scale and scope of the challenges faced by the Indo-Pacific, any US response will need to leverage partnerships in the region. The strategy underlines that this is not just about US-China competition or a unilateral US role in the region. In fact, the United States’ partners and allies “bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behavior,” and they have stakes and agency in how the region is shaped.

The strategy therefore details how the US vision aligns with the Indo-Pacific strategies of its most important partners, including Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In a nod to the EU’s recently released Indo-Pacific strategy, the US document also notes that, “like France,” the United States recognizes the “strategic value of an increasing regional role for the European Union.”

The United States will focus on building “collective capacity” to deal with challenges in the region and on fostering interaction among partners, including between Asia and Europe. This would mean strengthening existing alliances, including with the likes Japan and South Korea, investing in regional organizations, and building up the “latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions, including the Quad” of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. The utility of coalitions like the Quad, which allow different countries to pool resources in a flexible manner, is central to US strategy in the region, as is investing in the bilateral partnership with “a strong India.”

Bridging the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic

A lot of the points made in the Biden administration’s strategy will not come as a surprise to observers of US policy in the Indo-Pacific. What is new is a clear articulation of how the United States wants to work with partners outside the region, particularly Europe. One of the goals in the strategy is “building bridges between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic.” As the current Russia-Ukraine crisis shows, this will not be an easy task. It has led some to question how the United States’ focus on the Indo-Pacific can be sustained. The crisis has also highlighted the challenge of dealing with an assertive Russia and an assertive China at the same time. At least in the short term, the United States will need to be a reliable partner in Asia and Europe simultaneously, including by finding ways to link its partners there more closely. Japan’s decision to share surplus natural gas with Europe in the wake of the crisis is just one example of how crucial such links are.

The new US Indo-Pacific strategy contains the beginning of this bridge-building. It not only stresses the importance of European engagement in the region but also encourages more interaction among its Asian and European partners. The good news for Washington is that Europe has already started shifting its regional focus away from China toward partners like ASEAN, India, and Japan. Many in Europe have come to understand the importance of flexible coalitions, which the Biden administration has been emphasizing. Countries like France and Italy have instituted trilateral dialogues with the likes of Australia, India, and Japan. The upcoming Indo-Pacific ministerial forum in Paris will be a major step in sharpening the EU’s strategy in the region and will see the announcement of concrete projects it will undertake there. While the United States was not invited, its most important regional partners and allies will participate. The inclusion of Australia in particular is an important step in healing the rift caused by AUKUS.

The priorities in the US and EU Indo-Pacific strategies also overlap. For example, the United States aims at promoting high-standards infrastructure and regional connectivity, and the EU, with its Global Gateway plan, is an obvious partner with resources and capacities to bring to the region. The EU and the United States also focus on critical and emerging technologies as well as “values-aligned technology standards.” In the security sphere, the US strategy includes civilian security challenges as well as building maritime capacity and domain awareness, which are also the key thrust of most European security engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The new US strategy’s call for “managing competition with China responsibly” while offering a positive vision for the region will also strike a chord in many European countries, which have taken a cautious approach toward China.

The United States and the EU have already instituted an Indo-Pacific dialogue to further explore these convergences. The bigger challenge is to stitch together different conversations currently held in various formats—from the Quad to the EU-US Trade and Technology Council—to drive outcomes, offer public goods and alternatives, and avoid duplicating efforts in the region.

#### Indo-Pacific cooperation with NATO strong now — summit proves

Galic 22 — Mirna Galic, senior policy analyst for China and East Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace, fellow of Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, served as a special advisor in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations, 2022 (“Despite Ukraine Focus, Asia-Pacific to Play Prominent Role at NATO Summit,” United States Institute of Peace, June 27th, Available Online at https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/06/despite-ukraine-focus-asia-pacific-play-prominent-role-nato-summit)

Why are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea being invited to the NATO summit at the highest level?

NATO’s endeavor to include its Asia-Pacific partners in the Madrid Summit is part of a larger effort in recent years to streamline these partners into NATO’s structures and functions. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea have been formal partners of NATO since the early 2010s, part of a slate of “partners across the globe,” but they are seen as an increasingly important subset of NATO’s global partners. There is even an informal nickname for these countries, the Asia-Pacific Four or AP4. There are several key reasons for NATO’s special interest in these partner countries.

First is the character of the countries themselves. All four are established democracies that share values with NATO allies, are interested in mitigating international security threats, and have sophisticated and capable militaries. Australia, Japan and South Korea are also U.S. treaty allies, while New Zealand is a close U.S. partner. There are a number of areas where cooperation and coordination between NATO and the Asia-Pacific partners is mutually beneficial, including emerging and disruptive technologies, disinformation, cyber security, maritime security, the rules-based international order and space.

Second is the growing importance of these partner countries’ broader region, the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific is one of the most dynamic regions in the world, and is expected to be the driver of global economic and technological growth in the decades to come. It is also home to a great power, China, and this takes on added importance as strategic competition between the United States, Russia and China becomes increasingly relevant on the international stage. The significance of the Indo-Pacific region and its impact on global affairs is increasingly realized not only in the United States, but also in Europe.

Third, and relatedly, is the benefit to NATO of having interoperability, coordination and information sharing with countries embedded in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as the messaging and optics on unity this provides. The Asia-Pacific partner countries have a long history of living with China, balancing economic and security imperatives, pushing back on violations of international law, deterring, and dealing with coercive measures, all of which is immensely valuable insight for European partners. Their intelligence and analysis regarding what is happening in the region is likewise of great interest.

Perhaps most importantly, with the reemergence of great power conflict, a strategic competitor sitting in each region, and an evolving Russia-China relationship, there are many common strategic challenges that European and Asia-Pacific partners are having to adapt to that would be valuable for them to discuss together. These include, among others, intermediate-range nuclear forces, missile defense, inter-theater deterrence and defense, and how to push back on great power use of force in contravention of international norms. The last is certainly relevant to the Russian invasion of Ukraine but also has parallels with China and Taiwan, which is why Ukraine is seen as more than a European security issue.

Why do the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, in turn, want to attend the NATO summit?

For many of the same reasons that NATO wants them to be there, not least of all the need to adapt to common strategic challenges related to changes in the international system. Just as NATO sees benefits to engaging with partners in the Asia-Pacific on security issues, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea see a value to engaging with European partners. NATO gives them a convenient platform from which to do that. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also given many of these countries a sense of vulnerability that European security dynamics have not engendered in far-flung regions since the Cold War. There is a clear cognizance that how the world reacts to Russia’s use of force against Ukraine will inform China’s calculations in the region, including on Taiwan. Attending a NATO summit that will heavily address Russia and Ukraine is a way to project unity and to manage the lessons that China is learning from Russia’s actions and the international response to them.

#### Indo-pacific relations strong — recent summit and mutual interests prove

Inagaki et al 22 — Kana Inagaki, Tokyo bureau chief at the Financial Times, covered tech in Tokyo for The Wall Street Journal, covered the foreign exchange and stock markets as a business reporter for Kyodo News, Nic Fildes, Australia & Pacific Correspondent at the Financial Times, former technologies and communications editor at The Times, Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S-China correspondent at the Financial Times, served as Washington Bureau Chief, 2022 (“China’s rise pushes Asia-Pacific nations to embrace Nato,” *Financial Times*, July 2nd, Available Online at https://www.ft.com/content/497f116b-4c03-4d19-a5b1-da4490c183bb)

One US official said Washington had pushed for Japan and the other three nations to attend Nato as part of a strategy by President Joe Biden’s administration of building and expanding coalitions of like-minded allies to counter China.

The US official said Japan wanted to expand and diversify its security ties as an insurance policy to protect itself from China in case the 2024 US election produced a president who was weaker on the alliance with Tokyo. “Japan is trying to build capacity outside of its relationship with the US,” he said.

Christopher Johnstone, a Japan expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US think-tank, said Kishida in particular felt a keen sense of threat because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and wanted Europe and Nato to be more attuned to the challenge from China.

Kishida had also encouraged British and German naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific over the past year, said Johnstone, who until recently was in charge of Japan policy at the National Security Council. “It fits a larger pattern of diversifying relations,” he said.

At the Madrid summit, Anthony Albanese, who was elected prime minister of Australia in May, dismissed accusations that Nato and its partners had constructed an “imaginary foe” in the form of China.

Albanese pointed to Beijing’s “no limits” partnership with Russia and its refusal to condemn the invasion of Ukraine. “China must look at what is happening and look at the resolve that is there from throughout the world and should be condemning Russia’s actions,” he said.

South Korea’s president Yoon Suk-Yeol, who made his international debut at the summit, pledged his country would play a bigger security role. “The co-operative relationship between South Korea and Nato will become a cornerstone for solidarity,” Yoon said.

On the summit sidelines, Yoon met Kishida and Biden for the countries’ first trilateral meeting in nearly five years. The South Korean leader used the occasion to signal willingness to repair ties with Japan that have been badly strained by disputes over historical issues and trade.

Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerns about how to contain China’s military ambitions had prompted a flurry of collective security arrangements in Asia. These include the Quad, which includes the US, Japan, Australia and India, and the Aukus pact, under which the UK and the US will help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines.

Those multilateral security networks and existing bilateral defence pacts have also been complemented by regional economic initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, unveiled recently by Biden.

### Extend: “Alliance Fragmentation Inevitable”

#### Closer Euro-Pacific alignment is impossible because of divergent security concerns.

Fraser 22 — Dominique Fraser, Research Associate at the Asia Society Policy Institute, former Researcher at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland (Australia), holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Switzerland), 2022 (“An Alignment with Limits: NATO and its Partners in the Indo-Pacific,” Asia Society, July 7th, Available Online at https://asiasociety.org/australia/alignment-limits-nato-and-its-partners-indo-pacific, Accessed 07-15-2022)

Last week’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit was a landmark event in trans-Atlantic relations, positioning Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to European security and agreeing to NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, a previously almost unthinkable outcome.

But the Summit was also significant for the Indo-Pacific: the Alliance officially designated China as a “systemic challenge” and, for the first time, all four NATO partners from the Indo-Pacific attended: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea.

NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners agree that we live in “a more dangerous and unpredictable world”, in the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Most have already announced increases to their defence budgets. Particularly noteworthy are Japan, which plans to double its defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP, which would make it the world’s third largest; and Germany, which has dedicated a special fund of EUR 100 billion (AUD 151.6 billion) to its armed forces. A significant sum considering its annual defence budget is just half that.

The fact that these two aggressor-cum-pacifist states are rearming shows just how different the world today is, even compared to a decade ago.

In 2010, NATO’s Strategic Concept, which lays out how the Alliance collectively assesses security challenges, China didn’t warrant even a passing reference. Cooperation with Russia was considered of “strategic importance”. It wasn’t until 2019 that NATO first mentioned China. Then, the Alliance spoke of the “opportunities and challenges” presented by China’s growing influence. Just two years later, the word “opportunities” had been dropped.

It might be tempting to see this change as solely influenced by the United States, which has identified China as “the most serious long-term challenge to the international order”. In reality, China only has itself to blame for “losing” Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine immediately following China’s declaration of a “no limits” friendship with Russia deeply worries Europe, as does China’s continued diplomatic support of Russia.

But a cooling of relations has been evident for some time. The EU has long been concerned about China’s abysmal human rights record, is dissatisfied with Hong Kong’s “authoritarian turn”, has rallied against what it describes as China’s “discriminatory trade practices”, and has been angered over counter-sanctions applied to some its Parliamentarians, which froze the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

NATO members and their Indo-Pacific partners thus increasingly agree on where threats to the global order come from. In this year’s Strategic Concept, NATO warns that China’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge [NATO’s] interests, security and values”.

Still, while the strategic convergence across many in the Euro-Atlantic and its Indo-Pacific partners is here to stay, we should not confuse it with complete overlap.

Japan and Germany are both increasing their defence budgets, but they do so with different adversaries in mind. While NATO is keeping an eye on China, Stoltenberg has made clear the Alliance does not see it as an adversary for the defence pact. China is mainly seen through a Russia lens, with NATO taking aim at their “deepening strategic partnership”.

The reverse is also true. While they are rallying behind Ukraine to defend international norms, NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners are sharply focused on the possible precedent Russia’s brutal invasion might set in Asia (though New Zealand resists this characterisation). Japan has been a strong supporter of Ukraine, warning that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow”. Australia has proudly proclaimed to be Ukraine’s largest non-NATO supporter, cautioning China to take lessons from Russia’s pariah status.

Beyond NATO, the European Union views China as a “systemic rival” and economic competitor, but the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy is less about balancing China’s power in the region and more about amplifying EU engagement with, and influence in, Asia.

Nor, despite growing concern about China, is there consensus across EU member states on how best to meet the challenge. While some, like Hungary and Greece, are still seeking closer economic cooperation while keeping the security dimension separate, others, like Sweden and Lithuania, are increasingly looking to limit Chinese presence and influence, seeing the relationship through a security lens.

These differences were on display during the negotiations for the Strategic Concept. The United Kingdom pressed for a more forceful tone on China alongside the United States, while France and Germany, where for some the idea of Wandel Durch Handel (change through trade) remains alive and where China plays an important role in the vital car industry, wanted to tone down language.

In the end, NATO not only included a reference to the China “challenge”, but also noted that it hoped for “constructive engagement” on building transparency. Only time will tell whether this is realistic or will seem just as outdated, if not naïve, as the idea of NATO cooperation with Russia appears today.

For NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners, including Australia, a united Euro-Atlantic and willingness to push back against the China-Russia entente is positive. So too is greater European engagement in Asia. Even so, the task of building a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, or what Australia’s new Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, calls a “strategic equilibrium”, largely will remain the work of the United States and its close Indo-Pacific partners.

#### Multiple barriers within NATO *and* with Asian allies prevent closer strategic alignment.

Galic 21 — Mirna Galic, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Asia Security Initiative and the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at The Atlantic Council, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Department of State, holds an M.P.A. in International Relations from Princeton University, 2021 (“Opportunity knocks for NATO and its partners in the Asia-Pacific,” The Atlantic Council, March 26th, Available Online at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/opportunity-knocks-for-nato-and-its-partners-in-the-asia-pacific/, Accessed 07-14-2022)

NATO’s Asia-Pacific partner countries—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea—are easily among the Alliance’s most undervalued assets. All four are established democracies that share NATO’s values and have contributed to NATO initiatives. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia are also US treaty partners and boast some of the world’s most sophisticated militaries—outmatching those of the vast majority of NATO allies—according to global military rankings. Although NATO and these partners have developed their relations over the past two decades, various constraints have limited the ambition and potential of these relationships. A recent report from a group of experts, charged by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with identifying ways to strengthen the Alliance for the future, could lead to a change in this status quo.

The report calls on NATO to devote increased attention and resources to the security challenges posed by China—a relatively new focus for the Alliance—in part through deepened consultation and cooperation with its Asia-Pacific partner countries. Engagement between NATO and these partners on China is certainly important, but the increased attention paid in this context toward the Asia-Pacific partners also serves as an opportunity for both NATO and these countries to assess—and where possible address—the constraints that have thus far limited their relations. Doing so would enable NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners to maximize the potential of these partnerships going forward—both in regard to China and more broadly.

The constraints from NATO’s side include its partnership program, which poses particular challenges for the Asia-Pacific partners. These partners belong to a catch-all “Global Partners” designation created for countries falling outside of NATO’s formalized, regionally based partnership categories: Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. NATO has not made space for meaningfully engaging Global Partners in the partnership activities that it offers, which are geared toward the needs and interests of the countries in these formalized partnership categories. Most partnership activities are also held in Europe, limiting their accessibility to countries in the Asia-Pacific. Increasing resources for NATO’s partnership program, as recommended in the expert-group report, could help with these problems, but first the problems must be recognized and solutions to address them prioritized.

NATO military exercises present a similar issue; although many are open to Global Partners, they are also largely held in Europe. Expanding formal NATO military exercises to other geographic areas more readily accessible to Asia-Pacific partners—like the Indian Ocean—would require endorsement by the NATO Military Committee and approval by the North Atlantic Council. Such hurdles have thus far been too high for an organization whose decisions are made on the basis of consensus among thirty countries. A less formal option, such as a smaller, ally-led exercise under a NATO flag, would still require Military Committee approval but presents a somewhat lower bar to entry. More feasible still may be sending NATO observers to exercises held by Asia-Pacific partners. Such an option may provide a useful starting point from which to build momentum for addressing the accessibility aspect of military exercises more thoroughly.

The hurdle of consensus for military exercises highlights a deeper problem for relations between NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners. Despite NATO’s outreach to and articulated support for these partners, and despite general acknowledgement of the significance of the broader region in which they are located, there has been no agreement among allies on the priority of the Asia-Pacific Global Partners for NATO. That’s the case even though these countries make up the largest regional group within the Global Partners category. NATO allies have been split on their level of ambition vis-à-vis the Global Partners writ large since the category emerged, with divisions breaking along intra-Alliance fault lines between more globally oriented allies, like the United States, and those favoring NATO’s traditional transatlantic character, like France. Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, which underscored the continued importance of European territorial defense, added to the divisions among allies regarding Global Partners. If the emphasis on Asia-Pacific partner countries in the expert-group report is to find fertile ground rather than bumping up against these obstacles, it may be necessary to lay additional political groundwork within NATO.

The lack of consensus within NATO on the Asia-Pacific partners has also hampered the Alliance’s ability to craft a strategic approach to these partnerships, resulting in a largely tactical one instead. NATO has established the administrative and political frameworks necessary to formalize its “bilateral” relationship with each of the Asia-Pacific partners, including by finalizing Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme agreements, approving national staff contributions to NATO headquarters and satellite installations, and facilitating exchanges of visits between high-level officials. The Alliance and its Asia-Pacific partners have also undertaken operational cooperation on issues like piracy and the war in Afghanistan. NATO has made uneven progress, however, in deepening and further developing the potential of its individual relationships with these countries, which have progressed largely on an ad-hoc basis. The Alliance has also lacked a strategy for harnessing the potential of the Asia-Pacific partners as a group, instead favoring a hub-and-spokes approach.

NATO is not alone in these shortcomings; the Asia-Pacific partners all have various individual constraints on their relations with NATO. In a recent paper for the Japan Institute of International Affairs, I discuss examples from Japan-NATO relations. Although further research on the other partners is warranted, some of the basic issues facing Japan—personnel shortages, competing priorities, and only a nascent strategic vision for relations with NATO—are mirrored in other Asia-Pacific partner countries. The Asia-Pacific partners have also failed to take adequate advantage of coordination with one another as a tool for advocacy with NATO. Such coordination could amplify a regional voice in NATO and be a more effective method of championing issues and activities relevant to the region than the efforts of any single country. The partners, however, would first need to determine jointly any shared goals and interests regarding NATO, as well as potential areas of contention.

#### E.U won’t follow on because of strategic autonomy

Binnendijk 22 — Hans Binnendijk, distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, former Vice President for Research at the National Defense University at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, Daniel S. Hamilton, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe, served as executive director of the American Consortium on European Union Studies, Alexander Vershbow, former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, former U.S ambassador to Russia, 2022 (“Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense,” Brookings Institute, June 24th, Available Online at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/)

The term “strategic autonomy,” popular in some European circles and anathema in others, stems originally from an earlier discourse within the French strategic community to describe France’s ambition to boost its military capabilities and reduce its dependencies so that it could act alone if necessary to protect French interests, beginning with crisis management operations in Africa and along Europe’s southern periphery. Of course, the European Union (EU) has been trying to develop its capacity for military action for some decades. Yet it was only in 2016 that the “strategic autonomy” term was lifted to the EU level, with the publication of the bloc’s Global Strategy. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not define the notion’s content or its implications.[2]

In the years that followed, the term gained traction in some EU countries as concerns in Europe mounted about U.S. reliability as an ally under President Donald Trump, China’s rising technological and norm-setting challenges, and signs that the EU could be trampled as the American and Chinese elephants collided. Debate was further energized by signs of faltering European technological prowess, and especially by the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed European dependencies across a number of health-related sectors.

Over time, the term began to assume a far more expansive meaning. European concerns have spawned a raft of related phrases, such as “European sovereignty,” “economic sovereignty,” “health sovereignty,” “technological sovereignty,” “data sovereignty,” “cybersecurity sovereignty,” even “digital strategic autonomy.” The result, as one European observer noted, is a “muddle of words.”

European commentators and leaders cloud things further by interpreting these assorted phrases very differently, according to their diverse strategic cultures, threat perceptions, and calculations of self-interest.

Taken together, however, this jumble conveys a shared and deeply-felt anxiety among many Europeans that their grand experiment of integration is being imperiled by internal weaknesses and external forces. In all of its forms, the autonomy narrative is meant to generate EU-wide consensus behind ambitious and often-costly initiatives to bolster the bloc’s technological, industrial, and norm-setting capabilities in ways that their proponents believe can preserve European competitiveness, lower strategic dependencies, raise the EU’s ability to resist geopolitical or geoeconomic coercion, and give it more freedom to maneuver and shape its environment.

### Extend: “Euro-Pacific Alignment Not Key”

#### European allies can’t help the U.S. counter China.

Bandow 22 — Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, former Special Assistant to President Reagan, holds a J.D. from Stanford University, 2022 (“Great Power folly? NATO’s ill-timed turn to China,” *Responsible Statecraft*, July 5th, Available Online at https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/07/05/great-power-folly-natos-ill-timed-turn-to-china/, Accessed 07-15-2022)

So what does NATO plan on doing in the Asia-Pacific? If European alliance members still are not serious about their defense from Moscow, they aren’t likely to confront an even more formidable power thousands of miles away, one with which many of them have significant economic ties.

They do know the talk, however. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept released in Madrid devoted two paragraphs to China. The first complained that the PRC’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” China was accused of conducting “malicious hybrid and cyber operations,” seeking “to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains, using “its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence,” and subverting “the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.”

Moreover, “the deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.”

The second paragraph detailed NATO’s response to Beijing’s activities. Although open “to constructive engagement,” members stated that they “will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defense and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules based international order, including freedom of navigation.”

Nowhere did the 11-page statement explain how NATO would achieve these objectives after members’ awareness was suitably boosted. No action steps were included. The political leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea attended, but received no promises of practical military support if conflict erupted with China. Indeed, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol rushed to assure the PRC that the summit was “not about excluding a certain country.”

Nevertheless, NATO’s Pacific diversion did get Beijing’s attention. And China’s response was sharp: “Nato’s so-called Strategic Concept, filled with cold war thinking and ideological bias, is maliciously attacking and smearing China. We firmly oppose it.” The PRC went on to warn: “When it comes to acts that undermine China’s interests, we will make firm and strong responses.”

Beijing needn’t worry. Other than the United States, only France and the United Kingdom can credibly claim to have some combat capability in the region. Efforts by other members to exhibit military reach have been pathetic, enough to irritate China, but little more. What European government is going to invest substantially in its navy and create an expeditionary army, with airpower to match, to fight the PRC, when further investments are desperately needed in Europe?

Again, consider the state of the UK military, one of Europe’s best. Reported the Times of London: “The most likely war British soldiers face now is in Estonia, a 24-hour, 1,500-mile journey. Our ability to move large quantities of equipment and supplies across such distances is untested even in peacetime. When our conventional munitions run out, only the overstretched Americans, or nuclear weapons, stand between us and defeat. If Russia can survive the first week, it wins.”

And the UK plans to take on the PRC too?

Asian and European democracies can cooperate against China in important areas: promoting human rights, deterring cyber-attacks, diversifying supply chains, addressing trade abuses, and rebuffing economic coercion. Although the Strategic Concept mentions enhancing NATO-European Union cooperation to address “the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security,” European governments and the EU, not NATO, should be the starting point on these issues for friendly Asian states.

The transatlantic alliance should focus on expanding Europeans’ capacity to defend themselves from Russia. If they ever complete that process, then they could add Beijing to their potential adversary list. Until then they should stop pretending to be Asia-Pacific powers.